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Confucian traditions are often regarded in purely historical terms. Having been 
transmitted and transformed over nearly two and a half millennia, this focus 
on history is well-justified. But Confucian traditions are by no means solely of 
historical interest and significance.
In the last quarter century, amid remarkable advances in science and tech-
nology that have dramatically transformed practices in virtually every domain 
of human endeavor, recognition has dawned that human activity is capable 
of adversely affecting planetary-scale phenomena such as climate and that the 
greatest challenges we will face in the coming decades will not be technical but 
ethical. We now know that human beings and our ways of being in the world 
are complicit in the predicaments we are facing—among them global warming; 
the persistence of hunger in a world of food excesses; widening gaps of wealth, 
income, resource use, and risk; and the increasingly intimate interdependence 
of economic and political vitality and volatility. Secondly, we know that these 
predicaments are not constrained by national or social boundaries. Pandemics 
and global warming have global reach and affect everyone regardless of nation-
ality or status. Thirdly, an organic relationship obtains among this set of press-
ing challenges that renders them zero-sum: We either address them all or we 
can resolve none of them. In short, these challenges cannot be met seriatim by 
individual players but must be addressed instead by a world community acting 
in concert. Finally, the predicaments with which we find ourselves ever more 
powerfully confronted can only be addressed by effecting a radical change in 
human intentions, values, and practices.
When we look for cultural resources that will enhance capabilities for 
resolving these global predicaments, primary among them are values and prac-
tices that will support replacing the familiar competitive pattern of single 
actors pursing their own self-interest with a collaborative pattern of players 
strengthening possibilities for coordination across national, ethnic, and reli-
gious boundaries. And it is in this context that Confucian traditions assume 
distinctive contemporary relevance. As is now widely appreciated, Confucian 
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cultures celebrate the relational values of deference and interdependence and 
understand persons as constitutively embedded in and nurtured by unique 
transactional patterns of relations. This series is committed to exploring how 
and to what extent contemporary Confucian ethics that locate moral conduct 
within a thick and richly textured pattern of family, community, and natural 
relations may be a force for challenging and changing the international order. 
At the same time, the series is committed to raising critical questions retrospec-
tively about the contributions and failings of Confucianism in its long history 
as a pan-Asian phenomenon, as well as prospectively about the globalization of 
Confucian values in response to contemporary global dynamics.
A key element in our Confucian Cultures series is the translation of sem-
inal works in Confucian cultures from Asian language sources. While Asian 
scholars continue to translate much of contemporary Western scholarship into 
Asian languages, including Western commentaries on their own cultures, the 
opposite has not been true. Translations of the best Asian scholarly literature 
into English remain rare.
But the scope of the series is not limited to promoting literacy on Con-
fucian cultures as understood within those cultures themselves. An essen-
tial parallel element in the series will be critical research on Confucianism by 
scholars outside of these Asian traditions. Moreover, the series is committed 
to approaching Confucian traditions in a manner that respects the diversity of 
those traditions, and will welcome scholarship that looks at Confucian cultures 
through a range of disciplinary lenses, including literary, anthropological, and 
historical perspectives, and those that are philosophical and religious. Finally, 
the series is committed to publishing works that explicitly place Confucian 
thought and cultures in conversation with other traditions. This, we hope, will 
contribute to the collaborative realization of a more just, equitable, and harmo-
nious global future.
In this inaugural volume in the series, Lee Ming-huei offers an interpreta-
tion of traditional Confucian themes from a contemporary perspective. In light 
of the demise of Confucianism as a state ideology in East Asia, Lee surveys the 
prospects Confucianism still has as a cultural resource for the modern world. 
With a strong sense of history and an unrelentingly rigorous philosophical 
methodology, he assesses the strengths, the failures, the possibilities, and the 
limitations that might still be relevant to the moral education and the social and 
political philosophies of these different yet continuous Asian Confucianisms.




The project of comparative philosophy is almost exclusively associated with 
Western philosophers opening their minds and hearts to non-Western ways of 
thinking. Even the term “comparative philosophy” was coined by a small group 
of Western philosophers who founded the University of Hawai‘i’s philosophy 
program. This new vision was borne primarily through the imagination of 
Charles A. Moore, who wished to create an opportunity where outsiders “could 
most closely approach the ideal of understanding other traditions as the people 
of those traditions understand themselves.”1 We may forget in the twentieth-
first century how radical an idea this must have been in 1939, when the first 
East-West Philosophers’ Conference was held.
As Moore realized, one must understand from within before creating a new 
philosophical approach. And before a new approach can gain ascendancy as 
method—that is, before considering the way in which comparative philosophy 
is to be done—the way in which it is approached is fundamental and crucial. In 
other words, we need to have a clear direction before the process develops and a 
theoretical framework before techniques and practices are put into place—only 
after the approach to comparative philosophy is developed, is there an opening 
for deciding what method or methods we wish to engage.
But comparative philosophy is not exclusively a Western undertaking as 
some think. In fact, many non-Western philosophers have been engaging in 
their own approaches and development of methods. In seeking an understand-
ing of European ways of thinking, Ming-huei Lee left his native Taipei for the 
University of Bonn, where he studied the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Today, 
he is one of New Confucianism’s most prominent thinkers. In Confucianism: Its 
Roots and Global Significance, English-language readers get a rare opportunity 
to read in a single volume the work of one of Taiwan’s most distinguished schol-
ars. Although Ming-huei Lee has published in English before, the corpus of his 
non-Chinese writings is in German. Readers of this volume will soon discover 
the hard-mindedness and precision of thinking so associated with German phi-
losophy as they enter into his discussions of Confucianism. As readers progress 
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through this book, they will be constantly reminded that all philosophy should 
be truly comparative.
In arranging and editing this book, I have tried as much as possible to let 
Lee jiaoshou’s philosophical insights and deep understandings of Confucian-
ism come forth both as he intended as well as in the spirit of comparative phi-
losophy’s originary time. At times, I have added some minimal text for clarity 
purposes and enhancement of his points. In no way has the meaning or style of 
his text been altered. All edited and content contributions have been approved 
by Professor Lee. The book has been divided into three sections: Classi-
cal Confucianism and Its Modern Reinterpretations, Neo- Confucianism in 
China and Korea, and Ethics and Politics. These sections evince just some of 
the range of Ming-huei Lee’s thinking as well as his inclusive reach of Confu-
cian philosophy to the whole of East Asia, especially to Korea. In the Ethics 
and Politics section, readers will get a taste for the return to his own tradition 
through the lens of Kantian philosophy with his analysis of Confucius and the 
virtue ethics debate in Confucian philosophical circles. Lee’s thinking through 
Mou Zongsan’s interpretation of Confucianism, Zhu Xi and the Hu xiang 
scholars’ debate on ren, and the unfolding of the debates over the “four bud-
dings” and “seven feelings” in Korea by Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong sets up the 
subsequent chapters of the book: a reconstruction of Wang Yangming’s phi-
losophy and theories of democracy, and a critique of Jiang Qing’s “political 
Confucianism.” His work in this book adds a sizable appendage to Confucian 
scholarship. Moreover, the interrelated ideas and arguments presented in this 
book are a special contribution to the Confucian project in English-speaking 
countries across the world.
I am grateful for the opportunity to convert these essays into a unified book 
form for readers because they show in many ways how to think with, through, 
and beyond a tradition. Being able to assist in bringing Ming-huei Lee’s work 
to English readers in a more accessible fashion is indeed an honor. This proj-
ect originated with and was mentored by Huang Chun-chieh, University Chair 
Professor and dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities and 
Social Sciences at National Taiwan University. Much of the fine work of the 
institute occurs behind the scenes with Kirill O. Thompson, the associate dean, 
and this project is no exception. So many extraordinary projects and undertak-
ings that have benefited so many have found their origin with Huang Chun-
chieh and the institute. My deep gratitude to Huang Chun-chieh laoshi moves 
unendingly throughout my life. This book is just one of the contributions origi-
nating with him and moving munificently beyond him for the benefit of others. 
To me, he is the embodiment of the Confucian ideal, and I dedicate my work 
on this project to him.
Finally, I am most grateful to Professor Ming-huei Lee for his generosity, 
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patience, and cooperation. As one of East-Asia’s most prominent Kant authori-
ties and Confucian scholars, he offers both East Asia and the West something 
very few can provide. Through his work, we are given a space to reflect critically 





The present volume comprises newly revised versions of my articles on Confu-
cianism that have been published since the year 2000. In these articles I discuss 
some traditional themes of Confucianism from a modern and comparative per-
spective. Although the original articles were written on different occasions, they 
exhibit a common concern with the modern purports of East Asian Confucian 
traditions. For the publication of this volume, I have updated the articles with 
editorial revisions, material emendations, and supplemental content.
I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Professor David Jones. He contrib-
uted more to this volume than what an editor would normally do. He not only 
edited my manuscripts and polished the texts, but also inserted commentaries 
for readers. I would like to express my sincere gratitude also to Professor Huang 
Chun-chieh, dean of the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and 
Social Sciences at the National Taiwan University. With his excellent talent for 
organization, he induced me to write some of the essays included in this volume 
to elaborate the themes I develop here. Special thanks go also to Professor Roger 
T. Ames and Professor Peter D. Hershock for their kindness in receiving this 




Destinies and Prospects of the Confucian Traditions in  
Modern East Asia
I n  t h e  pa st, China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam formed what might be 
called a “Confucian cultural sphere.” As a result of Chinese immigration, Con-
fucian values became an essential part of the cultures of Singapore and Malaysia 
as well. Although the modern fate of Confucian traditions in these countries 
has varied, they have all faced common problems, such as the challenge from the 
West, the pursuit of modernization, the collapse of traditional systems, as well 
as others. Perhaps the most significant commonality was the eclipse of Confu-
cianism as a national ideology. After East Asia’s entry into the modern world, 
the restoration of Confucian traditions to the status of national ideology, as 
Jiang Qing 蔣慶 would like to see, became impossible. However, it will be sug-
gested throughout this book that Confucian traditions can still function as a 
main resource for cultural Bildung, that is, for the education, formation, and 
cultivation of self and society. In this light Confucianism should not retreat 
into the realm of “inner sagehood” (neisheng 內聖), as Yu Ying-shih 余英時 
suggests, because Confucianism is characterized by the connectedness of “inner 
sagehood” with “outer kingliness” (waiwang 外王). In the twenty-first century 
Confucianism needs to develop a modern system of ethics as well as theories of 
cultural, political, and social criticism. In this context, the views of both Jiang 
Qing and Yu Ying-shih will be discussed below.
Modern Confucianism: A Wandering Soul?
In a 1988 paper titled “The Predicament of Modern Confucianism” (Xiandai 
Ruxue de kunjing 現代儒學的困境), the renowned scholar Yu Ying-shih used 
the metaphor of a “wandering soul” to describe modern Confucianism.1 Yu, 
who much appreciates the Confucian tradition and its values, uses “wandering 
soul” without any intended mockery and merely to describe the predicament 
of modern Confucianism. He notes that, in the past, the institutionalization 
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of Confucianism allowed it to considerably dominate China’s traditional cul-
ture. Since the advent of the modern era, however, in the course of the total 
collapse of Chinese society, China’s traditional political and social systems were 
rocked in succession, “the connection between Confucianism and the political 
and social systems was broken, and institutionalized Confucianism died.”2 As 
a result, Confucianism no longer had a system on which it could depend and 
became, as Yu puts it, a “wandering soul.”
Yu also points to an important reason why modern Confucianism fell into 
this predicament: Traditional Confucianism lacks its own system or organiza-
tion and has to depend on existing political and social systems, which is a situa-
tion different from that of Western religions, especially Christianity. By basing 
itself on its own churches, Christianity avoided becoming a wandering soul in 
its own domain. In stark contrast is Confucianism. In modern society Confu-
cianism has no churches on which to establish itself. Rather, it could be argued 
that modern Confucianism has only been able to attach itself to universities and 
scattered Confucian communities. Modern universities’ increasing emphasis on 
specialization, however, has come in conflict with Confucianism’s traditional 
emphasis on liberal arts and general education.
In view of this modern and ongoing situation, what direction should Con-
fucianism take in the future, and how should it position itself in society? Yu 
provides an initial answer to these questions in his “Confucianism and Daily 
Life” 儒家思想與日常人生. Yu writes, “A modern way forward for Confucian-
ism is to become part of daily life, and it seems that only by doing this can it free 
itself from the system and regain its influence on spiritual values.”3 He goes on to 
add that the Confucianism of the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) 
dynasties after Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) had already developed 
such an orientation. In fact, this new direction broke with traditional Confu-
cianism’s ideal of “inner sagehood–outer kingliness” (neisheng waiwang 內聖
外王) and the “sage ruler–worthy chancellor” (sheng jun xianxiang 聖君賢相) 
arrangement.4 His conclusion is as follows:
Modern, daily-life oriented Confucianism can realize itself only in the 
private domain, separating it from the public domain, a situation that is 
roughly similar to the modern Western separation of church and state. In 
other words, Confucianism can still play an important role on the level of 
self-cultivation and maintaining order in the family; however, in terms of 
governing the country and pacifying the world, Confucianism can only 
project indirect influence as a “cultural backdrop.”5
Although I do not disagree with Yu at a fundamental level, he does seem to 
overlook the possibility of a modern transformation of the traditional “inner 
Introduction 3
sagehood and outer kingliness” connection. However, before discussing this 
oversight any further, it is instructive to follow Yu’s “wandering soul” metaphor 
and then review the modern fate of Confucian traditions in East Asia.
The Development of Confucian Traditions in East Asia
One could argue that Confucianism was already a “wandering soul” from its 
inception during the pre-Qin era (before 221 BCE), before it became China’s 
national ideology. Although Confucius devoted much of his life to traveling 
restively to various surrounding states, he actually had little influence and was 
forced to give up his efforts to find a ruler whom he could serve. Instead he 
decided to promote his own ideas and accept disciples. The “Second Sage,” 
Mencius (Mengzi 372?–289? BCE), had much the same experience. It was only 
much later after the establishment of the Han empire that Confucianism was 
combined with the system of autocratic monarchy and attained the status of a 
national ideology. This amalgamation lasted until the Qing dynasty ended in 
1911. In addition to the autocratic monarchy system, Confucianism was also 
dependent on the examination, education, and family clan systems. The exami-
nation system included the Han era recommendation (chaju 察舉) and employ-
ment (zhengpi 徵辟) systems, the Wei and Jin dynasties’ (220–420) Nine Ranks 
system ( jiupin zhongzheng zhi 九品中正制), and the imperial examination sys-
tem (keju zhi 科舉制) after the Tang dynasty (618–907) and until 1905, when 
the Qing court abolished it. The education system included each dynasty’s cen-
tral and local-level schools as well as the private academies that were established 
after the Song dynasty (960–1279). This was essentially the scenario until the 
Western educational system replaced the Chinese traditional educational sys-
tem during the late Qing. The traditional Chinese family clan system was then 
gradually replaced by the small family system with the advent of the modern age.
If we consider the spread of Confucianism beyond China, we find similar 
developments, especially in Korea. Among the countries of East Asia, Korea 
most closely mirrored the experience of China. During Korea’s period of the 
Three Kingdoms (from approximately the first century BCE until the seventh 
century), the Koguryŏ 高句麗, Silla 新羅, and Paekche 百濟 kingdoms adopted 
China’s systems in succession. By the time of the Koryŏ 高麗 era (917–1392), 
Confucianism had spread to the Korean Peninsula, and the Koryŏ dynasty 
actively sought to emulate China’s political, educational, and examination sys-
tems. The Chosŏn 朝鮮 dynasty (1392–1910) that followed reflected China’s 
various systems to an even greater extent, and Confucianism (particularly the 
teachings of Zhu Xi 朱熹 [1130–1200]) attained the status of national ideol-
ogy. This practice was retained until Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910.
After the Paekche scholar Wang In 王仁 took the Analects (Lunyu) to 
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Japan at the end of the fourth century, Confucianism gradually came to be 
valued by the Japanese nobility. The Seventeen-Article Constitution promul-
gated by Prince Shōtoku 聖德 in 604 was based essentially on Confucian ide-
als. In the middle of the sixth century, Emperor Kōtoku 孝德 implemented 
the Taika 大化 period reforms, which fully copied the systems of China’s Tang 
dynasty. In 702, Emperor Bunbu 文武 promulgated the Taihō code 大寶律令 
that mandated the founding of universities, the teaching of Confucian classics, 
and the implementation of the kōkyo examination system, which was based on 
the Tang dynasty’s gong ju 貢舉 system. In the early Nara 奈良 (710–794) and 
Heian 平安 (794–1185) periods, the study of Chinese culture, which especially 
included Confucianism, developed rapidly. During the subsequent Kamakura 
鐮倉 (1185–1333) and Muromachi 室町 (1338–1573) periods, the literati 
lost influence with the military’s domination. Then, during the Tokugawa 德
川 period (1603–1867), there was a revival of Confucianism, and the shogun’s 
administration (bakufu 幕府) took the teachings of Zhu Xi as the basis for 
official education. This situation persisted for over two hundred years, until 
1867, when the Tokugawa bakufu restored imperial rule and Emperor Meiji 明
治 came to power. The most significant difference between Japan and China, 
however, is that the Japanese examination system existed in name only after the 
eleventh century.
Beyond Korea and Japan, Confucianism also became influential in Viet-
nam. During China’s Han dynasty, the government established the three pre-
fectures of Jiaozhi 交趾, Jiuzhen 九真, and Rinan 日南 within the borders of 
Vietnam. During the Tang dynasty, the area that is now central and northern 
Vietnam was a Chinese prefecture that was historically called Annam 安南. 
Before Vietnam’s independence in the tenth century, its various systems were 
identical to China’s. After independence, a succession of Vietnamese dynasties 
continued to use China’s systems, establishing schools and an examination sys-
tem covering the Confucian Four Books and Five Classics. Vietnam’s examina-
tion system was established by the Ly 李 dynasty (1010–1225), continued dur-
ing the Tran 陳 dynasty (1225–1400), and reached its zenith during the Le 黎 
dynasty (1428–1789) before it was abolished in 1919. Until Vietnam became a 
French colony in 1883, it can be claimed that it was a Confucian state, at least 
in terms of its political, social, and educational systems.
Possibility of Restoring Confucianism to a Form of State Religion
The brief historical overviews of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam above can 
give us some understanding of the meaning of Yu Ying-shih’s “wandering soul” 
metaphor as used to describe the fate of Confucian traditions in modern times. 
By the late Qing dynasty, faced with the decline of Confucian political and social 
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institutions, Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) advocated establishing Confu-
cianism as the state religion. Confucius was venerated as its founder and, copy-
ing from Western Christianity, Kang Youwei established a Confucian Church 
(Kongjiaohui 孔教會). After the founding of the Republic of China in 1911, 
Kang, Chen Huanzhang 陳煥章 (1880–1933), Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), and 
other well-known scholars further promoted the Confucian Religion Move-
ment, which gained support from Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 (1859–1916) and his 
Republican government. Following the dissolution of Yuan’s Hongxian Empire 
洪憲帝制, however, Kang Youwei’s Confucian Religion Movement failed.6 
The primary cause of its failure was its going against contemporary trends by 
attempting to restore Confucianism’s sacred traditions in a modern society that 
was already disenchanted with them. It is of little wonder that Liang Qichao 梁
啟超 (1873–1929), Kang Youwei’s most notable student, published the article 
“Defending Religion Is Not the Way to Venerate Confucius,”7 where he openly 
opposed the Confucian Religion Movement.
Kang Youwei’s Confucian Religion Movement represented an effort to 
institutionalize Confucianism, but this effort was not the only one of its kind. A 
similar movement existing today in mainland China is called “political Confu-
cianism” (zhengzhi Ruxue 政治儒學) and the “kingly way of governance” (wan-
dao zhengzhi 王道政治). This movement was started by Jiang Qing. Beginning 
in the late 1990s, Jiang began vigorously to promote a return to Confucian val-
ues, encouraging study of Confucian classics and restoring traditional rituals. 
He further asserted that Confucianism should replace Marxism as the official 
ideology and ultimate spiritual values of the Chinese people.8
Jiang elucidated his concepts as follows. In his view, the thought of Con-
fucius covered two distinct yet related dimensions that had developed into 
two different traditions: “mind-and-nature Confucianism” (xinxing Ruxue 心
性儒學), or “life Confucianism” (shengming Ruxue 生命儒學), and “political 
Confucianism,” or “institutional Confucianism” (zhidu Ruxue 制度儒學). The 
latter was developed especially in the New Text Gongyang 公羊 School. Jiang 
criticized Hong Kong and Taiwanese New Confucians for being familiar only 
with mind-and-nature Confucianism and not with political Confucianism. In 
trying to develop democracy from Confucianism, they neglected its particular 
characteristics and positions, and simply accepted Western political values as 
universal. Rather than following this route, Jiang advocated making full use of 
the traditional resources of political Confucianism.
Jiang proposed replacing Western democratic governance with “the kingly 
way of governance.” From his perspective, the kingly way of governance offers 
advantages over democratic governance. In terms of the problem of political 
legitimacy, democratic governance emphasizes legitimacy only based on the will 
of the people, whereas the kingly way of governance derives its legitimacy from 
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three sources: legitimacy based on the will of the people; transcendent, divine 
legitimacy; and historical and cultural legitimacy. In essence “the kingly way” 
makes for balanced governance.
Although we may find Jiang Qing’s dream interesting because it incorpo-
rates essential Chinese cultural virtues, questions arise concerning its implemen-
tation and operation. His criticism of the modern democratic electoral system 
for the ease with which it can slide into vulgar or populist politics may be to the 
point, but is it so clear that China currently possesses the necessary historical 
and social conditions for the actual realization and execution of Jiang Qing’s 
system? Or is his dream nothing but a utopian pipe dream? To many observers, 
attempting to restore Confucianism to the status of national ideology in mod-
ern China seems like attempting to restore the ideal of Caesaropapism in the 
West. As readers proceed through this book, it should become clearer why such 
an idea is simply impractical and dislocated in time. I will give a critical review 
of Jiang Qing’s idea of “political Confucianism” in the last chapter of this book.
The Prospects of Confucianism in the Twentieth-First Century
Comparing Yu Ying-shih’s views with those of Jiang Qing, we may observe 
that, although they both affirm the significance and value of the learning of 
“inner sagehood” in modern society, their views on “outer kingliness” are at 
two extremes of the spectrum: Jiang Qing overemphasizes “outer kingliness,” 
whereas Yu Ying-shih underestimates it. In his article “Confucian Thought and 
Daily Life,” Yu quotes a view expressed by the American humanist scholar Irving 
Babbitt (1865–1933). In his Democracy and Leadership Babbitt maintains that 
the teachings of Confucius can provide political leaders with qualities they 
need.9 Yu takes this pronouncement as support for his own view that a “daily-
life oriented Confucianism can still continue to indirectly help in governing the 
country and pacifying the world.”10 Though this is perhaps true, Confucianism 
can perform even more functions in a modern, democratic society.
Although the terms “inner sagehood, outer kingliness” first appeared in 
the “Tianxia” chapter of the Zhuangzi, they are apt expressions of the essence 
of Confucianism. The Confucian ideal of inner sagehood and outer kingliness 
affirms the connection between the two as well as the necessity of inner sage-
hood leading to outer kingliness. If modern Confucianism has indeed become 
the study of inner sagehood alone, as Yu holds, and its realization can be pur-
sued only in the private domain, with only an indirect role in the public realm, 
then the essence of Confucianism has been lost. Here, we may borrow from 
Hegel’s legal philosophical terminology to understand the relationship between 
inner sagehood and outer kingliness. If we understand these terms roughly as 
a relationship between Moralität (individual, rational, and reflective morality) 
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and Sittlichkeit (ethical, social life), they shed some light on inner sagehood and 
outer kingliness. The learning of inner sagehood in traditional Confucianism 
essentially belongs to the realm of Moralität. As for Sittlichkeit in the Hegelian 
sense, it is not limited to the realm of politics, but covers the household, civil 
society, the state, and even world history. In this sense, the areas touched on 
by Confucianism’s “outer kingliness” are principally the same as those found 
in Sittlichkeit. For Hegel, Moralität cannot stop at the self, but must necessar-
ily extend to Sittlichkeit. In response to Kant’s more abstract moral philosophy, 
Hegel wished to synthesize the best of Moralität with Sittlichkeit, that is, to 
embed Moralität into the concrete forms of what Confucians refer to as li—the 
rites, customs, and ritual proprieties of cultural traditions that manifest in the 
feelings, moods, emotions, behaviors, and mental states of individual human 
beings. In other words, this way of thinking resonates with Confucianism’s 
extension of “inner sagehood” to “outer kingliness.”
Even though traditional Confucianism did not include these last three 
areas (civil society, the state, and world history) in the modern sense, all of these 
four spheres of human life—including the household—do indeed belong to the 
realm of politics. The household too falls within the scope of Confucianism’s 
“outer kingliness,” as we see in Analects 2.21:
Someone addressed Confucius, saying, “Sir, why are you not engaged in 
politics?” The Master said, “What does the Book of Documents say of filial 
piety?—‘You are filial; you discharge your brotherly duties. These quali-
ties are displayed in politics.’ This then also constitutes the exercise of 
politics. Why must there be a question about making one participate in 
politics?”
Because filial duties are espoused as having a political dimension (in the sense 
that politics functions or at least should function along the lines of family rela-
tionships and dynamics), the idea of family is a central one for the Confucian 
project. For this reason, despite East Asia’s traditional family clans having been 
transformed into the small households of the modern era, Confucian traditions 
can still continue to play a role in keeping order in these small households. In 
places in East Asia where there has been a sustained preservation of Confucian 
traditions (such as South Korea and Taiwan), emphasis on making offerings to 
ancestors is more prevalent than in China itself. In ethnic Chinese communities 
in Singapore and Malaysia as well, Confucian traditions are closely linked to 
making offerings to ancestors, resulting in a trend toward the “religionization” 
of Confucianism. In Indonesia this process has a century of history, and the 
“Confucian religion” (Kongjiao 孔教), which has been permitted to operate 
openly in recent years, essentially takes ancestral worship and family ethics as its 
8 Introduction
core. At present, because of the long ban on Chinese-language education dur-
ing the rule of Suharto, nearly all Indonesian Chinese under the age of fifty are 
unable to speak Chinese. Nevertheless, the “Confucian religion” has been well 
preserved over time through the clan structure and family ethics, and because 
of this preservation it represents a vital example of the role that outer kingliness 
has played as it is passed down through time.
On the educational front, Confucianism can also be a resource for Bildung. 
In the past, Taiwan’s Kuomintang government included instruction in the Four 
Books of Confucianism in its high schools’ “Basic Teaching Materials for Chi-
nese Culture” course. Although this practice drew criticism from academia 
because of its political intent,11 it still had certain positive aspects.12 In recent 
years, both Taiwanese and mainland Chinese social organizations’ strong pro-
motion of children studying Confucian classics outside of the school system 
has also had positive effects. In university education, Confucianism can become 
part of “general education” through classical readings courses.
Confucianism has already become the subject of specialized study in 
university departments of philosophy, Chinese literature and language, and 
history. Concerns have been voiced regarding whether this trend toward the 
disciplinization, specialization, and intellectualization of Confucianism may 
damage its far-reaching cultural sense and cause Confucianism to lose its vital-
ity. In recent years questions have been raised regularly about “the legitimacy 
of Chinese philosophy” in discussions in mainland China. In fairness, these 
concerns are not without reason. Those who raise such doubts mainly focus 
on whether the essence of East Asian traditions (including the Confucian tradi-
tion) can be carried forward in the Western academic system. But such thinking 
seems to misplace the crux of the issue. The central question should be whether 
or not traditional thought, including East Asian thought, can preserve its 
essence in the modern academic system. This question has been taken up in the 
West by the French historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot (1922–2010). In his 
work Exercices spirituels et philosophie antique, Hadot emphasizes the original 
meaning of philosophy, which he wishes to restore. The practice of philosophy 
“as a way of life” was at the core of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy. In 
the modern Western academic system this original meaning of “philosophy” 
has been replaced with a “discourse about philosophy.”13 Thus, traditional East-
ern and Western thought both must face the problem of the specialization and 
intellectualization of the modern academic system.
Although the modern academic system cannot preserve the original vital-
ity of Confucianism, it can actually open up another aspect of Confucianism, 
that is, an intellectualized Confucianism. Apart from Confucianism as “wis-
dom of life,” it can develop a modern system of ethics as well as a theoretical 
basis for cultural, political, and social criticism—as the saying goes, “losing at 
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sunrise and gaining at sunset.” The following example demonstrates this kind of 
Confucian political criticism.
New Confucians in Hong Kong and Taiwan such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗
三 (1909–1995), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978), Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1903–
1982), and Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (1887–1969) created a theory of “develop-
ing democracy from Confucianism.” They have advocated that China should 
employ a democratic system that is based on the “intrinsic requirements” of 
Confucianism.14 This theory does not, as Jiang Qing has maintained, draw 
too close to Western culture, nor does it, as Taiwanese liberals such as Yin 
Haiguang 殷海光 (1919–1969) have held, arise from a psychological need for 
self- protection. In brief this theory comprises two main points: First, the com-
bination of Confucianism with monarchy arose from particular historical cir-
cumstances, and Confucianism’s essence can be more fully realized in a modern 
democratic system. Second, democracy cannot be directly transplanted from 
the West to China and can only be absorbed through the internal development 
and adaptation of traditional Chinese culture.
In the past, liberalism was seen as the theoretical foundation for democ-
racy, but, if the communitarian criticism of liberalism is meaningful, we have to 
admit that a Confucian justification for democracy is possible. This is the theo-
retical core of the theory of “developing democracy from Confucianism” and 
can also be seen as an example of Confucian political criticism. In this sense an 
intellectualized “academic Confucianism,” another development of traditional 
Confucianism, has a major role to play because it can also be seen as a display 
of Confucianism’s “outer kingliness” and more keenly reveal the connection 
between “inner sagehood” and “outer kingliness.”

PART I





Mou Zongsan’s Interpretation of Confucianism
Some Hermeneutical Reflections
Mo u  Zo n gs a n  牟宗三 (1909–1995) played a significant role in the devel-
opment of “Contemporary New Confucianism.” This chapter narrows his role 
more specifically and hermeneutically reflects on his interpretation of Confu-
cianism, which is characterized by the influence of Western philosophy, espe-
cially that of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). In his 
interpretation, Mou employs not only Kant’s philosophical terminology such 
as “thing-in-itself,” “intellectual intuition,” and “autonomy,” but also his philo-
sophical framework of “appearance” and “thing-in-itself.” Mou even views this 
framework as the common model for all philosophical thinking. His interpreta-
tion of Confucianism, however, has encountered criticisms on two fronts. On 
one hand, he has been reproached for distorting Kant’s “original” philosophy, 
and, on the other hand, he has been criticized for reading too much Kant into 
Confucianism.
Mou’s Interpretation of Confucianism
As a reaction to the challenge of Western culture, “Contemporary New Con-
fucianism” arose in China at the beginning of the twentieth century. In view 
of the variety of its contents and directions, it should be regarded more as an 
intellectual movement than as a school. The initiators of this movement pri-
marily include Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) and Xiong Shili 熊十力 
(1885–1968), with Zhang Junmai, Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, 
and perhaps Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895–1990) as their followers.1 Characteristic of 
this movement is its attempt to integrate some ingredients of Western culture 
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with the Confucian tradition, insofar as these ingredients can facilitate Chi-
na’s modernization and promote the further development of Chinese culture. 
This attempt is often based on the philosophical reconstruction of the Chi-
nese tradition in terms of Western ideas. The efforts of the New Confucians 
are similar in many ways to those of the Fathers of the Church in developing 
early Christian theology. In this respect, Mou Zongsan deserves special atten-
tion for his philosophical achievements; an analysis of Mou’s interpretation of 
Confucianism and the hermeneutical problems involved in his reconstruction 
of Confucian philosophy are of special cultural significance and philosophical 
purport.
Mou’s reconstruction of Confucianism is characterized by his appropria-
tion of Kant’s philosophical framework and concepts, and is one of the earliest 
instances of what has come to be known in the West as comparative philoso-
phy—however, instead of moving from the West to the East, the intellectual 
movement here is from China to the West.2 Strictly speaking, Mou may be 
considered unqualified to be a Kant specialist because of his lack of acquain-
tance with the German language. Nevertheless, as occasionally is the case, this 
disadvantage is offset by his genius for philosophical thinking and his diligence 
in researching—sometimes a “disadvantage” can be transformed into its oppo-
site. On the basis of English versions, he translated Kant’s three Critiques and 
Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten into Chinese. To these Chinese ver-
sions he appended his commentaries, which are not only philological but also 
 philosophical-interpretative. He often interprets Kant’s philosophy by contrast-
ing it with Chinese philosophy, especially with Confucian philosophy.
Kant’s influence on Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism can best be con-
sidered from two perspectives: the framework of philosophical thinking and 
moral philosophy. In the first place, Mou appropriated Kant’s philosophical 
framework of “appearance” and “thing-in-itself.” For Mou this framework can 
serve as the common model for all philosophical thinking. In 1975 he pub-
lished Appearance and Thing-in-Itself (Xianxiang yu wuzishen 現象與物自身), 
where he thoroughly discussed Kant’s distinction. In this book, he interpreted 
Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself ” not as a usual epistemological concept but as 
one with value-connotation. He did so even though he realized Kant had never 
clearly expressed this thought. In this regard, Mou shows his Confucian (and 
New Confucian) roots. In Mou’s view, an epistemological concept of “thing-
in-itself ” is not sufficient to support Kant’s transcendental distinction between 
appearance and thing-in-itself since the “thing-in-itself ” in this sense lies always 
beyond human knowledge. In order to solve this problem, Mou appealed to the 
thesis that human beings are indeed finite but have access to the infinite, which 
is a common conviction of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. As revealed 
in his Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo 
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zhexue 智的直覺與中國哲學) (1971), he found this access in the “intellectual 
intuition” of human beings.
It is generally known that Kant ascribes intellectual intuition only to God. 
But on a full analysis of the relevant sections of the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Mou came to the conclusion that Kant’s philosophical system logically implies 
the possibility of ascribing intellectual intuition also to humans, although it 
is contrary to Kant’s own expressions. This is a viewpoint Johann G. Fichte 
(1762–1814) also advocated. It is here that Mou found a key to the compari-
son between Kantian and Chinese philosophy. Therefore a “transcendent” or 
“noumenal” metaphysics, which is impossible for Kant, is possible for Chinese 
philosophy. In such a metaphysical structure Mou found the proper place for 
Confucian metaphysics. According to Mou, Confucian metaphysics is founded 
on liangzhi 良知 (original knowing) or benxin 本心 (original mind), which is 
a type of intellectual intuition of the moral and therefore free subject. In this 
sense, the “thing-in-itself ” has a practical connotation, because it is a horizon 
that discloses itself through liangzhi. So Mou views Confucian metaphysics as 
a “moral metaphysics,” which is different from Kant’s “metaphysics of morals” 
inasmuch as the latter means a metaphysical (a priori) explanation of morals.
This point brings us to the second perspective of moral philosophy. In the 
introduction to his epoch-making work Heart-Mind as Reality and Human 
Nature as Reality (Xinti yu xingti 心體與性體), Mou critically examined Kant’s 
system of moral philosophy. Mou agreed with Kant’s view that the essence of 
morality lies in the “autonomy” of the moral subject (will). In the concept of 
“autonomy,” Mou found the key not only to interpret the doctrines of Confu-
cianism, but also to classify the systems within Confucianism. At the same time, 
however, he curiously pointed out that the whole meaning of Kant’s insight in 
this respect cannot be fully developed within the framework of his own moral 
philosophy. The reason for this is that Kant presupposes a dualist standpoint 
between the rational and the emotional deportment in the moral agent. Kant’s 
strict separation of the rational from the emotional means the moral subject can 
function only as a principium dijudicationis (the principle of the appraisal of the 
action) and not at the same time as a principium executionis (the principle of its 
performance). In other words, the moral subject in Kant lacks the power of self-
realization, which means there is a narrowing of the “autonomy” of the moral 
subject as its moral self-legislation. For Mou, it is because of this narrowing and 
the deprivation of intellectual intuition in humans that Kant is not in a position 
to establish a moral metaphysics. In its place Mou saw the prototype of moral 
metaphysics in Confucianism.
Thus, in Mencius’ theory of xin 心 (heart-mind) as moral subject, Mou 
found a more suitable philosophical-anthropological framework for Kant’s 
concept of “autonomy” because this theory is based on an a priori universalism 
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as well as a unity of the rational and the emotional. On the basis of Mencius’ 
philosophical anthropology, Wang Yangming advanced the thesis of the unity 
of moral subject and moral law (xin ji li 心即理) as well as that of the unity of 
moral knowledge and action (zhi xing he yi 知行合一). The first of these the-
ses means that liangzhi as moral subject is the last resort for moral legislation, 
whereas the second means that liangzhi functions not only as the principium 
dijudicationis, but also as the principium executionis of the moral good.
In both characteristics of Mencius’ moral philosophy—that is, the ethics 
of autonomy and the philosophical-anthropological unity of the rational and 
the emotional—Mou finds the criteria for the grouping of different systems 
within Confucianism. In his classification, he identifies Confucius, Mencius, 
the author(s) of the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong 中庸), and the commen-
tators of the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) in the mainstream of pre-Qin Con-
fucianism. Xunzi 荀子 (ca. 298–238 BCE) is then considered as a represen-
tative of another stream of Confucianism because he established an ethics of 
heteronomy. For the same reason, Mou excluded the Han Confucians from the 
mainstream of Confucianism because they appealed to what Kant called “theo-
logical ethics,” which made their ethics heteronomous in nature.
In his Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality and From 
Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan (Cong Lu Xiangshan dao Liu Jishan 從陸象山到
劉蕺山) (1979), Mou propounds a new classification of the Song-Ming Neo- 
Confucians. In his opinion, the early Northern Song dynasty Confucians, 
such as Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), Zhang Zai 張載 (1020–1077), and 
Cheng Hao 程顥 (1032–1085), belong to the aforementioned mainstream. 
Here we see something novel compared to the traditional view, since the 
thought of Cheng Hao and his brother Cheng Yi 程頤 (1033–1107) formerly 
were not distinguished from each other. According to Mou, Song-Ming Neo-
Confucianism developed into three systems: (1) that of Lu Xiangshan 陸象山 
(1139–1193) and Wang Yangming, (2) that of Hu Hong 胡宏 (1106–1161) 
and Liu Jishan 劉蕺山 (1578–1645), and (3) that of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi. 
The first two systems lead to a moral philosophy that is founded on the auton-
omy of the moral subject. The difference between them consists only in their 
approaches. The first system starts subjectively from a philosophical-anthropo-
logical thesis on the human heart-mind, whereas the second one starts objec-
tively from ontological assertions about Tian 天 (Heaven). In any event, Mou 
regards these systems together in the mainstream of Confucianism. In contrast, 
the third system is excluded from the mainstream, although through his com-
prehensive philosophical system, Zhu Xi has exerted tremendous influence on 
the subsequent development of Confucianism. The reason for this lies in Mou’s 
judgment that this system is essentially intellectualistic and therefore based on 
the heteronomy of the moral subject.
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Mou and His Critics
In the Chinese-speaking community, Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism, 
as mentioned above, encounters dual criticisms for simultaneously distorting 
Kant’s “original” philosophy and reading too much Kant into Confucianism. 
An example of the former criticism is that of Kuang Zhiren 鄺芷人, who criti-
cizes Mou for interpreting Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself ” as one with value- 
connotation.3 The criticism of Huang Jinxing is of the latter type; he questions 
whether it is appropriate to introduce the concept of “autonomy” into the inter-
pretation of Confucianism.4 In addition, some scholars doubt the suitableness of 
ascribing Zhu Xi’s ethics as heteronomous.5 Mou’s interpretation of Confucian-
ism seemingly also fails to cope with the criticism from the so-called neoprag-
matic or contextualistic discourse of such scholars as Herbert Fingarette, Roger 
T. Ames, Henry Rosemont, Jr., Randall P. Perenboom, and others, who empha-
size the particularity of Chinese philosophy and avoid, as much as they can, using 
Western philosophical concepts or categories in their interpretations of it.6
None of the above critics has given a methodological reflection on Mou’s 
interpretation of Confucianism, but one can be found in Feng Yaoming’s 馮耀
明 article in Chinese “Conceptual Relativism and Chinese Philosophy.” On the 
basis of W. V. Quine’s relevant theories, Feng advances a so-called conceptual 
relativism that includes the following points:7 (1) Every conceptual scheme is 
a subjective device, which is able to describe and interpret the objectively real 
but has no necessary relation to it. This can be called “internal relativity.” (2) In 
every conceptual scheme, the meaning of concepts, the truth of sentences, and 
the affirmation of beliefs are relative to the presumption of this scheme. This 
can be called “external relativity.” (3) Because of the double relativity, differ-
ent concepts that belong to different conceptual schemes or theoretical systems 
are unintertranslatable, and hence the nexuses of beliefs to which these con-
cepts belong are incommensurable. (4) Therefore, no conceptual scheme has 
absolute and ultimate superiority in its function of justification, and there is no 
criterion that is independent of all conceptual schemes and hence theoretically 
neutral. (5) The objectively real that the conceptual relativism presupposes is 
not the given actual but a regulative concept, such as Kant’s thing-in-itself. (6) 
Conceptual relativism is different from irrationalism, subjectivism, skepticism, 
and pluralism, because it presupposes the objectively real and admits a relative 
superiority between different conceptual schemes in regard to their function of 
describing and interpreting the objectively real. (7) As a methodology, concep-
tual relativism rejects any direct conceptual transplantation or appropriation 
but admits absorption or transformation between conceptual schemes that have 
similar theoretical traits.
According to his “conceptual relativism,” Feng then makes a quantitative 
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comparison between the metaphysical frameworks of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Bud-
dhism, and Confucianism in terms of ten theoretical traits: immanence, partici-
pation, transcendence, subjectivity, immutability, objective reality,  subject-object 
duality, contrast of reality, value-connotation, and metaphysical preexistence. In 
light of the comparison, Feng argues that it is Plato’s metaphysical system rather 
than Kant’s that is the closest to Confucianism.8 From this he concludes: “It is the 
burden for both sides either to adopt or integrate the epistemological connota-
tions of Kant’s concept of ‘thing-in-itself ’ into any system of Chinese philosophy 
or to adopt or integrate the philosophical-anthropological implications of the 
concept wu 物 [thing] included in any system of Chinese philosophy into Kant’s 
critical philosophy.”9 Needless to say, this criticism is leveled at Mou’s interpreta-
tion of Chinese philosophy.
It is unnecessary to discuss the relation of Feng’s “conceptual relativism” to 
Quine’s, but Donald Davidson’s criticism of conceptual relativism is worth dis-
cussing in this context, for it is relevant to our concerns.10 According to David-
son, the incommensurability between different conceptual schemes implies 
the unintertranslatability between different languages that can transmit these 
schemes, granted that every conceptual scheme must be transmitted by some 
language. However, the unintertranslatability between different languages 
means either complete or partial failure of translatability. Davidson demon-
strates convincingly that we cannot make sense of the claim of complete failure, 
so the only possibility is the case of partial failure. Here it is not necessary to go 
any further into the details of Davidson’s argument. For our present purpose it 
will suffice simply to provide a quote:
The dominant metaphor of conceptual relativism, that of differing points 
of view, seems to betray an underlying paradox. Different points of view 
make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which 
to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of 
dramatic incomparability. What we need, it seems to me, is some idea of 
the considerations that set the limits to conceptual contrast. There are 
extreme suppositions that founder on paradox or contradiction; there are 
modest examples we have no trouble understanding.11
In brief, the claim of total unintertranslatability between differing conceptual 
schemes must presuppose a common coordinate system independent of them; 
otherwise, we shall lack a common foundation for the comparison between 
them. But this amounts to negation of the point we want to defend.
Now, if we return to Feng’s idea of “conceptual relativism,” according to 
his fifth and sixth points, he seems to presuppose a common coordinate sys-
tem, namely, the objectively real, even when he stresses the unintertranslatabil-
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ity between different conceptual schemes. In light of Davidson’s theory, we are 
warranted to suppose that by “unintertranslatability” Feng means here only 
partial failure of translatability, as his seventh point suggests. Therefore, the 
distance of Feng’s standpoint from Davidson’s is not as great as one may think. 
When we apply Feng’s conceptual relativism to the intertranslation of differing 
philosophical systems such as the Confucian and the Kantian, it amounts to 
no more than a trivial truth that in two philosophical systems we cannot find 
two totally corresponding concepts, because at the very least they do not have 
exactly the same position and meaning within their own systems. That is to say, 
in employing a concept in one system to interpret a concept in another system, 
we are always doing it analogically, and therefore some conceptual adjustments 
become inevitable. Even in ordinary conversations we are used to making such 
adjustments either consciously or unconsciously. This is why we can communi-
cate with each other by means of the same concepts although we have different 
nexuses of beliefs. So it seems that Feng’s “conceptual relativism” is more rhe-
torical than substantial.
In addition, Feng’s “conceptual relativism” as a methodology of philosophi-
cal interpretation cannot offer any clear criteria for determining between which 
concepts there are similarities in their theoretical traits that allow a meaningful 
conceptual absorption or transformation. With regard to the ten theoretical 
traits that Feng uses for comparison, we may ask, “Why just these ten?” And 
in reference to the comparison between Confucian and Kantian systems, we 
may also ask, “Why not compare their ethical frameworks instead of their meta-
physical ones?” It is obvious that in the ethical sphere there are more similarities 
between Confucian and Kantian philosophies.12
Moreover, the least persuasive point in Feng’s “conceptual relativism” 
lies in the fact that it totally neglects the hermeneutical dimension of philo-
sophical interpretation. Because of this neglect he hastily concludes that Kant’s 
philosophical framework of appearance and thing-in-itself has “no value- 
connotations” when he compares it with other philosophical frameworks.13 
As we have seen, Mou interprets Kant’s concept of “thing-in-itself ” not as an 
epistemological concept, but as one with value-connotation. If this interpreta-
tion is correct, Feng might wish to give up or at least revise his view on Mou’s 
philosophical interpretation. As I have indicated elsewhere:
The concept of “thing-in-itself ” in Kant’s philosophy has a double mean-
ing. In its epistemological context, it is, as generally understood, a factual 
concept; in its ethical context, it reveals some kind of value-connotation. 
In terms of Kant’s assertion of the primacy of practical to speculative rea-
son, we are oriented to say that the latter, that is, the ethical interpreta-
tion, is the real implication of this very concept.14
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On the face of it, Mou’s interpretation of “thing-in-itself ” seems contrary 
to Kant’s own expositions, especially to those in the First Critique. Apparently 
Mou’s approach presupposes Friedrich Ernst Daniel Schleiermacher’s (1768–
1834) hermeneutical motto that “we understand the writer better than he him-
self did.”15 As Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) shrewdly sees, the whole his-
tory of modern hermeneutics shows itself in the changing interpretation of this 
statement, which embraces the proper problem of hermeneutics.16 In order to 
do justice to Mou’s interpretation of Confucianism, it is necessary to go further 
into his hermeneutical views.
Mou’s Hermeneutical Views
Mou never articulated a system of philosophical hermeneutics. None of his 
works has devoted special attention to the problems of modern hermeneutics. 
Yet his prefaces to his books Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy and 
Appearance and Thing-in-Itself and his lectures titled “The Text-Interpretative 
Approach for the Study of Chinese Philosophy” and “Objective Understanding 
and Rebuilding of Chinese Philosophy” reveal his hermeneutical views. Mou 
does not draw a sharp distinction between “interpretation” and “understand-
ing.” His hermeneutical view seems to run parallel with Gadamer’s dictum that 
“all understanding is interpretation.”17
In his preface to Appearance and Thing-in-Itself, Mou attempts to justify 
his interpretation of Chinese philosophy. On one hand, he appeals to the Bud-
dhist hermeneutical principle of the Four Refuges:
Rely on the spirit, not the letter.
Rely on the teaching, not the teacher.
Rely on direct knowledge, not discursive consciousness.
Rely on the definitive meaning, not the provisional meaning.18
On the other hand, Mou resorts to Kant’s distinction between “rational” and 
“historical” knowledge in the First Critique. As Mou writes:
In interpreting texts three things should be avoided: superficiality, out-
of-context interpretation, and one-sided comparison. One has to com-
prehend the text thoroughly, while suspending the incomprehensible. In 
this way the fundamental meanings of texts will reveal themselves. Then, 
one has to determine further the levels and scopes of the meanings. That 
is to say, one has to make clear the differences and similarities of the 
meanings. “Difference” means demarcation between meanings. “Similar-
ity” means convergence of various meanings. Once this becomes clear, 
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one may comprehend the meanings of texts through one’s own reason, as 
if they came from one’s own mouth. It begins with comprehending the 
meanings on the basis of the “letter” and ends with “rely on the spirit, not 
the letter.” The reasons for “not relying on the letter” lie in avoiding liter-
alism. Literalism achieves only what Kant terms as “historical,” not “ratio-
nal” knowledge. The beginners and those who are confined by their own 
schools are inclined to fall into this trap. Only those who are skilled in the 
text-interpretative method become able to “rely on the spirit, not the let-
ter.” . . . All grand systems of thought are objective rational systems, which 
are crystallizations of the wisdom of the sages. When we understand the 
sages’ wisdom through the texts, our lives are to be exalted to the level 
of reason through their words. How can one speak of “relying on the 
spirit, not the letter,” if one’s life is not moved by objective truths? Is he 
really relying on the spirit? At this moment, it is better to start from the 
very beginning. Such a beginning method has to be concrete, actual, and 
precise. It unites gradually the variety of meanings into reason as their 
ultimate criterion. It is through the lack of practicable methods that one 
falsely speaks of the differences and similarities between the meanings 
due to literalism or arbitrarily plays with words or unites the meanings 
by making their demarcations blurred. For those who are skilled in the 
text-interpretative method, the rational is simultaneously the historical.19
The above quotation covers almost all important problems of modern hermeneu-
tics. It contains at least three points: (1) Understanding or interpretation has its 
“objectivity,” and only at the level of reason can it reach “objectivity.” (2) It must 
be through the subjective “life” that understanding or interpretation can reach its 
“objectivity.” (3) Understanding or interpretation covers two levels, namely, the 
semantic and the philosophical, which correspond respectively to Kant’s “histori-
cal” and “rational” knowledge. But the former level is subordinate to the latter.
If we put these points into the context of modern hermeneutics, their 
meanings will become clearer. In the development of modern hermeneutics, 
there are two divergent, although not completely opposite, lines. One line was 
founded by F. E. D. Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and 
the other was initiated by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), then developed 
into a methodology by Gadamer. The first stresses the autonomy of the object 
of interpretation and argues strongly for the objectivity of interpretation. The 
second line starts from the historicity of understanding and disputes all inter-
pretative standpoints outside of history, and hence questions the possibility of 
“objectively valid interpretation.” The controversy between these two lines has 
culminated in the dispute between Gadamer and Emilio Betti (1890–1968), 
who argued for the reconstruction of authorial intention.
22 Classical Confucianism & Its Modern Reinterpretations
In light of Mou’s first point, his hermeneutical principle may belong to the 
line of Schleiermacher because Mou grants the possibility of “objectively valid 
interpretation.” For Mou the object of philosophical interpretation is not the 
texts as such, but their meanings, which are comprehensible only through rea-
son. So the term “objective” for him means “conforming to reason” rather than 
“corresponding to the original meanings of texts”—his motto for the interpre-
tation of philosophical texts would be that “one has to interpret the texts as 
reasonably as possible.” Therefore, we must suppose that reasonable interpreta-
tions correspond to the “original” meanings of texts more than unreasonable 
ones. An “objective” understanding or interpretation presupposes the ability to 
use reason for thinking. Even when we want to prove that the thoughts revealed 
in some texts contain logical contradictions, we can resort only to reason. This 
seems to be implied in Bertrand Russell’s remark about the reports of Xenophon 
and Plato on Socrates: “A stupid man’s report of what a clever man says is never 
accurate, because he unconsciously translates what he hears into something that 
he can understand. I would rather be reported by my bitterest enemy among 
philosophers than by a friend innocent of philosophy.”20 Regarding the validity 
of philosophical interpretation, Mou rejects a relativistic standpoint insofar as 
he does not deny the possibility of achieving an interpretation corresponding 
to the original meanings of texts. Nevertheless, he does not take an objectivistic 
standpoint because he finds the criteria for determining the original meanings 
not in the texts as such, but in our own reason.
Mou’s second point also reveals his distance from objectivism, because he 
views the responsiveness of life as another precondition for a valid interpreta-
tion. This reminds us of Dilthey’s hermeneutics for the reason that he sees the 
guarantee of an objectively valid interpretation not in abstract reason, but in 
what he terms “objective spirit,” namely, in “the manifold forms in which the 
community existing between individuals has objectified itself in the sensible 
world.”21 In other words, the “objective spirit” is the embodiment of human 
nature in culture, which in Dilthey’s system is inseparable from the concept of 
“life.” Likewise, for Mou, our reason cannot embody itself without life. In this 
sense, human reason is “experiential.” Therefore, Mou defines Confucianism 
as a “learning of life” (shengming de xuewen 生命的學問). For him the concept 
of “life” covers both the spiritual activities of individuals and the institutional 
activities of communities such as politics, economy, law, and so forth.22 Mou 
also points out that objective understanding requires not only the faculty of 
understanding, but also a “responsive life and temperament.”23 Note how simi-
lar Mou’s hermeneutical view is to that of Dilthey.
Mou’s third point refers to Kant’s distinction between “rational” and “his-
torical” knowledge. Kant defines these two kinds of knowledge in this way: 
“Historical knowledge is cognitio ex datis [knowledge from facts]; rational 
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knowledge is cognitio ex principiis [knowledge from principles].”24 Whether 
a kind of knowledge is historical or rational does not depend on its content 
but on the way in which to acquire it. In brief the knowledge that one obtains 
through one’s own rational thinking is “rational.” But the same knowledge 
would be “historical” if one were to take it only as data and did not exalt it to 
the level of rational thinking. Since the latter kind of knowledge is dead, Kant 
compares it to a “plaster cast of a living man.”25 For Kant, philosophical inter-
pretation should not remain at the level of “historical knowledge” but must be 
exalted to the level of “rational knowledge.”
In an article published in 1790, Kant replied to criticism from Johann 
August Eberhard (1739–1809), who claimed that Leibniz’ philosophy had 
already contained a critique of reason even more comprehensive than that of 
Kant. At the end of this article, Kant writes:
Thus the Critique of Pure Reason may well be the real apology for Leib-
niz, even in opposition to his followers who exalt him with words of 
praise that hardly do him honor. It can also be an apology for many older 
philosophers who speak the purest nonsense through certain historians 
of philosophy, for all the praises the latter bestow. They do not compre-
hend the intention of these philosophers when they neglect the key to all 
explications of the works of pure reason through concepts alone, namely, 
the critique of reason itself (as the common source of all concepts), and 
are incapable of looking beyond the literal meaning of what these phi-
losophers have said to what they intended to say.26
Evidently, “works of pure reason through concepts alone” refers to what Kant 
terms “rational knowledge.” And the distinction between what a philosopher 
has said and what he intended to say corresponds to the difference between 
“historical” and “rational” knowledge. Philosophical interpretation should 
begin with the literal meanings of texts and then be required to go further into 
the level of “rational knowledge.” As soon as it reaches that level, the interpreter 
may determine the “original” meanings of texts according to his or her own rea-
son, even in opposition to their literal meanings. This is what modern herme-
neutics terms as the “hermeneutical circle.” So it is no accident that Heidegger 
appeals to the quotation above when he defends his interpretation of Kant’s 
first Critique.27
In his lecture “The Text-Interpretative Approach for the Study of Chinese 
Philosophy,”28 Mou stresses the necessity of the “text-interpretative approach” 
(wenxian tujing 文獻途徑). But in the study of Western philosophy, we discover 
this does not apply because Western philosophy is more systematic and the con-
cepts it employs are more distinct. Because the majority of Chinese philosophi-
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cal texts were not systematically written, modern researchers have had to start 
from reading the texts, and the “text-interpretative approach” becomes critical. 
This is why, in his works such as Heart-Mind as Reality and Human Nature 
as Reality, From Lu Xiangshan to Liu Jishan, Talent and Xuan-Principles (Cai-
xing yu xuanli 才性與玄理) (1963), Buddhata and Prajna (Foxing yu bore 佛
性與般若) (1977), and On the Highest Good (Yuanshan lun 圓善論) (1985), 
Mou explicated a great many relevant texts. For him, the “text-interpretative 
approach” is not identical with a historical or philological approach. He criti-
cizes the philologists of the Qing dynasty for adopting a lopsided hermeneuti-
cal principle where philosophical implications can be disclosed only after the 
clarification of philological issues (Xungu ming erhou yili ming 訓詁明而後義
理明). In modern terms, the fault of the latter approach lies in the neglect of the 
“hermeneutical circle.” On the contrary, Mou’s “text-interpretative approach” 
is founded on the circular interactions between philological commentary and 
philosophical exposition.
Unlike the above-mentioned Western philosophers, Mou himself never 
built up a philosophical hermeneutics. Yet some of Mou’s hermeneutical prin-
ciples can be drawn on the basis of the foregoing discussions. In brief, he distin-
guishes between two levels of philosophical interpretation: the philological and 
the philosophical. At the former level, an interpreter must “comprehend the 
meaning on the basis of the letter.” Mou never neglected the methodological 
meaning of this level, insofar as he translated Kant’s main works and explicated 
the basic texts of Chinese philosophy. At the second level of philosophical inter-
pretation, Mou warns us that one must “rely on the spirit, not the letter.” Mou’s 
philosophical creativity can best be sensed in this regard.
In his book Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, he defends his 
interpretation of Chinese philosophy:
One may say, your so doing amounts to forcing Kant into the Chinese 
philosophical tradition. Kant may not wish this, and he may even dis-
like your tradition. I say, what is rational has its necessary consequences 
whether you like it or not. Kant may like to know the Chinese tradition 
since he gave special attention to morality and also was good at discussing 
morality. You think that Kant may not like the Chinese tradition because 
you do not understand the proper, real, and profound meanings of this 
tradition. As long as the proper, real, and profound meanings of the Chi-
nese tradition can be disclosed, I believe it is still Kant who really under-
stands Chinese Confucianism.29
Just as Kant and Heidegger, Mou claims at the second level of philosophical 
interpretation that he understands the author better than the author did him-
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self. If someone questions him at this level regarding whether his interpreta-
tion corresponds to the original meanings of texts, it reveals only the former’s 
ignorance of philosophical thinking as well as the principles and problems of 
hermeneutics. It may be argued that the criteria for distinguishing a creative 
interpretation from a distorted one lie in nothing else but the philosopher’s cre-
ativity. In this sense and to that extent, it seems safe to defend Mou’s philosophi-
cal interpretation of Confucianism, especially in spirit, and not by the letter.
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CHAPTER 2
Modern New Confucians on the Religiousness of 
Confucianism
S i n c e  t h e  s ev en t een t h  c en t u ry,  the question whether or not 
Confucianism is a religion has been a subject of much heated debate in intellec-
tual circles. Before the regime change in mainland China in 1949, most Chinese 
intellectuals, including representative figures of the first generation of Modern 
New Confucians,1 did not regard Confucianism as a religion. Thereafter this 
tendency underwent an essential change with the emergence of the third gen-
eration of Modern New Confucians, especially Tang Junyi, Xu Fuguan, and 
Mou Zongsan. In their view, the Confucian tradition does not lack a religious, 
transcendent spirit, but, as we will see, Xu Fuguan’s view is different from that 
of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. For both Tang and Mou Confucianism is 
a “humanistic religion,” which, for them, means the oneness or conflation of 
humanism and religion. In other words, the humanistic focus of Confucian-
ism has a religious dimension as its essence. Although Xu Fuguan agrees on the 
humanistic emphasis and does not deny that Confucianism originally possessed 
a religious dimension, he claims that this dimension has gradually been trans-
formed and finally replaced by a humanistic spirit in the process of historical 
development.
The Question of Confucianism and Religion
The question of Confucianism as a religion has been debated both inside and 
outside China. The emergence of this question can be traced far back to the 
debates among the Catholic missionaries who came to China in the late Ming 
and early Qing. The Jesuit Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), in accordance with the 
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missionary strategy at the time, attempted to harmonize Confucianism with 
Christian beliefs. In order to bridge the gap between the two and to rule out the 
possibility of direct conflict between Confucianism and Christian doctrines, 
Ricci explicitly emphasized that Confucianism was not a religion.2 However, 
his successor, Nicholas Longobardi (1559–1654), altered his strategies and in 
doing so provoked the “Rites Controversy” within the Roman Catholic Church. 
From the mid-Qing (early nineteenth century) on, Chinese and Western cul-
tures began to come into contact on a much broader scale and the subsequent 
import of the term zong jiao 宗教 (religion) once again evoked a debate over 
whether or not Confucianism was a religion. According to the research of Japa-
nese scholar Suzuki Norihisa, it was the Japanese who initially adopted the Chi-
nese characters zong jiao to translate the term “religion,” which first appeared in 
the Japanese translation of a protest letter submitted by the American ambas-
sador to the Japanese Meiji government in 1868.3 This usage gradually gained 
popularity in Japan and was also adopted by the Chinese intelligentsia.
Under the influence of the European Enlightenment and the underlying 
scientism since the early Republican period (1912 and later), Chinese intel-
lectuals tended to parallel and even equate “religion” and “superstition.” Con-
sequently, the majority of scholars were reluctant to view Confucianism as a 
religion, emphasizing only its humanistic tradition. The only exceptions were 
perhaps Kang Youwei, who endeavored to establish Kongjiao (Confucian reli-
gion) as a national religion, and his followers. However, taking the prevailing 
view of religion as a starting point, Liang Qichao, one of Kang’s senior students, 
published the article “Defending Religion Is Not the Way to Venerate Con-
fucius,” in which he openly opposed the “Kongjiao movement.” His argument 
presupposed that so-called religion in the West is nothing more than supersti-
tion and that religion is not the proper vehicle for progress.4 The renowned 
scholar Wang Guowei 王國維 (1877–1927) also asserted that “the sayings of 
Confucius and Mencius are not really religious, but doctrinal.”5 Another famous 
scholar, Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1869–1936), opposed the Kongjiao movement 
as well by claiming Confucius was not the founder of any religion since he had 
actually rejected religion.6
Yet another example is the leading liberal educator Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 
(1868–1940), who had studied in Berlin and Leipzig (1907–1911) and later 
held important positions in Republican China as minister of education (1912), 
president of Beijing University (1917–1923), and president of Academia Sinica 
(1928–1940). Influenced by the works of Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), he 
advocated the “substitution of aesthetic education for religion.”7 According to 
Cai, human spirit has three functions: cognitive, volitional, and emotional. In 
the beginning of human culture, religion possessed all three of these functions, 
but with cultural and societal progress, the cognitive function was the first to 
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become separated from religion and was taken over by science. Subsequently, 
physiologists, psychologists, and sociologists devoted themselves to research 
on morality and facilitated the emancipation of the volitional function from 
religion, leaving only the remaining function of the emotional, which was most 
connected to art. Hence “aesthetic feeling,” is connected most closely with reli-
gion. But as an appendage to religion “aesthetic feeling” had always been eroded 
by religion, because all religions have the tendency to oppose other religions 
and support for their own purposes authoritarian regimes in a republican age. 
In order to emancipate aesthetic feeling from the negative influences of religion, 
Cai advocates replacing religion with aesthetic education. For him, aesthetic 
education and religion are completely opposite for three reasons: (1) aesthetic 
education is liberal, whereas religion is compulsory; (2) aesthetic education is 
progressive, whereas religion is conservative; and (3) aesthetic education is uni-
versal, whereas religion is specific.
The New Confucians and the Question of Religion
Even representative figures of the first generation of Modern New Confu-
cians such as Xiong Shili and Liang Shuming did not regard Confucianism as 
a religion.8 Xiong Shili, for example, argues that “Chinese philosophy might 
be summarized in the phrase ‘being rooted in itself ’ [ziben zigen 自本自根], 
which was coined in the Zhuangzi. For that reason, Chinese people simply do 
not need religion. In other words, religion depends on the other; it is a kind of 
outward pursuit.”9 In the chapter “The Substitution of Morality for Religion” 
of his book The Essentials of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi 中國文
化要義), Liang Shuming emphasizes that Chinese culture after the time of the 
Duke of Zhou and Confucius “basically does not have a religious life any more” 
because “the teachings of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius do not pertain to 
religion.” He argues that, even though Confucianism is not a religion, it still 
possesses some quasi-religious functions by “arranging ethical relationships to 
organize society and designing and establishing rituals, music, and civility to 
cultivate people’s reason.” Therefore, it can be said to “substitute morality for 
religion.”10
The tendency to make the subject of religion taboo did not undergo any 
essential change until the emergence of the second generation of Modern New 
Confucians. In the wake of shifts in the political and social situation after the 
1949 regime change in mainland China, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, Zhang 
Junmai, and Xu Fuguan fled and took refuge in Taiwan and Hong Kong or in 
foreign countries. They profoundly felt the agony of “the falling and wither-
ing of the blossoms and fruits” of Chinese culture. For them, the changing of 
the banner in China meant not only a transition of political power, but also a 
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serious cultural crisis. This situation led them to reflect deeply on the underly-
ing aspects of Chinese culture. In the course of their reflections, they inevitably 
encountered what they regarded to be the misunderstandings and prejudices 
held by Westerners. One of these prejudices is that Chinese people only attach 
importance to everyday-life ethics and morality and lack a religious transcen-
dent feeling. Chinese ethical and moral ideals were considered merely to be 
concerned with regulating people’s external behavior while neglecting the inter-
nal dimensions of spiritual life. This misunderstanding can be traced back to 
Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy:
We have conversations between Confucius and his followers in which 
there is nothing definite further than a commonplace moral put in the 
form of good, sound doctrine, which may be found as well expressed and 
better, in every place and amongst every people. Cicero gives us De Offi-
ciis, a book of moral teaching more comprehensive and better than all the 
books of Confucius. He is hence only a man who has a certain amount 
of practical and worldly wisdom—one with whom there is no specula-
tive philosophy. We may conclude from his original works that for their 
reputation it would have been better had they never been translated.11
In January 1958, the four Confucians jointly published the “Manifesto 
Regarding Chinese Culture to People All over the World” 為中國文化敬告世
界人士宣言.12 The “Manifesto” is composed of twelve sections, and the fifth 
section, “Ethics, Morality, and Religious Spirit in Chinese Culture,” especially 
targets this prejudice with the intention of clarifying it. The authors admit that 
Western-style institutionalized religion and an independent religious cultural 
tradition are absent in Chinese culture, but this does not mean that Chinese 
people only pay attention to everyday-life ethics and morals and lack a religious 
spirit. In their view “since the religious transcendent feelings of Chinese people 
and the religious spirit they value have the same cultural roots as the ethics and 
morality the people cherish, they integrate the religious with the ethical and 
moral spirit as one inseparable entity.”13 These words mainly address the Con-
fucian tradition, emphasizing the oneness of morality and the religious spirit.
Because the “Manifesto” was drafted by Tang Junyi, it corresponds per-
fectly to an idea propounded in his book Mind, Matter, and Human Life (Xin 
wu yu rensheng 心物與人生). According to this idea, “religion is also a realm of 
the human world. Religion is culture, a kind of culture in which the whole of 
human life or the whole personality is related to the ultimate reality and truth of 
the cosmos, a kind of culture where heaven and humans meet and interact with 
each other.”14 In other words, religion and culture (humanism) are so intimately 
connected to each other in the Confucian tradition that they are inseparable. 
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To put it most directly, culture is nothing other than religion. If Confucianism 
is humanism, it is a sort of humanism with a profound religious dimension—
that is to say, it is oriented toward religion.15 This characteristic is similar to 
what the American scholar Herbert Fingarette called “the secular as sacred.”16
In light of this orientation of the Chinese tradition, Mou Zongsan views 
Confucianism as a “humanistic religion,” uniting humanism and religion as 
one. His article “Humanism and Religion” elaborates this idea and also refers 
to “humanistic religion” as “moral religion.” As he further explains, “A moral 
religion that is able to be the foundation for the establishment of a nation must 
have two dimensions: First, it is able to regulate and guide everyday life . . . ; Sec-
ond, it is able to lift spirits and to provoke inspiration, that is, it is able to main-
tain and create the life of culture.”17
According to these two criteria, he further elucidates in what sense “human-
istic religion” represented by Confucianism can be regarded as a religion:
The reason that humanistic religion is a religion lies in that, while it can 
be down to earth to regulate and guide everyday life, it can also be as 
lofty as confirming a transcendent and universal moral, spiritual entity. 
This entity becomes a “divine entity” and “source of values” with reli-
gious significance through the worship of Heaven, ancestors, and sages. 
The God in Christianity becomes an object of worship merely because 
of Jesus; therefore God is separate from the human world. The entity of 
worship in a humanistic religion, on the contrary, is not separate from 
the human world, because it becomes an object of worship with religious 
significance on the basis of the whole system composed of Heaven, ances-
tors, and sages. This constitutes the reason why it is a humanistic reli-
gion. How could it not be a superior and perfect religion? But what we 
talk about here as zong jiao is not “religion” as defined in the Western 
tra dition.18
Later, Mou Zongsan expands the connotations of “moral religion” in The Heart-
Mind as Reality and Human Nature as Reality to accommodate the three main 
Chinese cultural traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. In the 
introduction to the first part of volume 1, he ascribes the Daoist “principle of 
mysteriousness” (xuanli 玄理), the Buddhist “principle of nothingness” (kongli 
空理), and the Confucian “principle of human nature” (xingli 性理) to “moral 
religion.” He further explains, “What Song and Ming Confucians talked about 
is actually the ‘learning of moral human nature’ [xingli zhi xue 性理之學]. It is 
both morality and religion; that is, morality is religion. Herein morality and 
religion have the same nature and finally become one.”19
In an August 1980 interview more than a decade after the publication 
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of the “Manifesto,” Xu Fuguan indicated that he by no means agreed com-
pletely with the ideas regarding the relation between Confucianism and reli-
gion as expressed in the document. At the time he suggested that Tang Junyi 
might modify them, but the suggestion fell on deaf ears. Contrary to Tang, Xu 
believed that “Chinese culture originally also possessed religiousness and did 
not reject religion. Since the Spring and Autumn Period, however, it had gradu-
ally separated itself from religion and become rooted in human life. There is no 
need for it to turn back.”20 This confession concerns different understandings 
of the Confucian Way of Heaven within Modern New Confucianism. The dif-
ferences are subtle enough that they were often overlooked by past researchers. 
If Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan saw the essence of Confucianism in its pattern 
of thinking with regard to “integrating humanism and religion,” Xu Fuguan dis-
cerned the fundamental direction of Confucianism in the transformation from 
religious consciousness to humanistic consciousness.
The view upheld by Xu Fuguan was naturally not formed overnight; it 
was the result of his long study of Chinese intellectual history. In his History 
of Chinese Theories of Human Nature: The Pre-Qin Period (Zhongguo renxing 
lun shi: xian Qin pian 中國人性論史：先秦篇), he construes the development 
of the whole of Chinese intellectual history before the Qin as a process of the 
gradual humanization of the primitive religious consciousness that originated 
in the Shang dynasty. According to his elucidation this kind of transformation 
to humanism is formed through the Zhou people’s “consciousness of sorrow 
and worry” ( youhuan yishi 憂患意識) as a sense of morality. Their conscious-
ness of sorrow and worry is expressed through the concept of “reverence” ( jing 
敬). Xu contrasts this consciousness of sorrow and worry with the “conscious-
ness of horror” that constitutes the foundation of primitive religions. In these 
archaic religions ordinary people were driven by horror and despair and often 
felt themselves to be insignificant and weak. Consequently, they gave up their 
responsibilities and entrusted their fates to external gods or to Heaven. In con-
trast, the consciousness of sorrow and worry stems from human beings’ spiritual 
self-consciousness and is expressed as a sense of responsibility in human affairs.21
For Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan, religion and humanism as well as tran-
scendence and immanence are two sides of the same coin in Confucian thought. 
On one hand, they connect with each other and are inseparable, but there is also 
an eternal tension between them, on the other hand. For Xu Fuguan, however, 
the essence of Confucianism unambiguously lies on the side of humanism and 
immanence. Although he does not deny that Confucianism originally possessed 
a religious dimension, he insists that this dimension has gradually been trans-
formed over time and finally replaced by a humanistic spirit in the process of 
historical development. In short, for Tang and Mou the tension between reli-
gion and humanism as well as between transcendence and immanence consti-
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tutes the essence of Confucianism. Xu Fuguan, however, limits the significance 
of the religiousness of Confucianism to a certain historical period rather than 
regarding it as an essential element of Confucianism. In other words, for Xu 
Fuguan, Confucianism is a consummate humanism, and its religiousness is no 
more than a residue of history.
The Historical Roots of the Difference in Understanding
This difference in understanding actually comes from the different understand-
ings of the transformation of Confucianism from Confucius through the Doc-
trine of the Mean to Mencius. According to the records in classics such as the 
Book of Changes, the Book of Documents (Shangshu 尚書), and the Book of Poetry 
(Shijing 詩經), Chinese people before the Zhou dynasty did indeed have a strong 
sense of religion and performed sacrificial activities frequently. The objects of 
sacrifice included Heaven and Earth, ancestry, ghosts and gods, the sun, moon, 
stars, and natural phenomena such as the four seasons and disasters like flood 
and drought, the four directions, and so forth. This primitive system of beliefs 
even includes faith in the supreme god Tian 天 (Heaven) or Shangdi 上帝.
In the development of the religious tradition in the Zhou dynasty, Con-
fucius occupied a crucial position. Through his doctrines, he internalized both 
the external order of ritual and music in Zhou culture and the transcendent god 
Tian or Shangdi, as recorded in the Book of Poetry and the Book of Documents, 
into human nature and moral practice. The contribution made by Confucius in 
these two aspects is similar in nature and significance to Kant’s in the develop-
ment of Western ethics and the philosophy of religion. By introducing the con-
cept of “autonomy” into his ethics, Kant ascribed the origin of moral norms to 
the moral subject or to practical reason and advanced a “Copernican revolution 
in ethics.”22 By the same token, Confucius also finds in the moral subject and 
the humaneness it embodies the origin of the external order of ritual and music 
and the criteria for judging them. This is why he said, “When one talks about 
ritual, does it merely mean gifts of jade and silk? When one talks about music, 
does it merely mean bells and drums?” (Analects 17.11) and “What has a person 
who is not humane got to do with observing the rituals? What has a person 
who is not humane got to do with the playing of music?” (Analects 3.3). Fur-
thermore, he finds that the strength for practicing humaneness lies precisely in 
our own subjectivity. As he said: “Observing the rituals through self-discipline 
is humaneness. If for a single day one were able to accomplish this, the whole 
world would defer to this humane model. Becoming humane in one’s conduct is 
self-originating—how could it originate with others?” (Analects 12.1).23
According to the records in the Analects, Confucius’ thought has two 
aspects. On one hand, he still has a strong sense of Heaven or the Heavenly 
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Mandate—several cases even indicate that “Heaven” as construed by Confu-
cius still carried the flavor of a personal god. On the other hand, his notion of 
Heaven also shows a shift toward rationalization and humanization. Whereas 
the former highlights the transcendence of Heaven, the latter projects its imma-
nence. Xu Fuguan’s understanding, however, places the stress on the side of 
immanence:
What Confucius calls the Heavenly Mandate, Heavenly Way, or Heaven, 
if put in the simplest words, actually refers to the transempirical character 
of morality. Owing to its transempirical character, morality possesses uni-
versality and eternality. Because of its transempirical character, it could 
only be represented and symbolized at that time by traditional terms like 
“Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” or “Heavenly Way.” The universality and 
eternality of morality are precisely the real content of what Confucius 
calls “Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” or “Heavenly Way.”24
In light of this interpretation, when Confucius uses traditional terms like 
“Heaven,” “Heavenly Mandate,” and “Heavenly Way,” he intends merely the 
transempirical character of morality rather than any substantial religious con-
notation. In this sense the “Heavenly Mandate” that Confucius was aware of 
when he was fifty years old is “a Heavenly Mandate with moral character rather 
than one with religious character,”25 and his “awe of Heavenly Mandate” is actu-
ally “reverence for the endless moral obligations and responsibilities in his inter-
nal personal world.”26 As Xu further elaborates:
In Confucius’ mind, Heaven is merely the consciousness of the existence 
of cosmic life and laws in the face of phenomena such as “the four seasons 
proceed, myriad things on earth grow.” He neither took a step forward to 
make a further metaphysical exploration of this, nor did he regard it as 
proof of the existence of a personal god in any way.27
Regarding the concept of “Heavenly Mandate” in the Doctrine of the Mean, 
Xu Fuguan provides a similar reading:
The term “Heaven” as in “The Mandate of Heaven can be called mor-
alized human nature” does not loosely refer to the sky over our heads. 
Instead it is a kind of internal moral self-guide, expressed in the process 
of introspection and elimination of vices, which cannot be transformed 
or influenced by the external world. The so-called Heavenly Mandate 
merely refers to the mind that, when one gets to the bottom of it, shows 
itself to be irresistibly driven by an unknown power while being free of 
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any physical bonds. The mind at this moment, because of being free of 
any physical, a posteriori bonds, only feels itself as a priori existence, 
namely, a kind of universal existence that breaks through varied a poste-
riori barriers. Thus in the Doctrine of the Mean it is named by the tradi-
tional term “Heaven.”28
The same line of thought also appears in Xu Fuguan’s interpretation of 
Mencius’ notion of the “Heavenly Way.” Mencius made the statement: “For a 
man to give full realization to his heart-mind is for him to understand his own 
nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. By preserv-
ing his heart-mind and nurturing his nature he is serving Heaven” (Mencius 
7A.1).29 Xu Fuguan’s reading of these words is as follows:
The truth is that beyond the heart-mind there is no human nature, and 
beyond human nature there is no Heaven. This is why Mencius can say that 
“by preserving one’s heart-mind and nurturing one’s nature he is serving 
Heaven.” If beyond the heart-mind there was human nature and beyond 
the heart-mind and human nature there was Heaven, then, even if one 
claims full realization of his heart-mind, he would not necessarily know 
human nature. Consequently, preserving the heart-mind and cultivating 
human nature would also not be directly regarded as serving Heaven. The 
reason why the generally mentioned “serving Heaven” is always expressed 
in the form of religious rituals lies in [the belief ] that Heaven is beyond 
and above the heart-mind of the human being. . . . Mencius thinks that 
preserving the heart-mind and cultivating human nature are the way of 
serving Heaven. In this way, he completely accommodates the pursuits of 
ancient religion and transforms them into the expansion of the morality 
embodied in his body and heart-mind. Beyond one’s own moral character, 
there is nowhere to accommodate the religious illusions.30
Xu Fuguan summarizes the essential character of the Doctrine of the Mean 
in one sentence: “Confucianism takes morality as its core; the Doctrine of the 
Mean, by pointing out the immanent but also transcendent character of moral-
ity, establishes the foundation of morality.”31 His ensuing explanation shows 
that what he calls “transcendent character” actually refers to universality in a 
transempirical sense and has no religious connotation. On this understand-
ing he even criticizes his teacher Xiong Shili and his good friend Tang Junyi by 
name, insisting that their attempts to create metaphysics from Confucianism 
actually run counter to Confucius’ basic thought.32 His criticism also covertly 
targets Mou Zongsan.
Although Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan agree with Xu Fuguan’s stance 
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of viewing the development of pre-Qin Confucianism as a process of human-
ization and affirm the intellectual turn taken by Confucius, the Confucian 
tradition in their view still preserves some kind of religious consciousness in 
the process even with the caveat that it might have undergone a certain trans-
formation. Moreover, this religious consciousness has by no means faded with 
the development of Confucianism. On the contrary, it has become an essential 
ingredient. According to the ideas presented in the “Manifesto,” religious con-
sciousness expresses itself in three areas. The first area is the practice of sacrifi-
cial rituals of Heaven and Earth worship and ancestor worship. Notions such 
as “the harmony of Heavenly virtues and human virtues” (Tian ren hede 天人
合德), “harmony between Heaven and humanity” (Tian ren heyi 天人合一), 
“Heaven and humanity are not two separate entities” (Tian ren bu er 天人不
二), “Heaven and humanity have the same substance” (Tian ren tongti 天人同
體), and so forth represent the second area. And the third is the belief in the 
values of humaneness and righteousness and in the Way itself, and the deter-
mination to sacrifice oneself to achieve humaneness and to give up one’s life to 
obtain righteousness.33
In his Development of the Chinese Humanistic Spirit (Zhongguo renwen 
jingshen zhi fazhan 中國人文精神之發展), Tang Junyi emphasizes the religious 
significance of the three sacrificial rituals of Heaven-Earth worship, ancestor 
worship, and sage worship.34 In addition, in his masterpiece The Existence of Life 
and Horizons of the Soul (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jing jie 生命存在與心靈
境界), which was written in his old age, he puts forth the notion of “nine hori-
zons of the soul,” dividing the horizons that the soul can reach through dialecti-
cal development into “objective horizons,” “subjective horizons,” and “horizons 
beyond both the objective and the subjective.” In the “horizons beyond both 
the objective and the subjective” in the final stage, Christianity, Buddhism, and 
Confucianism respectively represent the three horizons from bottom to top in 
terms of perfection. In his mind, Confucianism represents the zenith of the reli-
gious horizons.
Mou Zongsan also identifies “religiousness” as an essential ingredient 
of Confucianism. The collection of his lectures published in 1962 titled The 
Characteristics of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi 中國哲學的
特質) concludes with the chapter “Confucianism as a Religion,” emphasizing 
Confucianism’s strong religious character or spirit. Written in his later years and 
published in 1985, On the Highest Good reexamines the issue of “the highest 
good” propounded by Kant by incorporating it into the line of the Buddhist 
“perfect teaching” ( yuanjiao 圓教). Mou Zongsan addresses the “perfect teach-
ings” of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism, respectively, and finally identi-
fies himself with the perfect teaching of Confucianism, making it the highest 
type of religion for him.
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A Headless Humanism
It is clear that Xu Fuguan holds a view on the relationship of Confucianism and 
religion that is different from that of Tang and Mou. For Xu Fuguan, the devel-
opment of pre-Qin Chinese intellectual history is a process of humanization, and 
the essence of Confucianism lies in its substituting humanistic spirit for religious 
consciousness. As for concepts of primitive religions such as “Heaven,” “Heavenly 
Mandate,” or “Heavenly Way,” which appeared in pre-Qin documents, especially 
in the Analects, Xu Fuguan either regards them as residues of history or inter-
prets them through a rationalizing process. Regarding the development of meta-
physics that appeared in Confucianism after the Qin and Han dynasties such as 
Zhou Dunyi’s 周敦頤 (1017–1073) Explanations of the Diagram of the Supreme 
Ultimate (Taijitu shuo 太極圖說) or religious thought such as the Han Confu-
cians’ theory of “interaction between Heaven and humanity” (Tian ren ganying 
天人感應), Xu regards them all as deviations from the core of Confucian doc-
trines. Contrary to Tang and Mou’s understanding, in Xu’s eyes, the relationship 
between Confucianism and religion expresses itself in a totally different image. 
Although the process of humanization of pre-Qin Confucianism transformed 
primitive religious consciousness, it only internalized the concept of a god into 
human nature and moral practice from the external transcendent character in 
the Book of Poetry and the Book of Documents. In doing so, it was turned into 
another type of religious consciousness. Confucius’ idea of “the Heavenly Way” 
retains the flavor of a personal god, with the process of internalization not being 
completed until the emergence of the Doctrine of the Mean. Thereafter, Confu-
cianism still retained a transcendent religious consciousness, but no longer with 
a personal god as its object. In this kind of religious consciousness, religion and 
humanism or the transcendent and the immanent are not opposed to each other, 
even though there are certain tensions between them. As for the Han Confu-
cians’ theory of the “interaction between Heaven and humanity,” Tang and Mou 
also regard it as a deviation from the core of Confucian doctrines, because it runs 
counter to the notion of moral autonomy.
The Xu Fuguan brand of humanism with any religious character excluded 
might conform to what Mou Zongsan has called “headless humanism.”35 Though 
Mou never mentioned Xu’s name in criticism, Mou undoubtedly opposed this 
sort of “headless humanism.” Mou’s Moral Idealism (Daode de lixiangzhuyi 道
德的理想主義) includes chapters titled “The Basic Spirit of Humanism” and 
“Completion of Humanism,” which analyze Western humanism. In the latter, 
Mou expresses himself explicitly:
The religious tradition carries the highest enlightening power for moral 
spirituality and cultural ideals. . . . The sense of divinity and sin in moral 
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religion, which is contained in the inward contraction and the upward 
transcending of the authentic religious spirit, possesses the lofty signifi-
cance of humanism. At this moment humanism should absorb it [the 
sense of divinity and sin] and meld with it. In this way humanism will 
be connected to the religious tradition, and we will not be opposed to 
any great religious spirit. On the other hand, any great religious spirit 
through the elevation by and melding with humanism will also gradu-
ally shed its radical character and begin to reflect on itself step by step in 
order to fully adjust, broaden, and promote itself.36
Xu Fuguan’s “headless humanism” can be regarded as a rather unique the-
ory. At its core is a set of ethics, but it cannot provide a set of explanations of the 
world itself. Given the history of the development of Confucianism, its explan-
atory power is fairly limited. Putting aside the Han Confucians’ theory of the 
“interaction between Heaven and humanity,” is it true that the “three sacrificial 
rituals,” which existed throughout the history of the development of Confu-
cianism, and the relation between Heaven and humanity, which had become 
the focus of discussion in Song-Ming Confucianism for hundreds of years, are 
merely residues of history? In the entire history of the development of Song-
Ming Confucianism, the propounding of the relation between Heaven and 
humanity not only concerns moral psychology, but also provides an explana-
tion of the ultimate reality of the cosmos. This kind of explanation goes beyond 
the scope of any “headless humanism.” As far as this point is concerned, Tang’s 
and Mou’s ideas are more consistent with the historical development of Con-
fucianism and better elucidate its constituted essence. It is little wonder that 
none of the third generation of New Confucians such as Liu Shu-hsien or Tu 
Wei-ming adopts Xu Fuguan’s interpretation. On the contrary, they repeatedly 
emphasize Confucianism’s religiousness. As early as 1971, Liu Shu-hsien pub-
lished an article titled “The Religious Import of Confucian Philosophy: Its Tra-
ditional Outlook and Contemporary Significance” that elucidated the issue of 
religiousness.37 Likewise, Xu Fuguan’s student Tu Wei-ming takes the Doctrine 
of the Mean as being representative in showing the religiousness of Confucian-
ism.38 Moreover, the combination of this sort of religiousness with humanism 
not only makes Confucian humanism different from modern Western human-
ism and distinguishes Confucian religiousness from the “Abrahamic religions,” 
but it marks Chinese religiosity as being profoundly unique.

PART I I




The Debate on Ren between Zhu Xi and  
the Huxiang Scholars
Mo d er n  sc h o l a r s  of classical Chinese philosophy find the indistinct-
ness of notions as well as the lack of a single conceptual system to be among the 
greatest obstacles to the interpretation of philosophical texts. These character-
istics are traceable to the uniqueness of the mode of writing and even thinking 
that prevailed in ancient China. An example of this uniqueness is the Analects, 
which is the most authoritative Confucian text, composed of a series of discon-
nected short dialogues and events wherein we cannot discern a single overarch-
ing systematic series of representations. In part, this is because of how the text 
was compiled. Two generations of students collected their quotes for almost 
a century, and it took another hundred years before those quotes were “tied 
together” as a single book. As Michael Nylan writes in her edited book on the 
Analects, “The text is a patchwork: fragments from different hands have been 
stitched together, with uneven skill—there are some repetitions, interpolations, 
and contradictions; there are some puzzles and countless loopholes; but on the 
whole, there are very few stylistic anachronisms: the language and syntax of 
most of the fragments is coherent and pertains to the same period.”1
This is in contrast to the somewhat more systematic dialogues of Plato,2 
especially the earlier ones, where the elenchus, or method of Socrates, is revealed 
with discussions that often begin with a definition of terms and are then fol-
lowed by a disputation by Socrates. The elenchus usually unfolds with the asser-
tion of a thesis, which becomes the target of refutation by Socrates, followed 
by his introduction of further agreed upon premises that ultimately imply the 
falsity of the original thesis, making its negation true.3 Although at some level 
it is appropriate to call these discussions debates or arguments, they typically 
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unravel in good nature (similar to the “debates” in Chinese philosophy) with 
the emphasis placed on dialogue, a going through (dia) language (logos) to 
ascertain the truth and a better way of ultimately being human.
To be sure, in the Analects we also occasionally find argumentation, such as 
that in 17.21 where Confucius discusses the significance of a three-year mourn-
ing period with his pupil Zai Wo 宰我,4 but most dialogues in the Analects lack 
argumentation. The use of the Hegelian idea of notion5 in the Analects is also 
unfamiliar to modern readers. As is well known, the notion of ren 仁 6 holds a 
central position in Confucius’ thought. There are forty-eight sections in the 
Analects where Confucius uses the notion of ren and discusses its meaning. In 
addition, there are five sections where Confucius’ pupils talk about ren. Among 
these examples, however, we find no consistent formulation, except between 
passages 17.17 and 1.3. In the Analects we do not find attempts by Confucius to 
establish a precise Socratic-like definition of ren. Owing to these characteristics 
of Confucius’ sayings, Hegel in a moment of Germanic superiority dismissed 
the Analects because they lacked the kind of speculative philosophy and rigor 
found in Cicero’s De officiis.7
Confucius’ way of “defining” key concepts not only perplexes modern 
readers, but has led to over a millennium of debates by later Confucians to 
ascertain what he actually meant. The Song Confucian scholar and philosopher 
Cheng Hao expressed perhaps just a little exasperation when he commented on 
passage 6.30 in the Analects: “It is very difficult to speak of ren.”8 His younger 
brother Cheng Yi also wrote: “It is very difficult to describe the principle of ren. 
The closest term to it is gong 公 [impartiality]; but this does not mean that gong 
is identical to ren.”9 Zhu Xi quoted the comment by Cheng Hao about ren and 
explained it in similar terms: “It is not easy to speak of ren, because it is subtle in 
its entirety.”10 The subtlety of extremely fundamental terms was in many ways 
an acceptable practice in the Chinese philosophical tradition and would have 
likely been a practice rejected by the Greeks and the subsequent Western philo-
sophical tradition.
Conceivably because of the difficulty in apprehending Confucius’ notion 
of ren, Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133–1180) compiled a book with the title Confucius’ 
Sayings about Ren (Zhu Si yan ren 洙泗言仁). This book is no longer extant, 
but its preface is preserved in Zhang’s collected works.11 The preface lists the 
text’s contents: (1) sayings about ren from the Lu edition of the Analects; (2) 
the Cheng brothers’ interpretations of ren; and (3) Zhang Shi’s comments on 
the Cheng brothers’ interpretations.12 At first Zhu Xi opposed the compilation 
of this text and others like it for two fundamental reasons. First, since all sayings 
of Confucius have direct or indirect references to ren, extra glosses are unneces-
sary. Second, these texts encourage pupils to take shortcuts in their moral self-
cultivation instead of following the proper and prescribed order.13 However, in 
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a letter to Zhang Shi, Zhu Xi admitted that compilations like Confucian Say-
ings about Ren would be conducive to moral self-cultivation.14 This book was 
followed by a series of similar compilations that later became popular among 
Confucians.15
The difficulty in comprehending Confucius’ sayings about ren originates 
from the fact that these sayings give neither lexical explanations of terms found 
in later Han Confucian writings, nor do they offer philosophical definitions of 
the type Socrates attempted to create. Mou Zongsan has pointed out that Con-
fucius’ sayings about ren are suggestive and heuristic in nature with a view to 
lead people into realizing ren as a morally creative reality.16 Confucius, therefore, 
varied his explanations of ren according to the dialogic situation, the pedagogic 
demand, and the rank and temperament of his speech partners. In this sense, 
it is an exercise in futility to attempt to find a lexical (nominal) or philosophi-
cal (real) definition that will accord with all of Confucius’ renditions of what 
constitutes ren. In what follows, I discuss the problem of the interpretation of 
ren in terms of the debate between Zhu Xi and the scholars of the Huxiang 湖
湘 school, among which Zhang Shi ranks as one leader. Hu Hong, the founder 
of the Huxiang school, was Zhang Shi’s teacher. Because Hu, Zhang, and their 
followers carried out their cultural and intellectual activities mainly in the area 
of Huxiang (Hunan province), the school was given this designation.
The Zhu Xi–Zhang Shi Debate on Zhong and He
Just before the debate between Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi took place, Zhu Xi’s phil-
osophical development took a crucial turn. He changed his interpretation of 
the notions of “equilibrium” (zhong 中) and “harmony” (he 和) as found in the 
Doctrine of the Mean. At first Zhu Xi followed his teacher Li Tong 李侗 (1093–
1163) on questions of achieving the primordial tranquility of heart-mind 
through quiet-sitting ( jingzuo 靜坐). In 1168, still under the influence of his 
teacher five years after Li’s death, he formulated his own interpretation of “equi-
librium and harmony.”17 In formulating this interpretation, Zhu Xi exchanged 
ideas with Zhang Shi in person as well as through correspondence. In 1169 at 
the age of forty, Zhu Xi suddenly felt doubtful about this “old interpretation” 
as a result of conversations with his pupil Cai Yuanding 蔡元定 (1135–1198). 
This prompted Zhu Xi to spawn a “new interpretation” of “equilibrium and 
harmony,” which he formulated in his “Treatise on the Manifest State of Heart-
Mind and the Indistinct State of Heart-Mind ” as well as in his correspondence 
with Zhang Shi and his followers.
A comparison between Zhu Xi’s old and new interpretations of equilib-
rium and harmony is much too complex to be fully discussed in this chapter, and 
it is also unnecessary because Mou Zongsan studied this difference in detail.18 
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In brief, Zhu Xi’s “old interpretation,” according to Mou’s analysis, reflected his 
wavering between Cheng Hao’s and Cheng Yi’s directions of thought, whereas 
his “new interpretation” exclusively followed Cheng Yi. An essential contribu-
tion of Mou to the study of Neo-Confucianism lies in how he differentiated 
Cheng Hao’s direction of thought from Cheng Yi’s, instead of following previ-
ous scholars who treated them as a pair.19 Generally speaking, Zhu Xi’s formula-
tion of the new interpretation of “equilibrium and harmony” marked the fixing 
of his own philosophical framework. As Mou puts it, this framework includes 
a dual ontological structure of li 理 (principle) and qi 氣 (material force), as 
well as a threefold anthropological structure of xin 心 (heart-mind), xing 性 
(nature), and qing 情 (emotion or feeling). For Zhu Xi, xing belongs to the 
higher realm of li, whereas xin and qing belong to the lower realm of qi; and xin 
as the subtlest of qi (qi zhi ling 氣之靈) integrates xing and qing with each other.
Within this philosophical framework, Zhu Xi drafted his “Treatise on 
Ren” (Ren shuo 仁說).20 This treatise took its final form after Zhu Xi’s repeated 
correspondence with Zhang Shi.21 Around the same time, Zhang Shi also wrote 
an essay with the same title.22 Owing to the remarkable similarity between 
the formulations found in both treatises, Zhang Shi’s treatise was mistakenly 
considered to be Zhu Xi’s, and the latter was considered to be a preface to the 
former.23 As Hitoshi Sato points out, even Zhu Xi’s pupils Chen Chun 陳淳 
(1159–1223) and Xiong Jie 熊節 (who received the jinshi degree in 1199) 
thought that Zhang’s treatise came from the hands of their teacher.24 On the 
basis of these facts, the contemporary scholar Liu Shu-hsien suggests that Zhu 
Xi, as editor of Zhang Shi’s collected writings, wrote another treatise on ren and 
added it to the collection.25 The key argument for this thesis rests on Zhang’s 
radical turn away from the views of the Huxiang school to those of Zhu Xi, as 
reflected in the text of this treatise. Liu writes: “I have grave suspicions about 
such a radical change in Zhang Shi’s thought. Frankly speaking, I suspect that 
this treatise on ren, in fact, did not come from the hands of Zhang Shi.”26 This 
thesis is strongly disputed by Wing-tsit Chan.27 Chan’s stance should likely be 
preferred since Liu seems to ignore the fact that the resemblance between the 
treatises of Zhu and Zhang is superficial rather than substantial. Even after the 
end of this debate, Zhu Xi acknowledged that there were differences between 
his views and those of Zhang. Once, Zhu’s pupil Zheng Kexue 鄭可學 (1152–
1212) asked him: “My master, in former times you repeatedly discussed ren 
with Nanxuan 南軒 [Zhang Shi]. Did you agree with each other in the end?” 
Then Zhu Xi answered: “There still were some disagreements. The views of 
Jingfu 敬夫 [Zhang Shi] come from Mr. Hu [Hong].”28 In order to determine 
where these “disagreements” lie, it is necessary to make a philosophical compari-
son between the texts of the two treatises.
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The Treatise on Ren
In his standard work Heart-Mind as Reality and Nature as Reality, Mou Zong-
san has a detailed philosophical analysis of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Ren” and his 
discussions about the interpretation of ren with Zhang Shi and his followers.29 
Surprisingly, however, nowhere in this work does Mou mention Zhang Shi’s 
treatise on ren. According to Mou’s analysis, the debate between Zhu Xi and 
Zhang Shi concerned the following topics: (1) the meaning of xin and its onto-
logical position, (2) the relation between ren and love (ai 愛), (3) the relation 
between ren and jue 覺 or zhijue 知覺,30 (4) the thesis of the unity of all things 
and the self, (5) the relation between ren and gong (impartiality), and (6) the 
interpretation of Analects 4.7.31 Since point 6 is secondary, the following discus-
sions are limited to points 1 through 5.
Before proceeding to the meaning of xin and its ontological position, it is 
informative to repeat Zhu Xi’s well-known definition of ren as “the principle 
[li] of love and the character [de 德] of xin.” In the first part of this definition, 
ren is viewed as the metaphysical ground for love as a kind of feeling (qing). 
In his twofold ontological structure, ren as xing (nature) belongs to the higher 
abstract realm of li, and love as qing belongs to the lower concrete realm of qi. 
In the second half of this definition, Zhu Xi provides an ethical gloss for ren by 
viewing ren as the metaphysical ground for the activities of xin (heart-mind) as 
moral agency. In his dual framework, the relation of xin to ren is the same as that 
of qi to li, with the caveat that xin is “the subtlest of qi.”
Now let us consider the first section of Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Ren”:32
“Heaven and Earth have the mind to produce things.” In the production 
of man and things, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their 
mind. Therefore, with reference to the character of the mind, although 
it embraces and penetrates all and leaves nothing to be desired, neverthe-
less, one word will cover all of it, namely, ren. Let me try to explain fully. 
The moral qualities of the mind of Heaven and Earth are four: origina-
tion ( yuan 元), flourishing (heng 亨), advantages (li 利), and firmness 
(zhen 貞). Moreover, the principle of origination unites and controls 
them all. In their operation they constitute the course of the four seasons, 
and the material force (qi) of spring permeates all. Therefore, in the mind 
of man there are also four moral qualities—namely, humanity (ren), righ-
teousness ( yi 義), propriety (li 禮), and comprehension (zhi 智)—and 
ren embraces them all. In their emanation and function, they constitute 
the feeling of love, respect, being right, and discrimination between right 
and wrong—and the heart of commiseration pervades them all. . . . For 
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ren as the Way (dao 道) consists of the fact that the mind of Heaven and 
Earth that produces all things is present in everything.
The primary question in this passage concerns “the mind of Heaven and Earth.” 
What does this phrase specifically mean? In his discussions with Zhu Xi about 
the old text of this treatise, Zhang Shi expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
proposition “Heaven and Earth have the mind to produce things.”33 Surpris-
ingly, this proposition came from Cheng Hao,34 whose direction of thought 
Zhang Shi usually followed. In reply, Zhu Xi stressed that Heaven and Earth 
possess the Way (dao) for producing things but that the process of producing 
is separate from the Way.35 In a letter to Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi suggested replac-
ing this proposition with the following: “The mind of Heaven and Earth that 
produces all things is that which man receives as his mind.”36 From this cor-
respondence it would appear that by “the mind of Heaven and Earth” Zhu Xi 
understood the principle (li) for the process of producing in the realm of qi 
rather than a cosmic mind with creative forces (as did Zhang Shi). So in this 
context Zhu Xi used the term “mind” (xin) only as an analogy, as Mou Zongsan 
has pointed out.37
In the first paragraph of Zhu Xi’s treatise on ren, we see four different 
orders: ontological (origination, flourishing, advantages, firmness), cosmic 
(spring, summer, autumn, winter), onto-ethical (humanity, righteousness, pro-
priety, comprehension), and ethico-psychological (love, respect, being right, 
and discriminating between right and wrong). In his dual ontological frame-
work, the relation of the first to the second order is nothing more than the rela-
tion of li to qi; and the relation of the third to the fourth order is the relation of 
xing to qing, which specifies the relation of li to qi. For Zhu Xi, li as principle is 
abstract and static; it contains no action in itself.38 Although it can be a meta-
physical ground for some action, this occurs only in the realm of qi. Conse-
quently Zhu Xi does not conceive of principle as a metaphysical entity with 
creative forces, since creation means action.
In contrast, Zhang Shi’s treatise on ren continues to promote his notion 
of such a metaphysical entity: “What is called the principle of love is none 
other than the mind of Heaven and Earth to produce things, and it is from this 
that ren originates.”39 It should be noted that Zhang Shi does not use the term 
“mind” as an analogy in the way Zhu Xi did. This is apparent in subsequent pas-
sages: “If nothing beclouds the principle of love, it will be internally combined 
with Heaven and Earth and all things like arteries and veins and hence func-
tion everywhere.”40 Here the principle of love, which Zhang identifies with “the 
mind of Heaven and Earth,” is obviously not only an abstract, static principle 
(as in Zhu Xi), but a dynamic entity with creative force that can penetrate all 
things. This is just one of the core ideas of the Huxiang school, which can be 
Debate on Ren between Zhu Xi & Huxiang Scholars 47
traced back to Cheng Hao. In Zhang Shi’s preface to Confucian Sayings about 
Ren, compiled around 1170 and hence before his discussion about ren with 
Zhu Xi, we find also “Ren is the mind of Heaven and Earth, which is present in 
humans. This is what ren means.”41 From this it would appear that, with respect 
to “the mind of Heaven and Earth,” Zhang Shi did not change his original posi-
tion after his discussion with Zhu Xi.
To be sure, Zhang Shi said in his treatise on ren that “to designate love as 
ren is to be blind to its substance, for ren is the principle of love.”42 To this sen-
tence he himself added a comment: “This is what Master Cheng [Yi] meant by 
the saying that ‘love is qing [feeling] and ren is xing [nature].’ ” Both Zhu Xi and 
Zhang Shi considered the distinction between ren and love to be a distinction 
between substance and function, but there is an essential difference between 
their views. The substance-function relation is vertical for Zhu Xi, whereas it is 
horizontal for Zhang Shi. In other words, for Zhang Shi, love as a function of 
ren pertains to the same ontological level as ren. Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, however, 
would not agree with this view.
Ren and the Principle of Love
In light of what has been discussed, we can now consider the second point, 
namely, the relation between ren and love (ai). In his “Treatise on Ren,” Zhu Xi 
continued from where we left off above:43
Someone said: According to our explanation, is it not wrong for Master 
Cheng to say that love is feeling (qing) while ren is nature 
(xing) and that love should not be regarded as ren?
Answer:  Not so. What Master Cheng criticized was the application 
of the term to the expression of love. What I maintain is 
that the term should be applied to the principle of love. For 
although the spheres of man’s nature and feelings are dif-
ferent, their mutual penetration is like the blood system in 
which each part has its own relationship. When have they 
become sharply separated and been made to have nothing 
to do with each other? I was just now worrying about stu-
dents’ reciting Master Cheng’s words without inquiry into 
their meanings, and thereby coming to talk about ren as 
clearly apart from love. I have therefore purposely talked 
about this to reveal the hidden meaning of Master Cheng’s 
words, and you regard my ideas as different from his. Are 
you not mistaken?
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Here “Master Cheng” refers to Cheng Yi, whose direction of thought Zhu Xi 
steadily followed.
The passage from Cheng Yi that Zhu Xi discusses here appears in Cheng 
Hao and Cheng Yi’s Henan Chengshi yishu 河南程氏遺書:
Because Mencius said that “the heart of commiseration pertains to ren,” 
later scholars have regarded love as ren. Commiseration is certainly love; 
but love is just feeling (qing), whereas ren is just nature (xing). How can 
one confine ren to love? Mencius said that “[the heart of ] commiseration 
pertains to ren”; for in the preceding text he had said that “the heart of 
commiseration is the budding of ren.” Since it is called “the budding of 
ren,” it should not be regarded as ren. Tuizhi 退之 [Han Yu 韓愈] erred 
in saying “universal love is ren.” To be sure, the person who has ren loves 
universally; but one may not therefore confuse ren with universal love.44
For Confucians it is not groundless to regard ren as love or even as uni-
versal love, since Confucius defined ren as “loving men” (ai ren 愛人) in reply 
to a question from his pupil Fan Chi 樊遲 (Analects 12.22). Likewise, Mencius 
adds to this sentiment by saying that “the person who has ren loves men” (Men-
cius 4B.28), and “the person of ren loves everyone” (Mencius 7A.46). More-
over, Mencius asserts that “the heart of commiseration is the budding of ren” 
(Mencius 2A.6) and that “the heart of commiseration pertains to ren” (Mencius 
6A.6). Following Cheng Yi, Zhu Xi interpreted the latter in light of the for-
mer, because the former corresponded with his more dualistic anthropological 
framework of xin and qing. So the relation of commiseration (or love) and ren 
was viewed as that between xin and qing, or between li and qi.
In his treatise on ren, Zhang Shi agreed with Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi that 
love is not ren. But this concession is merely rhetorical rather than substantial 
because both sides presented divergent formulations. In accordance with their 
dual framework of xin and qing, Zhu Xi and Cheng Yi viewed ren as “the prin-
ciple of love,” which, as abstract principle, contains no creative force in itself. 
Zhang Shi viewed ren likewise as the “principle of love,” but for him the term 
“principle of love” would mean something quite different. As mentioned above, 
“the principle of love” here does not mean something abstract and static, but 
rather a dynamic “mind” with creative forces that penetrate all things.
Generally speaking, although both Zhu Xi and Zhang Shi defined ren as 
the “principle of love,” the term did not mean the same thing to them. For Zhu 
Xi, the principle of love meant a static metaphysical principle for the feeling of 
love, and hence “principle” and “love” belonged to different realms. However, 
for Zhang Shi it meant a dynamic metaphysical principle that manifested itself 
as love, and hence “principle” and “love” belonged to the same realm.
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The Relation between Ren and Jue
In considering the third point, namely, the relation between ren and jue (or 
zhijue), it should be first noted that the Chinese term jue is itself ambiguous. 
Among others, its multiple meanings include “sensation,” “perception,” “feel-
ing,” “consciousness,” and “realization.” Let us consider a relevant passage from 
Zhu Xi’s “Treatise on Ren”:45
Someone said: The followers of Master Cheng have given many expla-
nations of ren. Some say that love is not ren, and regard the 
unity of all things and the self as the substance of ren. Oth-
ers maintain that love is not ren but explain ren in terms 
of the possession of zhijue by the mind. If what you say is 
correct, are they all wrong?
Answer:  From what they call the unity of all things and the self, it 
can be seen that ren involves love for all, but unity is not 
the reality which makes ren a substance. From what they 
call the mind’s possession of zhijue, it can be seen that 
ren includes the zhi (comprehension), but that is not the 
real reason why ren is so called. If you look up Confucius’ 
answer to Zigong’s 子貢 question concerning the conferral 
of extensive benefit on the people and bringing salvation to 
all, and also Master Cheng’s statement that ren is not to be 
explained in terms of jue, you will see my point. How can 
you still explain ren in these terms?
  Furthermore, to talk about ren in general terms as the 
unity of things and the self, this will lead people to be 
vague, confused, neglectful, and make no effort to be alert. 
The bad effect—and there has been—may be to consider 
other things as oneself. To talk about ren in terms of zhijue 
will lead people to be nervous, irascible, and devoid of any 
quality of depth. The bad effect—and there has been—
may be to consider desire as principle.
In this passage, Zhu Xi disputed two theses about ren: first, that ren consists in 
the unity of all things and the self, and, second, that ren consists in the posses-
sion of zhijue by the mind. The first thesis was brought forward by Yang Shi 楊
時 (1053–1135) and the second by Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐 (1050–ca. 1120).46 
Both of these theses are logically connected and are further traceable to Cheng 
Hao’s saying “Medical books used to describe the paralysis of the hands and feet 
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as a lack of ren. This is a very good description. The person who possesses ren 
identifies himself with Heaven and Earth and all things.”47
The first thesis will be considered in the next section. For now, we turn to 
the second thesis that ren consists in the possession of zhijue by the mind. In the 
above cited passage, “lack of ren” (bu ren 不仁) refers explicitly to a lack of per-
ception ( jue or zhijue), a euphemism for a lack of moral consciousness. In Ana-
lects 17.21, we witness a discussion between Confucius and Zai Wo concerning 
the significance of a three-year mourning period. When Zai Wo claimed that 
while in mourning he would feel at ease in eating good rice and wearing silk 
brocades, Confucius criticized him for being bu ren, that is to say, lacking moral 
consciousness. Thus, when Xie Liangzuo defined ren as the “possession of zhi-
jue by the mind,” he also meant moral consciousness.
For Zhu Xi, however, jue or zhijue holds a different set of connotations, as 
we see in the following passage from the Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類 (Classified dia-
logues of Master Zhu): “According to the meaning of these terms, ren is just the 
substance of love, and jue is just the function of zhi (comprehension). Both are 
properly different. But ren embraces four moral qualities [namely humanity, righ-
teousness, propriety, and comprehension]. If one has ren, how could he have no 
jue?”48 We see that Zhu Xi understood the relation of zhi to jue to be equivalent to 
that of ren to love, or as the relationship of ti 體 (substance) to yong 用 (function). 
In this context, it is necessary to distinguish ren as “character of mind” from ren 
as “the complete character of original mind.” The former is one of the “four moral 
qualities,” whereas the latter embraces them all. Only in the latter sense of ren did 
Zhu Xi find the connectedness between ren and jue. Hence, for Zhu Xi, it is a 
misappropriation of categories to interpret ren in terms of jue.
Furthermore, when Zhu Xi delimited the definition of jue as the moral 
quality of zhi, he understood the term zhi in an exclusively cognitive sense. In a 
letter to Zhang Shi, Zhu Xi wrote:49
What Shangcai 上蔡 [Xie Liangzuo] called zhijue is just the feeling of 
coldness, warmth, satiety, hunger and the like. Even [the capacities for] 
dealing with the changing situation and serving as an assistant to the spir-
itual pertain to nothing but this zhijue. But they have a wider or narrower 
scope of application. Nevertheless, their applications have reference only 
to the emanations and functions of zhi, and the person of ren alone can 
embrace them. Therefore, one can say that the person of ren possesses 
zhijue in his mind; but one cannot say that the possession of zhijue by 
the mind is ren.
Clearly, Zhu Xi understood jue (or zhijue) as a cognitive capacity that includes 
sensations caused by physiological reactions as well as the capacity to respond to 
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more complex situations. For him both are homogeneous, and they are differ-
ent only in the scope of their applications.
But in regard to the thesis that ren consists of the possession of zhijue by 
the mind, Zhu Xi’s criticism was likely based on a misreading of both Mencius’ 
text and what Cheng Hao and his followers meant. In Mencius’ assertion that 
“the heart of right and wrong pertains to zhi” (Mencius 6A.6), the “right and 
wrong” (shifei 是非) undoubtedly refers exclusively to moral judgment but not 
to the judgment of knowledge as Zhu Xi assumed. Therefore, even if we, fol-
lowing Zhu Xi, understand jue in terms of zhi, it should be noted that zhi as 
the capacity for moral judgment pervades all moral activities. In this sense, zhi 
constitutes an essential aspect of jue, since we cannot conceive of moral con-
sciousness without moral judgment.
At this juncture it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of jue, 
namely, between jue as sensation or perception, and jue as moral consciousness. 
They are heterogeneous in regard to either their origins or their functions. Hu 
Dayuan 胡大原, Hu Hong’s nephew, seemed to realize this distinction when he 
wrote:50
“Ren consists in the possession of zhijue by the mind.” This is the core 
thesis that Shangcai [Xie Liangzuo] brought up for his teaching of Dao. 
Therefore, it seems impossible for this thesis to be problematic. Further-
more, zhijue has different degrees of depth. All ordinary people can feel 
coldness, warmth, satiety, and hunger. If one considers such feelings to 
be the culmination of zhijue, it would be more than problematic! This 
is also the reason why Yichuan 伊川 [Cheng Yi] said that “ren is not to 
be interpreted in terms of jue.” Because he worried that one may merely 
adhere to the word jue.
In this context, Max Scheler’s distinction between Gefühl (feeling) and Füh-
len (to feel) is illuminating. For Scheler, Gefühl in a general sense refers to the 
sensible state that has a determinate location in the body, whereas Fühlen refers 
to intentional comprehension a priori.51 In this sense, he speaks of Wertfühlen 
(feeling of value). According to this distinction, we can say that what Cheng 
Hao, Xie Liangzuo, and the Huxiang scholars meant by jue or zhijue pertains 
to Fühlen but not to Gefühl. Here it should be noted that Hu Dayuan seems to 
misunderstand Cheng Yi’s comments about jue, because Cheng Yi did not pre-
suppose the heterogeneity of jue. In Zhang Shi’s treatise on ren, he wrote sim-
ply that “only the person of ren possesses clear zhijue. This is what constitutes 
zhi [comprehension].”52 Only in this statement do we find some trace of Zhang 
Shi’s concession to Zhu Xi’s point, since Zhang Shi here understood zhijue in 
terms of zhi as did Zhu Xi.
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The Unity of All Things and the Self
As mentioned above, there is a logical connection between the two theses that 
ren consists in the possession of zhijue by the mind and that ren consists in the 
unity of all things and the self. For Cheng Hao, Xie Liangzuo, and the Hu xiang 
scholars, jue or zhijue as moral consciousness also possesses an ontological 
meaning. This is the case because ren is at the same time a creative force, which 
belongs to the same level as its substance, namely, the “mind of Heaven and 
Earth.” For this reason, Mou Zongsan called it “ontological feeling.”53 Through 
such “feeling,” humans gain access to the “mind of Heaven and Earth” and 
hence enter into the macrocosm. Only based on such “feeling” can Cheng Hao 
and others speak of the “unity of all things and the self.” This idea can be traced 
back to Mencius’ following statements: “He who gives full realization to his 
heart-mind will understand his own nature, and he who understands his own 
nature will understand Heaven” (Mencius 7A.1) and “All things are there in me” 
(Mencius 7A.4). For Mencius, the “original mind” (benxin 本心) of humans has 
an ontological dimension. As a moral agent the original mind possesses the 
capacity for self-realization and thereby for creating a world of values wherein 
the essential meaning of “Heaven” resides.
For Zhu Xi, however, jue has no ontological connotation in itself; just like 
love, it belongs to the realm of qi (material force) and thus to a lower level than 
li (principle). In other words, for Zhu Xi, all kinds of jue are homogeneous. For 
this reason he criticized Cheng Hao, Xie Liangzuo, and others for “considering 
desire as principle.” Furthermore, in Zhu Xi’s dual ontological framework, such 
an “ontological feeling” that opens up a world of values common to humans and 
other things is not conceivable. Consequently, he criticized them for “consider-
ing other things as oneself.”
In light of the above discussion, we can come to consider the fifth point, the 
debate between the two sides about the relation between ren and gong (impar-
tiality). In the first section of this chapter, Cheng Yi’s statement was cited: “It 
is very difficult to describe the principle of ren. The closest term to it is gong 
[impartiality]; but this does not mean that gong is identical to ren.” Zhu Xi 
agreed with this statement because he, like Cheng Yi, viewed “impartiality” as a 
formal characteristic of the notion of ren. In other words, through the notion of 
“impartiality,” the connotations of ren are easily understood.54 In this sense, gong 
is not conceptually identical with ren. In contrast, Zhang Shi contended that 
gong was the substance of ren. In a letter to Zhu Xi, Zhang Shi wrote:55
If one overcomes his selfishness, he will become totally impartial and 
internally combined with Heaven and Earth and all things like arteries 
and veins. Thereby, he possesses the principle of love in himself and can 
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apply it to external things so that all things between Heaven and Earth 
are embraced in his ren.
Undoubtedly, Zhang Shi’s thesis that gong is the substance of ren logically implies 
the thesis of the “unity of all things and the self.” In reply, Zhu Xi stressed:56
What I call the “principle of love” is originally possessed by my nature. 
It comes to existence through total impartiality, but its being is not the 
result of total impartiality. It extends through my inner combination 
with Heaven and Earth and all things like arteries and veins, but its exis-
tence is not the result of such a combination.
Here Zhu Xi insisted on the ontological priority of ren as an abstract “principle 
of love” because, for him, the combination of ren with Heaven and Earth and all 
things could be only secondary in the ontological order. This is the main reason 
why Zhu Xi objected to Zhang Shi’s interpretation of ren in terms of gong.
Owing to Zhu Xi’s criticism, Zhang Shi added the following sentence to 
his treatise on ren: “To designate ‘impartiality’ as ren is to lose its reality, for 
impartiality is what enables man to be ren.”57 Even to this sentence he added a 
comment: “This is what Master Cheng [Yi] meant by saying, ‘It is very difficult 
to describe the principle of ren. The closest term to it is gong [impartiality]; 
but this does not mean that gong is identical to ren.’ ”58 Still, Zhang Shi did not 
concede Zhu Xi’s point, because in the same treatise he wrote:59 “The first thing 
for the realization of ren is self-mastery. If one overcomes his selfishness, he will 
become totally impartial, and the principle of love, which was originally pos-
sessed by his nature, will not be clouded.” This suffices in showing that Zhang 
Shi had not abandoned his original position.
In comparing these two treatises on ren, it becomes clear that, despite 
superficial resemblances, they still represent two divergent directions of 
thought, which are, moreover, traceable to the Cheng brothers. Zhu Xi, follow-
ing Cheng Yi’s direction of thought, constructed his own philosophical frame-
work, whereas Zhang Shi and his followers adhered to Cheng Hao’s direction of 
thought. Both sides tried to interpret the notion of ren from their own perspec-
tives, although they seem to ignore the differences between the Cheng brothers. 
Nevertheless, this comparison serves to strengthen Wing-tsit Chan’s conviction 




The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and  
Gi Gobong and Its Philosophical Purport
T h e  r e ac h  o f  Chinese Confucianism extended to Korea and Japan, and 
followed the Chinese diaspora wherever the Chinese went, whether it was by 
choice or by force. The first and second sages, Confucius and Mencius, would 
always accompany the transmigration or emigration of Confucian thought, as 
would other great Confucian thinkers such as Zhu Xi, the voice that gave Neo-
Confucianism its timbre. This chapter takes the historical context to Korea and 
explores the significance the Four-Seven Debates had in the unfolding of Con-
fucianism beyond its homeland in Yi Toegye’s 李退溪 (Hwang 滉, 1501–1571) 
and Gi Gobong’s 奇高峰 (Daeseung 大升, Myeong-eon 明彥, 1527–1572) 
encounters with Zhu Xi.
The Two Four-Seven Debates and Their Historical Background
The debate over the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings” (or the Four-Seven 
Debate) was the most important intellectual dispute in the history of Korean 
Confucianism. From its initial stirrings in the writings of Gwon Geun 權近 
(1352–1409) until its denouement at the end of the Chosŏn era (1392–1910), 
the controversy surrounding the proper interpretation of these concepts lasted 
for over five hundred years. Whereas there were many who contributed indi-
rectly to this debate during its long history, its most important phase occurred 
in the sixteenth century, when Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong, as well as Yi Yulgok 
李栗谷 (I 珥, 1536–1584) and Seong Ugye 成牛溪 (Hon 渾, 1535–1598), 
deliberated and discussed with one another the proper relationship between the 
four buddings and the seven feelings. Yi Yulgok’s and Seong Ugye’s main points 
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of difference involved in the Four-Seven Debate were without exception con-
tained in the arguments previously advanced by Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong. The 
exchange between them was basically a continuation, but it was an even more 
profound treatment of the issues than what was discussed in the first debate. 
Their discussion focused on problems involving the interpretation of Zhu Xi’s 
philosophical system and was less directly concerned with philosophical issues. 
It is necessary to explicate and clarify some of the problems of textual interpre-
tation that are implicated in the positions of Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong in their 
debate to uncover the philosophical significance of their respective views. This 
is necessary also to understand the subsequent exchange between Yi Yulgok and 
Seong Ugye, which will be discussed only when necessary.
The term “four buddings” (siduan 四端) comes from the Mencius 2A.6: 
“The disposition of commiseration is the budding of humanity; the disposition 
of shame and dislike is the budding of righteousness; the disposition of yield-
ing and deference is the budding of propriety; the disposition of discriminating 
between right and wrong is the budding of comprehension. Human beings have 
these four buddings, just like they have four limbs.” The term “seven feelings” 
(qiqing 七情) comes from the “Liyun” 禮運 chapter of the Book of Rites (Li ji 禮
記): “What are the feelings of human beings? They are joy, anger, grief, fear, love, 
hate, and desire. These seven feelings are what human beings are capable of with-
out learning.” Within Chinese Confucianism a number of thinkers had discussed 
the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings” separately, but the relationship 
between them did not develop into a topic of debate. However, in the unfolding 
of Korean Confucianism, the relationship between the “four buddings” and the 
“seven feelings” became an enduring focus of intellectual discussion.
The terminology of Immanuel Kant can be useful in understanding the 
relation between the “four buddings” and the “seven feelings.” The “four bud-
dings” can be seen as types of moral feelings and the “seven feelings” as types 
of physical feelings.1 For Kant, “moral feeling does not pertain to the giving of 
laws, but is the basis of their execution.”2 Such feelings as loving one’s neighbor, 
self-respect, moral feelings, and conscience constitute the requisite subjective 
conditions for what it means to become a moral person. In contrast, physical 
feelings have no relation to morality. Korean Confucianism would anticipate 
this division of feelings in the discussion of what constitutes a virtuous person 
and how to achieve this status. Korean Confucianists attempted to address a 
number of significant philosophical questions in the Four-Seven Debate that 
were similar to Kant’s questions: What exactly is the relationship between 
moral and physical types of feeling? Are they homogeneous or heterogeneous? 
What is the criterion for judging their similarity or difference? Stemming from 
these questions, their positions advanced against a unique background in the 
history of thought.
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Cheng-Zhu learning of the nature and principle (or Neo-Confucianism) 
began to make its way into Korea toward the end of the Koryŏ era (around 
the end of the thirteenth century). By the Chosŏn era, it had already attained 
an unparalleled position of authority among Confucian intellectuals. For this 
reason, Korean Confucians who engaged in the Four-Seven Debate were forced 
to deal with two layers of textual authority. In addition to the early Confucian 
texts such as the Book of Rites and the Mencius and the textual authority they 
represented, they had to confront the authority of the texts from the Cheng-
Zhu tradition. If we grant Mou Zongsan’s argument, which views Cheng Yi’s 
and Zhu Xi’s learning of the nature and principle as “lineages founded on sepa-
rate stems” (biezi wei zong 別子為宗) of the Confucian and Mencian traditions, 
then the intellectual historical background formed by these two layers of texts 
and textual authority in and of itself served as the root cause initiating the Four-
Seven Debate. If it is the case, as Mou Zongsan and other modern scholars have 
argued,3 that Zhu Xi premised his explanation of Mencius’ “heart of the four 
buddings” on his framework of the learning of the nature and principle, which 
consists of the twofold division between principle (li 理) and material force 
(qi 氣) and the threefold division between the mind-heart (xin 心), the nature 
(xing 性), and the feelings (qing 情), then Zhu’s ideas do not necessarily con-
form to those found in the text of the Mencius. Given this situation, respecting 
Zhu Xi’s authority meant that one has to deviate from the authority of Mencius 
and vice versa.
If we look at the arguments advanced by Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong, we 
find that Gi Gobong’s explanations more consistently adhere to Zhu Xi’s point 
of view, and thus he unavoidably departed from the views of Mencius. As for Yi 
Toegye, he could not make up his mind between Zhu Xi and Mencius, and he 
was unable to discern the incompatibilities in their basic points of view. In the 
debate between Yi Yulgok and Seong Ugye, Seong Ugye defended Yi Toegye’s 
viewpoint, whereas Yi Yulgok quoted Zhu Xi’s views to criticize Yi Toegye’s 
arguments, citing Gi Gobong in support of his position.
As Mou Zongsan’s research on this matter shows, in the area of ontol-
ogy, Zhu Xi presupposed a twofold framework of principle and material force, 
whereas, in the area of philosophical anthropology, he presupposed a threefold 
framework of heart-mind, nature (xing),4 and feelings. Moreover, he maintained 
that there is a relationship of correspondence between these two frameworks. 
Zhu Xi explained the relationship between principle and material force on two 
distinct levels. On the concrete level, all things existing in reality are necessarily 
composed of a combination of principle and material force. It is not possible 
for one to exist without the other: without principle, material force will lack 
any ontological foundation; without material force, principle will simply be an 
abstract form of being that lacks any real existence. However, on the abstract 
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level, these two entities are decidedly different, and it is impossible for them to 
reduce to one another.
In this context, Zhu Xi advanced the theory that “principle is prior to 
material force” (li xian qi hou 理先氣後).5 The meaning of “prior to” in this 
sentence does not refer to a temporal sequence, but rather to their ontological 
arrangement. In other words, principle has ontological priority over material 
force and serves as its foundation. However, the type of principle that could be 
distinguished from material force is only abstract and does not exist in reality. 
It therefore lacks the capacity to be active; for Zhu Xi held that the only thing 
that can be active is material force. According to Mou Zongsan’s explanation, 
Zhu Xi construed principle as something that “just has being but does not have 
activity.”6 This point is extremely pertinent to what follows, for one of the most 
significant questions in the Four-Seven Debate is whether principle is able to 
give rise to the four buddings, a question that involves the problem of whether 
principle is itself able to be active. On the level of philosophical anthropol-
ogy, Zhu Xi understood the relationship between nature and the feelings as 
one involving principle and material force, which are combined together in the 
mind-heart. Although in his ontological system he bestowed the mind-heart 
with a mediating and combining function, it ultimately pertains to the side of 
material force even if it is “the subtlest of material force” (qi zhi ling 氣之靈) and 
“the numinous of material force” (qi zhi jingshuang 氣之精爽).7
Moreover, Zhu Xi based his interpretation of Mencius’ “heart of the four 
buddings” on this philosophical framework. In his Collected Commentaries on 
the Mencius (Mengzi jizhu 孟子集注), Zhu Xi explained the passage concerning 
the four buddings in Mencius 2A.6 in the following manner: “commiseration, 
shame and dislike, yielding and deference, and [discriminating between] right 
and wrong are feelings. Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and comprehen-
sion are the nature. The mind-heart is that which unites the nature and the 
feelings. The buddings are clues [xu 緒]. As one’s feelings issue forth, the foun-
dation of the nature can be obtained and seen, just as the clues of something 
within can be perceived externally.”8 Zhu Xi took each of the four sentences 
from Mencius 2A.6, starting with “the disposition of commiseration is the bud-
ding of humanity,” and analyzed them according to the threefold conceptual 
framework of the feelings, the mind-heart, and the nature. The boundaries 
between these three concepts are clearly defined and absolutely do not allow 
for commingling. Let us take Zhu Xi’s analysis of the sentence “the disposition 
of commiseration is the budding of humanity” as an example. According to his 
interpretation, commiseration belongs to the feelings, and humanity belongs to 
the nature. The heart of commiseration is not equated with humanity but rather 
with the budding of humanity, which is the clue to the humanity of the nature, 
an internal principle becoming manifest externally. In other words, humanity 
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and commiseration do not exist on the same ontological level but are divided 
between principle and material force. This understanding clearly presupposes 
his threefold  philosophical-anthropological framework of mind-heart, feelings, 
and the nature.
Here we can see that Zhu Xi strictly distinguished “humanity” from the 
feeling of “commiseration”—as well as righteousness from the feeling of shame 
and dislike, propriety from the feeling of yielding and deference, and compre-
hension from the feeling of right and wrong—and attributed this distinction 
to the two different ontological levels of principle and material force. But, as 
noted above, his selective commentary on the above passage was premised upon 
his own philosophical framework, for, in Mencius 6A.6, Mencius unequivocally 
stated that “the heart of commiseration is humanity; the heart of shame and 
dislike is righteousness; the heart of reverence and respect is propriety; and the 
heart of [discriminating between] right and wrong is comprehension.” In this 
passage there is absolutely no indication, implicit or otherwise, that humanity, 
righteousness, propriety, and comprehension belong to a different ontological 
level than the feelings of the four buddings. It is clear that Zhu Xi based his 
interpretation of 6A.6 on his understanding of 2A.6 in order to establish a con-
nection to his own philosophical framework, and thus his views do not neces-
sarily conform to the purport of Mencius’ thought.
In addition, within Zhu Xi’s philosophical framework, the distinction 
between the original nature (benran zhi xing 本然之性)—which is also called yili 
zhi xing 義理之性, tiandi zhi xing 天地之性, and tianming zhi xing 天命之性—
and the physical nature (qizhi zhi xing 氣質之性) served as an important philo-
sophical foundation in the Four-Seven Debate for Korean Confucians. Zhang 
Zai first proposed the concept of the physical nature in the “Illumined Sincerity” 
chapter (Chengming pian 誠明篇) of Correcting Youthful Ignorance (Zhengmeng 
正蒙), and it was later inherited by Cheng Yi. For both Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi, 
the physical nature referred to the nature that was formed by natural endowment. 
The original nature denotes moral endowment: on one hand, its manifestation 
has to proceed through one’s corporeal form; on the other hand, it is limited 
by the corporeal form that gives rise to various discrepancies in the expressions 
of one’s life or in one’s life circumstances. When contrasted with the physical 
nature, the original nature was considered to be an independent concept.
Although Zhu Xi also adopted the phrase “physical nature,” he endowed 
it with a wholly different meaning. From his perspective, physical nature was 
original nature, but it was the original nature as it was embodied within physical 
matter (qizhi 氣質) and thus was termed physical nature.9 Physical nature was 
not an independent concept as contrasted with original nature. Even today, the 
majority of scholars studying Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism misapprehend the 
relationship between original nature and physical nature in Zhu Xi’s thought as 
Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye & Gi Gobong 59
one of principle and material force. In fact, according to Zhu Xi, both original 
nature and physical nature are principle; it is just that one is tainted by physical 
matter and the other is not. In Zhu Xi’s philosophical system, it is the original 
nature and physical matter (not the physical nature) that constitute the relation-
ship between principle and material force. In the Four-Seven Debate between 
Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong, the different interpretations of the physical nature 
held by Zhang Zai, Cheng Yi, and Zhu Xi did not receive sufficient attention, 
which needlessly contributed to Yi Toegye’s and Gi Gobong’s entanglement 
over theoretical issues.10
The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong can be traced 
directly to an explanatory note written by Jeong Jiun (鄭之雲, 1509–1561) in 
his diagram of the Heavenly Mandate (cheonmyeong do 天命圖),11 in which he 
stated that “the four buddings issue from principle [li]; the seven feelings issue 
from material force [qi].” After Yi Toegye saw this schema in 1553, he discussed 
it with Jeong Jiun, and they together decided on an emendation on the basis of 
Zhu Xi’s interpretation. They changed the above sentence to read: “The four 
buddings are the issuance of principle; the seven feelings are the issuance of 
material force.”12 Despite their rewording, the essential implication of these two 
sentences is actually the same.
In a letter to Gi Gobong written in 1559, Yi Toegye mentioned that, 
because of the criticism he received from other scholars, he decided to change 
the emended phrase to “the issuance of the four buddings is purely a matter of 
principle and therefore involves nothing but good; the issuance of the seven 
feelings includes material force and therefore involves both good and evil.”13 
Consequently, Gi Gobong expressed doubts about Yi Toegye’s new thesis in 
his “Letter to Yi Toegye [to discourse on] the Four Buddings and Seven Feel-
ings.”14 Over the next three years, they exchanged three letters in which they 
debated the problem of the “four buddings and seven feelings” in detail. Four 
years later, in 1566, Gi Gobong out of the blue composed the “Latter Discourse 
on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings” and the “Comprehensive Discourse 
on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings” and presented them to Yi Toegye.15 
Yi Toegye only briefly mentioned these essays in his two letters to Gi Gobong 
that year and neither approved nor disapproved of their content.16 Whereas the 
debate extended over a period of seven years, the most important intellectual 
exchanges occurred during the initial three years.
Yi Yulgok and Seong Ugye belonged to the generation immediately follow-
ing that of Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong. In 1572 Yi Yulgok reinitiated the Four-
Seven Debate in a letter to Seong Ugye. At the time, Seong Ugye was thirty-eight 
years old and Yi Yulgok was thirty-seven, Yi Toegye had already been dead for 
over a year, and Gi Gobong would die before the year was over. Seong Ugye and 
Yi Yulgok exchanged nine letters during 1572, continuing the debate held by 
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their forebears. Generally speaking, Seong Ugye defended Yi Toegye’s point of 
view, and Yi Yulgok criticized it by quoting Gi Gobong in support of his posi-
tion. The extant source material concerning their debate is not complete. The 
third, seventh, eighth, and ninth letters composed by Seong Ugye are no longer 
extant, and only the replies of Yi Yulgok have been completely preserved.17
The Four-Seven Debate between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong
Although the writings exchanged between Yi Toegye and Gi Gobong appear 
to be extremely complicated, they actually convey the positions of their authors 
quite clearly. Over the course of the debate, both sides maintained an open 
mind and even amended their own positions based on doubts expressed by the 
opponent. However, these emendations primarily involved the written expres-
sion of their ideas rather than the substance of their positions. The reason for 
the complexity of the written debate was that it involved the direct interpreta-
tion of Confucian writings.18
Generally speaking, the main point of divergence between their views 
was that Yi Toegye emphasized the heterogeneity of the four buddings and 
the seven feelings, whereas Gi Gobong insisted on the homogeneity of both. 
This difference gave rise to two more complicated and related questions: Do 
the seven feelings contain the four buddings within them? And is it possible for 
the four buddings to lose their proper measure? Given that Gi Gobong insisted 
that the four buddings and the seven feelings were homogeneous, his answer to 
both of these questions was affirmative. On the contrary, Yi Toegye persistently 
answered these questions in the negative.
The divergence in their points of view involves a more fundamental ques-
tion—whether principle (li), in and of itself, possesses the ability to be active? 
In other words, does the word “issue” ( fa 發) in the statement “the four bud-
dings issue from principle” imply that principle in and of itself possesses the 
ability to be active? Or does it mean only that principle is the ratio essendi of 
the four buddings and thus lacks the inherent capacity to be active? Even if this 
question had not appeared in their writings and constituted a focus of direct 
debate, it was implicit in their theoretical presuppositions and fundamentally 
involved in their disagreements over other matters. Concerning this question, 
however, Gi Gobong upheld Zhu Xi’s position, which viewed principle as “just 
having being but not the capacity for activity,” whereas Yi Toegye moved back 
and forth between Mencius and Zhu Xi and did not clearly recognize the con-
tradiction between their positions. Working from these basic assumptions, Yi 
Toegye and Gi Gobong invoked passages from classical texts to support their 
own points of view.
As noted above, since Yi Toegye maintained that the four buddings and 
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the seven feelings were heterogeneous, he invoked Zhu Xi’s “the four buddings 
issue from principle; the seven feelings issue from material force” in support 
of his position. Although he later revised this statement to read “the four bud-
dings issue from pure principle and thus are completely good; the seven feelings 
issue together with material force and thus contain both good and evil,” he did 
not abandon the point of view that the four buddings and the seven feelings 
were heterogeneous. Yi Toegye further invoked the Song Confucian distinction 
between the “original nature” and the “physical nature” to support his doctrine. 
In this vein he wrote:
It was only in later times, after the appearance of the Cheng brothers, 
Zhang Zai, and other thinkers that a thesis regarding the physical nature 
finally became unavoidable. That likewise was not just a case of creat-
ing differences out of a fondness for complexity. Since what they were 
referring to had to do with the condition after having been endowed and 
being born, then it was also not practicable to refer to it without distin-
guishing it from the original nature. Therefore I recklessly venture that 
the distinction between the four buddings and the seven feelings in the 
case of feelings (qing) is similar to the distinction between the original 
nature and the physical nature in the case of the nature (xing). If this is so, 
since it is considered permissible to distinguish between principle (li) and 
material force (qi) in speaking of the nature, why should it solely become 
impermissible to distinguish between principle and material force when 
speaking of the feelings?19
Yi Toegye continued to describe the characteristics of the four buddings and 
the seven feelings:
Whence do the feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, yielding 
and deference, and discriminating between right and wrong issue? They 
issue from the nature that is composed of humanity, righteousness, pro-
priety, and comprehension. And whence do the feelings of joy, anger, sor-
row, fear, love, hatred, and desire issue? They are occasioned by circum-
stantial conditions when external things contact one’s body and excite 
one internally.20
On the basis of these two passages, it is evident that, according to Yi 
Toegye, the essential difference between the four buddings and the seven feel-
ings is that the four buddings derive from the “original nature” and so inher-
ently possess spontaneity, whereas the seven feelings issue from the mind when 
the body is stimulated by external things and so inherently possess passivity. 
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Furthermore the distinction between the four buddings and the seven feelings 
is parallel to the distinction between the “original nature” and the “physical 
nature.” Yi Toegye’s interpretation of the four buddings and the seven feelings 
thus involves three questions: (1) How should we understand Zhu Xi’s state-
ment that “the four buddings issue from principle; the seven feelings issue from 
material force”? (2) How should we understand the distinction between the 
“original nature” and the “physical nature”? (3) Is the distinction between spon-
taneity and passivity sufficient to explain the difference between the four bud-
dings and the seven feelings?
Within Zhu Xi’s philosophical system “the four buddings issue from prin-
ciple; the seven feelings issue from material force” has a clear and definite mean-
ing. But the implicit meaning of the word “issue” ( fa) is not the same. The 
word “issue” in the phrase “issue from principle” means that principle is the 
ontological foundation for the four buddings, whereas “issue” in “issue from 
material force” connotes something closer to the term “initiate” in a psycho-
logical sense and means that the seven feelings are produced from the activity 
of material force. However, in Zhu Xi’s system, given that principle cannot of 
itself be active, one cannot go on to say that the four buddings are initiated by 
the activity of principle. Thus, Zhu Xi spoke of the “issuing” of principle meta-
phorically, whereas he spoke of the “issuing” of material force literally. And the 
“issuing” in the two cases does not mean the same thing. Yet Yi Toegye failed 
to recognize the different meanings of “issue” in Zhu Xi’s usage and uniformly 
attributed a type of activity to the term.
From a different perspective, Gi Gobong expressed reservations about Zhu 
Xi’s statement and viewed it as “words spoken by chance on some occasion that 
refer to only one side of the matter.”21 He explained his argument in the follow-
ing manner:
Master Zhu [Xi] has a saying: “When one speaks of the nature of heaven 
and earth, it refers solely to principle (li). When one speaks of the physi-
cal nature, it refers to the principle mixed together with material force 
(qi).” In light of this, the statement that “the four buddings are the issu-
ance of principle” refers exclusively to principle, and the statement that 
“the seven feelings are the issuance of material force” refers to principle 
mixed together with material force. And this means that the statement 
“[these] are the issuance of principle” certainly cannot be altered, whereas 
the statement “[these] are the issuance of material force” does not refer 
exclusively to material force.22
Gi Gobong invoked Zhu Xi’s distinction between the “original nature” 
and the “physical nature” to serve as the foundation of his argument. As noted 
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previously, in Zhu Xi’s usage, the physical nature is identical to the original 
nature; it is termed “the physical nature” because it refers to the original nature 
that has been immersed in and mixed together with physical matter (qizhi). 
In other words, the original nature is pure principle (chunli 純理), whereas the 
physical nature is a mixture of both principle and material force. Given this defi-
nition, the relationship between the original nature and the physical nature is 
not identical to the relationship between principle and material force. Thus, 
for Gi Gobong, if one desires to use Zhu Xi’s understanding of the relation-
ship between the original nature and the physical nature in order to explain the 
relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings, one can say that 
“the four buddings are the issuance of principle” but not that “the seven feelings 
are the issuance of material force.” This is because Gi Gobong clearly saw that 
the physical nature is a mixture of principle and material force and so cannot be 
correlated with “the issuance of material force.”
However, in contrast to Gi Gobong, Yi Toegye based his explanation of 
the relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings on the under-
standing of original nature and physical nature advanced by Zhang Zai and 
Cheng Yi. As noted earlier, in Zhang Zai’s and Cheng Yi’s usage, the original 
nature and physical nature were mutually independent concepts, and the rela-
tionship between them could be viewed as that between principle and material 
force. As their assumptions differed, Gi Gobong and Yi Toegye arrived at very 
different conclusions in the debate.
Moreover, the different interpretations of the “physical nature” and the 
“original nature” held by these two men naturally led to different views on 
the relationship between the four buddings and the seven feelings. According 
to Yi Toegye the four buddings and the seven feelings are mutually indepen-
dent and heterogeneous; however, according to Gi Gobong, the four bud-
dings are homogeneous with the seven feelings and are, moreover, included 
within them. Yi Toegye’s point of view on this subject is evident in his expla-
nation of the four buddings and the seven feelings as being heterogeneous 
(the contrast between spontaneity and passivity). Gi Gobong’s viewpoint on 
this matter is clearly expressed in his “Letter to Yi Toegye [to Discourse on] 
the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings.” In this letter, Gi Gobong used state-
ments in the Doctrine of the Mean about the feelings of joy, anger, grief, and 
pleasure to encompass the seven feelings from the Book of Rites, emphasizing 
the following:
Zisi 子思 was speaking of them in a way described as “speaking of them 
in their entirety,” whereas Mencius’ discussion is described as “singling 
out [the good side].” . . . It is just that, in the case of Zisi and Mencius, that 
with respect to which they were speaking was not the same, and so there 
64 Neo-Confucianism in China & Korea
is the distinction between the four buddings and the seven feelings. It is 
not that apart from the seven feelings there are also the four buddings. 
Now, if one regards the four buddings as being issued by principle and 
[hence] as nothing but good and the seven feelings as issued by material 
force and so involving both good and evil, then this splits up principle 
and material force and makes them two distinct things. It would mean 
that the seven feelings do not emerge from the nature and that the four 
buddings do not direct material force [to issue]. What such wording con-
veys cannot but be considered problematic, and later students of the mat-
ter will certainly have doubts about it.23
In this passage, Gi Gobong argued that the four buddings represent the proper 
measure of the seven feelings (what Mencius “singled out” from them). He 
therefore rejected the claim that the four buddings are heterogeneous with 
the seven feelings, contending instead that they are encompassed by the seven 
feelings. In his “Later Discourse on the Four Buddings and Seven Feelings,” he 
stated this clearly: “Those of the seven feelings whose issuance is perfectly mea-
sured are from the start not different from the four buddings.”24 Yet, since Yi 
Toegye distinguished the four buddings from the seven feelings according to 
the contrast between spontaneity and passivity, he clearly could not agree with 
the contention that “the seven feelings encompass the four buddings.”
However, because Gi Gobong insisted that “the seven feelings encompass 
the four buddings,” he naturally rejected the attempt to distinguish between the 
four buddings and the seven feelings according to the contrast between sponta-
neity and passivity. Instead, he advanced the hypothesis that “the four buddings 
are stimulated by things and act.” In one of his letters replying to Yi Toegye, Gi 
Gobong wrote:
That of feelings being aroused by things and moving is a natural prin-
ciple. For it is because there really is a given principle within that there is 
a match with the stimulus given externally; it is not that there is originally 
no such principle within, but upon the approach of an external thing, 
there is a fortuitous match and [the mind-heart] is aroused and acts. . . . If 
we are to discuss the matter in terms of being aroused by things and then 
moving, the four buddings are exactly the same. When the stimulus is a 
child about to fall into a well, then the principle of humanity automati-
cally responds, and the disposition of commiseration is thereby formed. 
When the stimulus is passing by a shrine or the court, the principle of 
propriety automatically responds, and the disposition of reverence is 
thereby formed. In being aroused by things, these are not different from 
the seven feelings.25
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In this passage, the statement “when the stimulus is a child about to fall in a 
well . . . and the disposition of reverence is thereby formed” comes from Zhu 
Xi’s “Reply to Chen Qizhi 陳器之.”26 The statement “when the stimulus is pass-
ing by a shrine or the court” refers to Analects 10.1: “Confucius, in his village, 
looked simple and sincere, and as if he were not able to speak. When he was in 
the prince’s ancestral temple, or in the court, he spoke minutely on every point, 
but cautiously.”27 In order to demonstrate theoretically that the four buddings 
and the seven feelings are homogeneous, Gi Gobong emphasized that both the 
four buddings and the seven feelings are based in internal principle and respond 
to external objects and situations. He appropriated the passage from Zhu Xi to 
explain how the arousal of the disposition of commiseration is solely attribut-
able to the circumstance of the child about to fall into the well and, likewise, 
that the arousal of the disposition of reverence is only attributable to the cir-
cumstance of passing by a shrine or the court. In other words, the arousal of 
the dispositions of the four buddings is linked to external circumstances, and 
in this regard there was no difference between the four buddings and the seven 
feelings.
Whereas Gi Gobong held that the four buddings and the seven feelings 
are homogeneous, he also conceded that the seven feelings sometimes failed 
to attain their proper measure. He further accepted, as an unavoidable logical 
consequence of his position, that the four buddings are not always good:
Indeed, the view that the four buddings are the issuance of principle (li) 
and are nothing but good is originally based on the point of view from 
which Mencius was speaking of them. But if one exactly discusses them in 
terms of feelings in general, then the issuance of the four buddings like-
wise involves cases that are not perfectly measured; one certainly cannot 
say that in all cases they are good. Take an ordinary, common person as an 
example: sometimes he will feel shame and dislike for what he should not 
feel shame and dislike, and sometimes he will have a sense of right and 
wrong about what should not be judged right or wrong. For principle is 
in the midst of material force and directs it in order to become actively 
manifest. When principle is weak and material force is strong, and so the 
control of the former over the latter does not succeed, it is certainly easy 
for such cases to occur when [material force] flows into activity. How 
then can it be that feelings have no evil? . . . Moreover, how can one regard 
the four buddings as having no evil?28
The theses that “the four buddings sometimes fail to attain their proper mea-
sure”29 and that “principle is weak, material force is strong”30 both come from 
Zhu Xi. In his philosophical system the four buddings and the seven feelings 
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both belong to the level of material force and are thus homogeneous. From this 
we can see that Gi Gobong’s understanding of the four buddings and the seven 
feelings faithfully represents Zhu Xi’s point of view.
In fact the argument advanced by Gi Gobong above seriously misconstrues 
Mencius’ “heart of the four buddings.” In Mencius 6A.15, Mencius explained 
the distinction between “the greater part of self ” (dati 大體) and “the minor 
part of self ” (xiaoti 小體): “The organs of hearing and seeing are unable to 
reflect [on themselves], and can be obscured by things. When one thing comes 
into contact with other things, it will be led away. The organ of the mind-heart 
can reflect [on itself ]. It will find the way only if it reflects [on itself ]; otherwise 
it will not find the way.”31 The seven feelings belong to the sphere of the minor 
part of self, that is, the physical life.
What Mencius called “the organs of seeing and hearing” actually denote 
the senses of vision and hearing. He used them to represent the complete natu-
ral life, which encompasses both the physiological and the psychological aspects 
of one’s life. The natural life of human beings is, in essence, situated in a particu-
lar condition that involves contact with external objects and the reception of 
their stimuli. The eyes and ears of human beings are the organs that are the most 
sensitive to external stimuli, and so Mencius used them to represent the whole 
of natural life. The first instance of the word “thing” (wu 物) in the statement 
“when one thing comes into contact with other things” refers to the organs of 
the ears and eyes. The second instance denotes the external objects. Since the 
eyes and ears are attracted by external objects, they are essentially passive and 
“unable to reflect [on themselves].” Mencius’ description of the “organs of the 
eyes and ears” is identical to Yi Toegye’s statement that the seven feelings “are 
occasioned by circumstantial conditions when external things contact one’s 
body and excite one internally.”
Mencius’ doctrine of the four buddings properly belongs to the sphere of 
the greater part of self, that is, the spiritual life. The term “mind-heart” (xin) 
in “the organ of the mind-heart can reflect [on itself ]” refers to the “original 
mind” (benxin 本心), which is the moral subject. It possesses, in its essence, 
spontaneity as indicated in the sentence “it will find the way only if it reflects 
[on itself ]; otherwise it will not find the way.” With regard to this, the heart 
of the four buddings is not like the organs of the eyes and ears that passively 
arise in response to external objects. Rather, the heart of the four buddings 
inherently possesses spontaneity, which is invested with the power of self-
actualization without being stimulated by external objects. As for the heart 
of commiseration, its issuance is not dependent on the condition of the child 
about to fall in the well; this circumstance is the occasion for its issuance, 
not its actual condition. This is similar to Mencius’ description of Shun 舜 
in 7A.16:
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When Shun lived in the depth of the mountains, he lived amongst trees 
and stones, and had as friends deer and pigs. The difference between him 
and the uncultivated man of the mountains then was slight. But when he 
heard a single good word, witnessed a single good deed, it was like water 
causing a breach in the dykes of the Yangtse or the Yellow River. Nothing 
could withstand it.32
This passage immediately follows the passage in which Mencius discourses 
on “original knowing” (liangzhi 良知) and “original ability” (liangneng 良能). 
Thus, what Mencius intended to explain is the power of the original knowing 
and original ability to issue from themselves. The sentence “when he heard a 
single good word, witnessed a single good deed” simply denotes the occasion of 
Shun issuing forth his original knowing and ability, not the condition of their 
formation. In the passage, Mencius clearly stated that “what a man is able to do 
without having to learn is his original ability; what he knows without having to 
deliberate is his original knowing.” For this reason, it is clear that Gi Gobong 
misconstrued Mencius’ doctrine of “the heart of the four buddings” when he 
grouped the four buddings, which inherently possess spontaneity, together with 
the seven feelings that arise in response to external things.
In addition, the thesis that the four buddings are sometimes not good not 
only lacks the slightest textual corroboration in the Mencius, it also directly 
contradicts Mencius’ doctrine that human nature is good. This is because Men-
cius explained the goodness of the original nature precisely through reference 
to the goodness of the four buddings; if the four buddings had that which was 
not good, he would then have had to discard the doctrine of the good human 
nature and merely propound the doctrine that “the nature possesses both good 
and evil.” But Mencius manifestly rejected this position in his critique of three 
erroneous views of the human nature in Mencius 6A.6—the other two positions 
are that “the nature lacks both good and evil” and that “it is possible for the 
nature to be either good or evil.” Strictly speaking, the circumstances of “feel-
ing commiseration when it is inappropriate to do so; feeling shame and dislike 
when it is inappropriate to do so” do not actually arise from the original mind. 
“Feeling commiseration when it is inappropriate” is not the true disposition of 
commiseration, but only has the appearance of commiseration. From Mencius’ 
point of view, saying that the four buddings have that which is not good is akin 
to saying that the original mind has that which is not good. How could Mencius 
concur with this statement? For this reason, Yi Toegye criticized Gi Gobong in 
the following way:
As for the thesis that the four buddings also involve cases that are not 
in perfect measure, although it is very novel, nevertheless this is not 
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what Mencius was originally getting at. Mencius’ intention was just to 
indicate that [the feelings] are pure emanations of humanity, righteous-
ness, propriety, and comprehension, with the view of manifesting that 
the nature is originally good and therefore the feelings are likewise good; 
that is all. But now you feel the need to put aside this correct and proper 
original intention, and pull it down to the level of the common, ordinary 
man, confusedly appealing to those of his feelings whose issuance is not 
perfectly measured. Indeed, a man’s feeling shame and dislike for what 
he should not feel shame and dislike, or feeling something is right and 
wrong when it should not be felt right and wrong—all this is the effect of 
the turbidity of material force. How could you refer to this kind of vulgar 
thesis as grounds for confusing the status of the four buddings as the pure 
issuance of heavenly principle!33
Yi Toegye appeared not to notice that Zhu Xi made similar statements. 
In fact, Gi Gobong himself also felt that his thesis was problematic. He thus 
frankly stated:
What I presented earlier all took the four buddings as a matter of prin-
ciple (li) and as good; and now here I am speaking of the issuance of the 
four buddings as also involving cases that may not be perfectly measured. 
These words seem to contradict each other, and I imagine you might 
think it strange. Nevertheless, if such a way of expressing it is carefully 
thought through, there is not necessarily any problem with its rationale 
and it can be fit into a single consistent explanation.34
Gi Gobong’s former and latter statements are clearly self-contradictory. As long 
as he accorded with Zhu Xi’s point of view and insisted that the four buddings 
and the seven feelings were homogeneous, then logically it was impossible not 
to come to the conclusion that “the four buddings have that which is not good,” 
which contradicts Mencius’ point of view. This type of predicament, in which 
all choices present difficulties, underscores the position presented at the begin-
ning of the chapter: respecting Zhu Xi’s authority means deviating from Men-
cius’ authority and vice versa.
Yi Toegye’s Theory of “The Mutual Issuance of Principle and  
Material Force” and Its Criticisms
Faced with Gi Gobong’s objections, Yi Toegye did not back down. Instead he 
proposed the following theoretical argument in response:
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Considering the case of heaven and earth and man and other things like-
wise is not a matter of principle being outside material force. If one can 
make the distinction in that case, then in the case of the nature (xing) or 
of the feelings, although one may say that principle is in material force 
or the nature is in the physical matter (qizhi), why is it impermissible to 
distinguish them? For in man’s single body, principle and material force 
combine, and so it is born. Therefore, the two have a mutually issuing 
function, and, moreover, they are interdependent in their issuing. Since 
it is a mutual issuance, one can see that each has its own predominant fac-
tor; since they are interdependent, so one can see that both are included 
in each other. Since both are included in each other, there is certainly an 
undifferentiated way of speaking of them; since each has its own basis, 
therefore there is nothing impermissible to speak of them in a differenti-
ated way. In discussing the nature, we grant that principle is in the midst 
of material force. Nevertheless, Zisi and Mencius could point out the 
original nature, and the Cheng brothers and Zhang Zai could emphasize 
the physical nature. Then, in discussing the feelings, we grant that the 
nature is in the midst of the physically endowed life. Why in that case 
alone should it be impermissible to consider in each case whence it issues 
and so distinguish the four buddings and the seven feelings in terms of 
their point of origin? The matter of combining principle and material 
force and having both good and evil does not pertain only to the feelings; 
the nature also is like that. How can you take this as evidence that it is 
impermissible to distinguish them?35
In this passage, Yi Toegye posited the relationship between principle and 
material force as “mutually interdependent in their issuing” in order to explain 
the relationship between the “original nature” and the “physical nature.” In 
so doing, he invoked Zhang Zai’s and Cheng Yi’s explanation of the physi-
cal nature and implicitly rejected Zhu Xi’s interpretation as a standard, since, 
as explicated above, in Zhu Xi’s system the relationship between the original 
nature and the physical nature is not one of principle and material force; rather, 
Zhu Xi defined the relationship between the original nature and physical mat-
ter (qizhi) as one of principle and material force. Only by basing his position 
on the interpretation of Zhang Zai and Cheng Yi is it possible for Yi Toegye to 
conceive of the relationship between the original nature and the physical nature 
as one involving the “mutual dependence and issuing together” of principle and 
material force. Also, it is only on the basis of this type of relationship between 
principle and material force as being “mutually interdependent in their issu-
ing” that Yi Toegye is able to account fully for the heterogeneity of the four 
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buddings and the seven feelings. Some years later, Seong Ugye cited the above 
passage, which he termed “Toegye’s Original Position,” in his debate with Yi 
Yulgok, which became the primary textual basis for Yi Toegye’s theory of “the 
mutual issuance of principle and material force.”36
Yi Toegye further responded to Gi Gobong’s thesis that “the four bud-
dings are also stimulated by things and act” by stating:
This thesis is, of course, correct. . . . From the perspective of the undiffer-
entiated manner of discourse, the seven feelings combine both principle 
and material force. This is clear enough without wasting too many words. 
But if we contrast the seven feelings with the four buddings and discuss 
each in terms of its distinct characteristics, the seven feelings are related 
to material force in the way the four buddings are related to principle. 
Their issuances each have their own systematic ramifications, and their 
designations each have their particular point of reference. Therefore, we 
can follow their predominant factor and categorize them separately. I 
have never said the seven feelings have nothing to do with principle or 
that they are aroused by a fortuitous encounter with external things. And 
the four buddings are certainly not different from the seven feelings with 
regards to being stimulated by things and then moving. It is only that, in 
the case of the four buddings, principle issues them and material force 
follows it, whereas, in the case of the seven feelings, material force issues 
them and principle directs it.37
In the last part of the passage, Yi Toegye has proposed a new explanation of the 
different functions of principle and material force in the issuance of the four 
buddings and the seven feelings.
In a different section of this same letter, Yi Toegye explained this thesis 
more clearly:
Generally speaking, there are cases where principle issues and material 
force follows, so one can speak of these in a way that takes principle as the 
predominant factor; but that does not mean principle is external to mate-
rial force. The four buddings are such a case. There are cases in which 
material force issues and principle directs it, so one may speak of these in 
a way that takes material force as the predominant factor; but that does 
not mean that material force is external to principle. The seven feelings 
are this kind of case.38
In Yi Toegye’s view, this thesis provided a response to Gi Gobong’s critique 
that “the seven feelings do not emerge from the nature and the four buddings 
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do not direct material force [to issue].” Moreover, by espousing this thesis, Yi 
Toegye was able to preserve the heterogeneity of the four buddings and the 
seven feelings. However, the ineffective nature of this kind of response makes it 
lack persuasive power, because Yi Toegye remained unable to account directly 
for the essential distinction between “being stimulated by things and moving” 
in the cases of the four buddings and the seven feelings. Instead of address-
ing this problem directly, he simply reiterated Gi Gobong’s thesis that “the 
four buddings are certainly not different from the seven feelings with regard 
to their being stimulated by things and then moving.” Thus, in his “Reply to 
Yi Toegye to Discourse Once Again on the Four Buddings and Seven Feel-
ings,” Gi Gobong still could not agree with this phrasing and, not surprisingly, 
recommended changing it to “As for the issuance of the feelings, in some cases 
principle acts and material force are together with it; in other cases material 
force is stimulated and principle directs it.”39 This statement and Yi Toegye’s 
statement “principle issues and material force follows it; material force issues 
and principle directs it” seem not to be different in their wording. However, 
Gi Gobong added “as for the issuance of the feelings” to the beginning of the 
sentence, which encased the four buddings and seven feelings within the con-
cept of “feeling.” In so doing, he thereby rejected Yi Toegye’s point of view that 
regarded the four buddings and the seven feelings as pertaining to different 
levels.
Fundamentally, the real key to this problem does not lie in the written 
expression of their ideas, but in how to interpret the meaning of Yi Toegye’s 
“issuance of principle” (lifa 理發) and Gi Gobong’s “activity of principle” (lidong 
理動). It is in fact possible to unite the literal meaning of these two phrases. Gi 
Gobong offers the following interpretation of this problem: “When material 
force is compliant with principle and issues without a single bit of obstruction, 
then it is the issuance of principle. If you wish to find some issuance of principle 
outside this, I fear that the further you go with such conjecture and groping, the 
more fruitless it will be.”40 Here Gi Gobong strictly adheres to Zhu Xi’s posi-
tion. Within this line of thought, the issuance of principle is actually the issu-
ance of material force, and the activity of principle is in reality the activity of 
material force. For, as repeatedly emphasized above, principle is incapable of 
activity in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system.
Some years later, Yi Yulgok wrote the following in a letter replying to 
Seong Ugye: “Generally speaking, that which gives issuance is material force; 
that whereby there is issuance is principle. Without material force, there would 
not be the power of issuing; without principle, there would not be that whereby 
it issues.”41 If Yi Toegye could have accepted this kind of explanation, which 
conforms to Zhu Xi’s viewpoint, he would not have had any reason to continue 
his debate with Gi Gobong. But his persistent unwillingness to concede to Gi 
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Gobong’s arguments indicates that he must have had an alternative explanation 
for the issuance of principle.
In Yi Yulgok’s letter quoted above, he expressed reservations about Yi 
Toegye’s notion that “principle issues the four buddings and material force fol-
lows it.” As he argued, “The state with regard to being issued by principle is like 
[Hu Yunfeng’s] saying that the nature issues forth as the feelings. But, if one says 
principle gives issuance and material force follows it, this means that at the very 
first moment of issuance, material force is not involved, but rather after that 
issuance it follows and gives issuance. Is this reasonable?”42 The thesis that “the 
nature issues forth as the feelings” comes from Hu Yunfeng 胡雲峰 (Bingwen 
炳文, 1250–1333), the Yuan dynasty follower of Zhu Xi’s learning.43
From the standpoint of Zhu Xi’s learning, the reservation expressed by Yi 
Yulgok is reasonable. Yi Yulgok later proposed the notion “principle pervades 
and material force delimits; material force issues and principle directs it” (itong 
i giguk 理通而氣局; gibar i riseung 氣發而理乘) to replace Yi Toegye’s notion of 
“principle issues [the four buddings] and material force follows it; material force 
issues [the seven feelings] and principle directs it.” This notion first appeared in 
Yi Yulgok’s sixth reply to Seong Ugye: “Principle is formless and material force 
has form; therefore, principle pervades and material force delimits. Principle is 
nonactive and material force is active; therefore, material force issues and prin-
ciple directs it.”44 Comparing this notion with Yi Toegye’s, the use of “material 
force issues and principle directs it” is consistent in the two formulations. Yi 
Yulgok only rejected the thesis that “principle issues and material force follows 
it.” Thus, his theory is also called “the proposition that the material force issuing 
and principle directing it is the sole way.”45
It is clear that Yi Yulgok’s substitution of “principle pervades and mate-
rial force delimits” for Yi Toegye’s “principle issues and material force follows 
it” was premised on Zhu Xi’s notion that “principle cannot be active.” This 
is because, from Yi Yulgok’s perspective, Yi Toegye’s theory of “the mutual 
issuance of principle and material force” is not different from admitting that 
principle could in fact be active, which violates the fundamental viewpoint of 
Zhu Xi’s learning. But how could this not have clearly demonstrated that Yi 
Toegye’s insights could not fit within the parameters of Zhu Xi’s learning? Yi 
Toegye seems to have become mired in the idea of viewing the four buddings 
as the activity of principle itself in order to conform to Mencius’ view. Yet, due 
to Zhu Xi’s authority, Yi Toegye also quite naturally invoked Zhu Xi’s “the 
four buddings are the issuance of principle” in support of his views. However, 
when he was forced to confront Gi Gobong’s questions, which are formulated 
from the standpoint of Zhu Xi’s learning, he could not escape the delimita-
tions inherent in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system, putting him in an awkward 
position.
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The Philosophical Purport of the Four-Seven Debate
Franz Brentano (1838–1917), a philosopher of German phenomenology, pro-
posed a fundamental question in his Foundation and Construction of Ethics: Is 
the principle of ethics knowledge or feeling?46 This question serves as the start-
ing point for phenomenological ethics and pervades its entire subsequent devel-
opment. The Korean Confucian Four-Seven Debate is, at its root, concerned 
with the same fundamental question.
At the beginning of this chapter, Immanuel Kant’s terminology was bor-
rowed in order to identify the four buddings with moral feeling and the seven 
emotions with physical feeling. As is generally known, during the critical 
period, Kantian philosophy presupposes a two-level framework consisting of 
“appearance” and “the thing-in-itself.” Within Kant’s ethics, this framework 
becomes the dual framework of feeling and reason. Within this latter frame-
work, the moral subject is the will as practical reason and is completely unre-
lated to all feelings (including moral feelings). Thus, on one hand, Kant indi-
cated that moral feelings and physical feelings are both sensible. On the other 
hand, however, he emphasized the fundamental distinction between these two 
types of feeling: moral feelings represent the effect of moral law on the feel-
ings, and physical feelings are initiated by the inclination of our will toward 
its objects.
When Kant decided to view the will as moral subject merely as practical 
reason and attributed moral feeling to the sensible level, this was not different 
from stripping the moral subject of the ability to implement the commands of 
moral law. In other words, the moral subject only possesses principium dijudi-
cationis (the principle of the appraisal of the action); its principium executionis 
(the principle of its performance) is relegated to moral feelings. The separation 
of principium dijudicationis and principium executionis leads to the difficulty of 
how to account for moral responsibility. On one hand, if moral feelings belong 
to sensibility, then they lack autonomy and naturally have no means of bearing 
moral responsibility. On the other hand, the moral subject is definitely able to 
give moral law and only lacks the ability to actualize the commands of moral law 
and thus too is unable to bear moral responsibility. The inevitable result is that 
moral responsibility falls into a vacuum at either end.
One of Kant’s successors, Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805), discovered this 
difficulty in Kant’s ethics. In order to solve it, he did away with Kant’s twofold 
ethical framework consisting of feeling and reason, and proposed the concept of 
Neigung zur Pflicht (inclination to duty). This intellectual trend was continued 
by the German philosophers of phenomenological ethics Dietrich von Hilde-
brand (1889–1977), Max Scheler (1874–1928), and Nicolai Hartmann (1882–
1950). Scheler, for instance, summarized Kant’s dual framework as follows:
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a priori = formal (= rational)_____________________________
a posteriori = material (= sensible)
However, Scheler indicated that this dichotomy does not actually exhaust all 
realms of possibility and that a third realm, the a priori and material, should be 
added.47 He placed our Wertfühlen (feeling of value) into this third realm of the 
a priori and material. He intentionally used the term Fühlen (to feel) to high-
light the spontaneity of Wertfühlen and thereby distinguished it from common 
Gefühl (feeling). In this way Wertfühlen was raised to the level of the a priori.
When looking back at the above analyses of the Korean Four-Seven 
Debate, we can say that the four buddings are a type of moral feelings in the 
Kantian sense and that the seven feelings are a type of physical feelings. Zhu 
Xi and Gi Gobong attributed both the four buddings and the seven feelings to 
the level of material force, just as Kant had attributed both moral feeling and 
physical feeling to the sensible level. With regard to this matter, the viewpoints 
of both sides have areas of similarity. The greatest point of divergence between 
the ethics of Kant and that of Zhu Xi is that, in Kant’s ethical system, the will 
as moral subject is the giver of moral law, whereas, in Zhu Xi’s philosophical 
anthropology, the nature is mere principle; though the mind-heart is able to 
recognize principle, it is not the giver of principle. For this reason Kant’s eth-
ics belongs to the “ethics of autonomy,” whereas Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the 
“ethics of heteronomy.”
In Kant’s ethics of autonomy, a moral feeling represents the effect of moral 
law on sensibility, and so it can be viewed as “a feeling self-wrought by a rational 
concept” (durch einen Vernunftbegriff selbstgewirktes Gefühl ),48 which is distin-
guishable in essence from a passive physical feeling initiated by contact with 
external objects. On the surface, this appears to be consistent with Yi Toegye’s 
usage of “the issuance of principle” and “the issuance of material force” to distin-
guish between the four buddings and the seven feelings. However, on a deeper 
level, there is a fundamental difference between the two systems.
For Kant, moral feelings do not belong to the activities of the moral sub-
ject, but represent only the effects of moral law on the feelings. The activity of 
the moral subject is just the giving of moral law, and moral law is only a formal 
principle that in and of itself does not possess the power of self-actualization. In 
contrast, when Yi Toegye bestowed principle with the capacity of activity, it was 
not different from acknowledging that principle issues from the original mind 
and that the four buddings are the activity of the original mind. In this way, 
the four buddings are elevated to the level of the original mind, which is quite 
different from Kant’s later understanding of moral feelings as belonging to the 
sensible level even if they have their grounds in reason. In sum, in Kant’s later 
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ethics, moral feelings and physical feelings share the same level but are hetero-
geneous, whereas, in Yi Toegye’s thought, the four buddings and the seven feel-
ings are located on different levels and hence heterogeneous. On this point, Yi 
Toegye’s position is closer to phenomenological ethics than it is to Kant’s ethics.
In Mencius’ philosophical anthropology the four buddings are the activity 
of the original mind; they issue directly from the original mind, and the origi-
nal mind is the origin of the principles of humanity, righteousness, propriety, 
and comprehension. Thus, Mencius’ philosophical anthropology can be seen as 
including Kant’s concept of autonomy but takes it a step further by elevating the 
four buddings as well as the principles of humanity, righteousness, propriety, 
and comprehension to the level of the original mind. As a result, in Mencius’ 
ethics, the four buddings are nothing but what Mou Zongsan called “ontologi-
cal feeling.”49 In terms of the self-legislation of the moral subject, the ethical 
viewpoints of Mencius and Kant coincide; however, with regard to the a priori 
nature of moral feelings, Mencius’ philosophical anthropology is fundamen-
tally consistent with phenomenological ethics.
Taking the above discussion into consideration, even if Yi Toegye respected 
Zhu Xi, his position in the Four-Seven Debate contravened Zhu Xi’s thought 
and corresponded to Mencius’ philosophy. Faced with the dual-layered texts 
and authority of Zhu Xi and Mencius, it was difficult for Yi Toegye to strike 
a balance between their different points of view, whereas, in the case of Gi 
Gobong, there was no such difficulty since he adhered to Zhu Xi’s standpoint 
throughout. Yet, rather than viewing this as a shortcoming in Yi Toegye’s posi-
tion, it reveals the richness and creativity of Yi Toegye’s thought and his refusal 
to be constrained by the limits inherent in Zhu Xi’s philosophical system.






Wang Yangming’s Philosophy and  
Modern Theories of Democracy
A Reconstructive Interpretation
T h is  c h a p t er  e x a m i n es another central Neo-Confucian philosopher, 
who intently studied Zhu Xi’s writings and later became one of his most serious 
critics. Wang Yangming challenged many aspects of Zhu Xi’s interpretations, 
and the nature of his criticism has contributed much to the modern discussion 
over the relationship between Confucianism and democracy among Taiwanese 
liberals and the New Confucians. Wang Yangming’s brand of Neo-Confucian-
ism plays a key role in modern Chinese philosophy, considerations of the com-
patibility of the theories of democracy, and the general Confucian project.
“Original Knowing”: Liu Shipei’s Reconstructive Interpretation of  
Wang Yangming’s Theory
Since the end of the Qing dynasty, the relationship between Confucianism and 
democracy has been a great concern of Chinese intellectuals. Even today, after 
a century of discussion, this problem is still being raised in connection with 
the debate over “Asian values.” In previous scholarship, a number of scholars 
claimed that the Confucian tradition encompasses the concept of democracy. 
This topic, however, has not received much contemporary scholarly attention. 
Recent discussions focus on the following questions: Is the Confucian tradi-
tion compatible with the requirements of modern democracy? If so, can we find 
intellectual resources in Confucian tradition that will facilitate the implementa-
tion of modern democracy?
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One topic that has received attention in connection with this ongoing dis-
cussion is the relevance of Wang Yangming’s learning to the implementation of 
democracy. The 1904 book The Essential Meaning of the Chinese Social Con-
tract (Zhongguo minyue jingyi 中國民約精義) was the earliest Chinese publica-
tion on the relationship between Wang Yangming’s thought and democracy. 
Written by Liu Shipei 劉師培 (Shenshu 申叔, 1884–1919), who relied on Yang 
Tingdong’s 楊廷棟 (1878–1950) translation of Rousseau’s Social Contract, the 
book compares some of Rousseau’s ideas with those of the Confucian tradition, 
claiming that the Confucian tradition already embodies the same democratic 
concepts.1 At that time, Rousseau’s book was accepted by Chinese intellectuals 
as one of the standard works for the theory of democracy. In his preface to The 
Essential Meaning of the Chinese Social Contract, Liu wrote that “in obtaining 
this [Rousseau’s Social Contract], our country has merely acquired a new schol-
arly locution and nothing more. And yet certain reactionary individuals regard 
it as a heterodox doctrine, as if the sages and worthies of our country had never 
advocated such an idea.”2 Liu continued: “Searching through our country’s 
works, I have obtained several texts that contain the former sages’ ideas about 
social contracts. I have appended my commentaries to these texts, corroborated 
them according to Rousseau’s theory, and reflected upon their strengths and 
weaknesses.”3
The range of Liu Shipei’s compilation extends from the Book of Changes 
to the works of the Qing scholar Dai Wang 戴望 (1837–1873). In the sec-
tion of the text devoted to Wang Yangming, he included the following three 
passages:
1. The man of humaneness [ren 仁] takes heaven, earth, and the 
myriad things as one body; there is nothing that is not the self. Thus 
[Confucius] said: “[The man of humaneness] in wishing to establish 
himself, seeks also to establish others; in wishing to be accomplished, 
he seeks also to accomplish others” (Letter to Wang Jiaxiu 王嘉秀 
Requesting Instruction).4
2. The mind of judging right and wrong knows without deliberation 
and is capable without study; this is the meaning of the “original 
knowing” [liangzhi 良知]. The original knowing is in the human 
mind; it does not vary between the wise and the foolish, and 
throughout the world it remains the same today as it was in the past. 
The cultivated individuals of our times should devote themselves to 
extending their original knowing. Then they of themselves naturally 
will be able to impartially judge right and wrong, unite likes and 
dislikes, view others as themselves, view the country as their families, 
and take heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body. When 
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this is accomplished, it would be impossible for the world to be in a 
state of disorder (Letter in Response to Nie Wenwei 聶文蔚).5
3. Only [those who] illuminate their bright virtue in order to love 
the people can take one body as the world; only those who love the 
people in order to illuminate their bright virtue are able to take the 
world as one body (Script written for Zhao Limeng 趙立孟).6
After quoting the above three passages, Liu added the following commentary:
[Wang Yangming’s] theory of the original knowing derives from Mencius’ 
thesis that human nature is originally good. Wang Yangming spoke of 
the original knowing, whereas Rousseau spoke of the goodness of human 
nature. The Social Contract states: “People’s predilection toward good-
ness derives from their innate nature. It is so even if they have yet to enter 
into the social contract”{book 2, chapter 6}.7 These words firmly grasp the 
purport of Mencius’ [thesis about] the goodness of human nature, from 
which [Wang Yangming’s] theory of the original knowing derives. The 
original knowing is that which originates only in heaven. Since people’s 
original knowing is the same, what they obtain from heaven is also the 
same. Since what they obtain from heaven is the same, as demonstrated 
by the statement that “Yao 堯 and Shun 舜 are the same as ordinary peo-
ple” {Mencius 4B.32}, how is it possible to establish a division according 
to different grades? The Social Contract also states: “Everyone is born to 
have the right or capacity to liberty as the master of his body. He manages 
his right or capacity to liberty with a view to control the affairs of the 
world, making them conform to his own will and not allowing it to bow 
even slightly to others. This is what rationality affirms” {book 4, chap-
ter 2}. Indeed, although there exist natural distinctions at birth between 
the strong and the weak, the intelligent and the ignorant, once the social 
contract is established, in the eyes of the law, such distinctions no longer 
exist. [These words] are similar to those expressed by Wang Yangming. 
{Yangming said: “Only the most refined sages in the world are able to be 
intelligent and wise. Formerly, [the sage’s ability] was looked at as being 
very miraculous, but now [we] see it as something that all people origi-
nally had.” He also said: “Only those who illuminate their bright virtue 
in order to love the people are able to take one body as the world.” He 
likewise said: “The bright virtue refers to the heavenly endowed nature, 
which is miraculously radiant and not darkened; it is the place from which 
the myriad principles originate.” This is exactly the purport of both the 
statement in Doctrine of the Mean: “What heaven imparts to man is the 
nature” and Mencius’ [thesis about] the goodness of human nature. Now 
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Wang Yangming regarded goodness as coming from the original nature, 
and thus he wanted all people truly to attain impartiality in their will. In 
this, his ideas were similar to the Song Confucian Lu Jiuyuan 陸九淵.}
Liu continued:
Moreover, Rousseau regarded renouncing the right or capacity to liberty 
to be equivalent to renouncing what makes one human. Thus preserving 
the right or capacity to liberty is one of the most important responsibili-
ties of our life. {Book 1, chapter 4, of the Social Contract states: “Those who 
discard the right or capacity to liberty discard their bright virtue bestowed 
by heaven and [maintain that] it comes from the outside. This is the mean-
ing of self-abnegation.”} This [statement] also takes liberty to be innately 
endowed at birth. Now, the right or capacity to liberty is endowed by 
heaven, just as the original knowing is endowed by heaven. Liberty has 
nothing on which it depends, just as the original knowing has nothing 
on which it depends. Thus it is permissible to say that the original know-
ing is just the right or capacity to liberty. Although Wang Yangming did 
not elaborate upon the principles of civil rights in his writings, the essen-
tial principles of equality and liberty can be inferred from his theory of 
the original knowing. Today, if we intend to shake up Chinese scholarly 
trends, need we only elaborate upon the theory of the original knowing?8
In the above commentary, Liu Shipei included three different passages 
from The Social Contract. By contemporary standards, Yang Tingdong’s Chi-
nese translation suffers from a lack of precision, and his sometimes mechanical 
use of traditional Chinese terminology reveals a tendency toward overinterpre-
tation. For example, Liu Shipei’s quotation from book 2, chapter 6, reads that 
“people’s predilection toward goodness derives from their innate nature. It is so 
even if they have yet to enter into the social contract.” This deviates widely from 
the original text that reads: “That which is good and conformable to order is 
such by the nature of things, independent of human conventions.”9 Since this 
passage does not directly address human nature, Liu Shipei’s use of it to prove 
that Rousseau advanced a thesis about the goodness of human nature is prob-
lematic. Yet, in some of his other works, in particular, Émile and Discourse on the 
Origin of Inequality, Rousseau clearly confirmed the goodness of human nature. 
Therefore, even if the texts Liu Shipei quoted from have problems, his conclu-
sions can still be regarded as fundamentally correct.
If we leave aside the particulars of these passages and look at Liu Shipei’s 
comments on the thought of Wang Yangming as a whole, we can discern Liu’s 
two key points: First, Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing encom-
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passes the essentials of liberty, equality, and civil rights; and, second, the mean-
ing of the phrases “taking heaven, earth, and the myriad things as one body” 
and “taking the world as one body” in Wang Yangming’s theory of the original 
knowing is especially consonant with the principles of civil rights.
Debate between Taiwanese Liberals and the New Confucians:  
The Relationship between Confucianism and Democracy
Although the above two points are relatively simple, they were often repeated 
and critiqued in the ensuing debate over the relevance of Confucianism to 
democracy. The significance of Liu’s conclusions for this debate can be seen in 
the papers presented at the “Conference on the Thought of Wang Yangming” 
hosted by the Center for Humanities Research at Taiwan Normal University 
in 1988. At the conference, three papers discussed the relationship between 
Wang Yangming’s philosophy and modern democracy: Wang Bangxiong’s 王
邦雄 “On the Theoretical Foundations of Democracy and Rule of Law from 
the Perspective of Zhu Xi’s and Wang Yangming’s Views on the Mind and the 
Nature,” Zeng Chunhai’s 曾春海 “Possible Problems in the Practical Implemen-
tation of Wang Yangming’s ‘Extending the Original Knowing’ in Democratic 
Order,” and Chen Yufu’s 陳郁夫 “On the Possibility of Using ‘Extending the 
Original Knowing’ as the Philosophical Foundation for Democracy.”10 In their 
papers, both Wang and Chen affirmed the relationship between democracy and 
Wang Yangming’s thought. What is noteworthy is that the basic points of their 
arguments do not go beyond those advanced by Liu Shipei.
In opposition to their views, Zeng Chunhai discussed four potential prob-
lems in the practical implementation of Wang Yangming’s “extending the origi-
nal knowing” in a democratic order:
1. Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing affirms a high level 
of spiritual value. It transcends the pursuit and allocation of common 
value, resulting in the absence of the capability to develop individualism 
and a consciousness of rights, both of which are essential elements of 
democracy.
2. The everyday norms of democracy must be established on the concep-
tualization of objective knowledge. The original knowing is not able to 
provide this because the knowledge acquired by the original knowing is a 
kind of “moral knowledge.”
3. The standards of democracy are institutional, experiential, external, 
objective, and require dealing with the structure, the operation, and the 
relationships of power. However, the standards of the original knowing 
are a priori, internal, and subjective. They merely involve the moral impli-
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cations that political activities may have and do not directly consider the 
problems surrounding institutions and power.
4. Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing takes the pursuit of a 
perfectly moral personality as its end. However, the demands made by 
democracy on its leaders are not moral ones.
Just as the papers presented by Chen and Wang, Zeng’s arguments do not break 
any new ground, because ideas similar to Zeng’s were already being advanced by 
Taiwanese liberals in the 1950s in their debate with the New Confucians over 
the relationship between Confucianism and democracy.
In this debate, the main representatives of liberalism are Yin Haiguang 殷
海光 (1919–1969) and Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1908–1994), whereas the main 
representatives of New Confucianism are Xu Fuguan, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, 
and Zhang Junmai.11 In their joint declaration “Manifesto Regarding Chinese 
Culture to People All over the World” dating from 1958, the New Confucians 
acknowledged that the “practical moral subject” in Confucian ethics (or the 
learning of the mind and nature) was not directly equivalent to the “political 
subject” sought by democracy.12 This acknowledgment demonstrates that they 
in no way dismissed the distance and even inconsistency between Confucian 
ethics—which includes Wang Yangming’s theory of the original knowing—and 
democracy. On this point, there is no obvious difference between the position 
of the New Confucians and that of the liberals. What causes the sides to part 
company are their attitudes toward the Confucian tradition. From the liber-
als’ point of view, the Confucian tradition not only failed to develop demo-
cratic institutions, but it also worked to obstruct the emergence of the idea of 
democracy throughout Chinese history. For this reason, if the Chinese people 
intend to establish a democratic order, the liberals argue, they have to model it 
on the West.
From the perspective of the New Confucians, however, the fact that Chi-
nese culture, which throughout history had been dominated by the Confu-
cian tradition, failed to establish democratic institutions did not prove that 
the essence of the Confucian tradition is incompatible with democracy. In 
their opinion, the establishment of democratic institutions is an aim internal 
to Confucianism; it is a cultural ideal that is pursued in the process of the 
spiritual development of Confucianism. In their attempts to demonstrate 
this, they responded to the challenge posed by the liberal scholars from two 
different angles. First, on the basis of his extensive research on the history of 
Chinese thought, especially in his book Intellectual History of the Han (Liang 
Han sixiang shi 兩漢思想史), Xu Fuguan demonstrated that the fundamental 
Confucian spirit was corrupted to a substantial degree by the establishment 
of the imperial monarchy after the Qin and Han. Thus, he argued, it is not 
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“true” that Confucianism adapted successfully in the historical development 
of the imperial monarchy. Second, Mou Zongsan formulated his doctrine of 
“the self-negation of the original knowing” to explain the internal connection 
between Confucianism and democracy.
Mou Zongsan first advanced the above notion in his book titled Wang 
Yangming’s Teaching of Extending the Original Knowing (Wang Yangming zhi 
liangzhi jiao 王陽明致良知教).13 He originally wrote the book to explain the 
relationship between original knowing and knowledge. Later, in his books Phi-
losophy of History (Lishi zhexue 歷史哲學) and The Principle of Legitimation 
and the Principle of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao 政道與治道), he again 
invoked this theory to explain the relationship of moral knowledge to sci-
ence and democracy. In these works he divided the expressions of reason into 
two types: “functional expression” and “structural expression,” or “intentional 
expression” and “extensional expression.” Simply put, the functional expres-
sion of reason is for Mou a type of intellectual intuition, where the relationship 
between the subject and the object is expressed as one of subordination. The 
structural expression of reason then is a conceptual form of thought, where the 
relationship between subject and object is expressed as one of coordination.
Mou Zongsan identified the moral knowledge emphasized by traditional 
Confucians as the functional expression of reason. He further contended that 
the knowledge of democratic systems and science belong to the structural 
expression of reason. He defined the functional expression of reason as the 
direct expression of the moral subject and argued that, at the moment of its 
transformation into structural expression, the moral subject necessarily under-
goes a dialectical turning of self-negation.14 This theory amounted to a modern 
transformation of the conceptual framework of traditional Confucianism—
“inner sagehood, outer kingliness”—where the direct connection between 
“inner sagehood” and “outer kingliness” was transformed into an indirect one.
Mou Zongsan used this theory as a clever response to the doubts raised by 
the liberal scholars concerning the relevance of Confucianism to democracy. 
On one hand, he admitted that moral knowledge and democracy are essentially 
different, thereby providing a reason for the failure of the Confucian tradition 
to develop democratic institutions in the past; on the other hand, he affirmed 
the internal connection between moral knowledge and democracy, and pro-
vided a philosophical explanation for correlation of the two. As a result the 
main point of dispute between the liberal scholars and the New Confucians 
shifted from the former to the latter, because the liberal scholars opposed taking 
moral knowledge as the foundation for democracy.
The main reason Taiwanese liberal scholars opposed making moral knowl-
edge the foundation for democracy is that they were influenced by the English 
and American liberal tradition. Passages from both Yin Haiguang and Zhang 
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Foquan demonstrate this point. In his essay “Keystone of Democracy,” Yin Hai-
guang wrote:
If you take morality as the foundation for democracy, then this is con-
sonant with Hegel’s panlogicism. Panlogicism is one of the theoretical 
foundations of panpoliticism, and panpoliticism serves as the framework 
for totalitarian government. Under the influence and even the domi-
nation of modern technology, the process is more important than the 
objective. This is because what people personally have contact with is 
the actual process but never the ideal objective. It has been like this since 
antiquity, and it has become more intense in the present. If the process 
of implementing the objective of morality is not done morally, then the 
ideal morality has the potential to create actual harm. The religious per-
secutions of the past, the tragedy engendered by the way of thinking of 
the “Record of Realization and Confusion Regarding Great Righteous-
ness” (Dayi jue mi lu 大義覺迷錄) in the East, and the formation of mod-
ern totalitarian government are all rooted in this. Morality itself actu-
ally does not have the capability of preventing immoral behavior from 
appearing. Therefore, morality is not even remotely able to serve as the 
foundation for democracy. Taking a step back, even if we say that there 
are no such harms, morality after all belongs to the ethical realm. It is 
external to institutions, and, because of this, morality and political insti-
tutions are still two different entities.15
Likewise, Zhang Foquan, in his book Liberty and Human Rights (Ziyu yu 
renquan 自由與人權), wrote:
“Formal” and “negative” liberty serves as the point of distinction between 
democracy and totalitarianism. In the world today, the theory of positive 
liberty can be called the fashionable theory of the moment. It is a slogan 
of the totalitarian world; it is also a slogan of the socialists. These peo-
ple harbor doubts about “negative liberty,” or the principle of removing 
“obstacles,” [saying that] it just treats the head when you have a headache 
or treats the feet when they hurt [i.e., it treats the symptoms and not the 
disease]. [They say that] what we are in urgent need of today is a com-
plete plan and a thorough method. Let me indicate that the above words 
can only be spoken after one has been hypnotized by totalitarianism. 
When people speak such words, the complete plan in their minds is to 
have a “superman” design the lives and thoughts of the masses. The thor-
ough method they envision in their minds involves opening up all bar-
riers and letting the great dictator unrestrainedly trample [the lives and 
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rights of ] the masses. In fact, these advocates of positive liberty are not 
actually criticizing the inability to implement existing means of liberty or 
the fact that existing components of liberty are currently awaiting modi-
fication. The material liberty they advocate, rather, involves only those 
rights that have been determined by the rulers. Over the past decades the 
bitter taste of this type of material liberty is something that people have 
actually experienced under totalitarian institutions.16
Zhang completed this book in May of 1953, before Isaiah Berlin (1909–
1997) advanced the distinction between positive liberty and negative liberty.17 
In addition to following the English and American liberal traditions, Berlin’s 
use of the concept of negative liberty to combat positive liberty was also formu-
lated against the historical background of the Cold War. From the time Jacob 
Leib Talmon (1916–1980) put forward the distinction between “totalitarian 
democracy” and “liberal democracy,” the majority of Anglo-American political 
scientists and intellectual historians recognized that the modern West had two 
traditions of democracy.18 The first began with J.-J. Rousseau and was contin-
ued through the advocacy of French intellectuals and led to the French Revo-
lution. Later, this tradition was picked up by the German idealists, especially 
Hegel, and, after being reinterpreted by Marx and Engels, the tradition led to 
the communist revolutions. The second tradition began with John Locke and 
was continued through the advocacy of English liberal thinkers and America’s 
founding fathers. It served as the foundation for the constitutional democracies 
of both Great Britain and the United States.
F. A. von Hayek (1899–1992) called these two traditions the “French 
tradition” and the “British tradition,”19 but it is actually more appropriate to 
call them the “European continental tradition” and the “Anglo-American tradi-
tion.” One of the points of divergence between these two traditions is precisely 
their different views of “positive liberty” and “negative liberty.” As the two pas-
sages quoted above demonstrate, the problem of “negative liberty” and “positive 
liberty” also entered into the debate between the scholars of liberalism and the 
New Confucians.
Simply put, the concept of “negative liberty” emphasizes the scope of 
action that remains exempt from external obstacles and constraints, whereas 
“positive liberty” refers to the freedom of self-realization that is not dependent 
on any external condition. As a result the advocates of the former stress external 
freedom, whereas the proponents of the latter tend to be more concerned with 
spiritual and moral freedom. The main reason liberals advocate negative liberty 
and oppose positive liberty is that negative liberty only involves itself with the 
scope of external behavior and preserves a neutral position with regard to value 
choices. The implications of negative liberty are clear, making it possible to cre-
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ate lists of “basic freedoms” or “bills of rights” that are not easily susceptible to 
distortion. In opposition to this, positive liberty concerns itself with the con-
tents of values, resulting in its engagement with metaphysical problems. This 
concern with metaphysics provides totalitarian regimes with an opportunity to 
invoke ideology as a pretext for interfering with people’s external freedom, as 
commonly seen in communist countries.
However, it is important to note that, although Taiwanese liberal scholars 
resembled their Western counterparts in using negative liberty to oppose posi-
tive liberty, the New Confucians not only did not reject negative liberty, they 
recognized that it is absent from the Chinese cultural tradition and that it is 
something that should be adopted. What the New Confucians disagreed with 
is the liberal scholars’ use of arguments based on logic and practical results to 
contrast positive liberty with negative liberty, employing the latter to reject the 
former. From the viewpoint of the New Confucians, negative liberty logically 
presupposes positive liberty; otherwise it has no means of being established.20 
Moreover, in terms of practical results, the New Confucians believed that the 
moral implications inherent in positive liberty could serve as an effective instru-
ment for dealing with totalitarianism. No wonder Xu Fuguan indicated that he 
“was not willing to be merely a liberalist.”21
Reappraising Wang Yangming’s Theory of “Original Knowing” from  
the Communitarian Perspective
From the 1980s there emerged in the American intellectual community the 
trend of “communitarianism,” whose main representatives were Alasdair 
MacIntyre (1929–), Michael Sandel (1953–), and Charles Taylor (1931–). 
This intellectual trend arose as a critical response to John Rawls’ (1921–2002 ) 
seminal work A Theory of Justice and later developed into a critical examination 
of the basic presuppositions of liberalism. The communitarian critique of lib-
eralism involves a number of points, which cannot be examined in detail here. 
For the present purpose, the problem of positive liberty and negative liberty, 
and concerns for the relationship between the individual and the community 
will be addressed.
In his essay “What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?” Charles Taylor pro-
vided a critical examination of the theory of negative liberty.22 In Taylor’s opin-
ion, limiting negative liberty to “the exemption from external obstacles” makes 
it impossible for it to encompass one of the core objectives of liberalism—the 
self-realization of an individual. Taylor contended that, once we adopt the 
standpoint of self-realization, we are unable to avoid distinguishing between 
true and false or between important and unimportant in all of our motives (or 
ends). In other words, the adoption of this standpoint requires us to recognize 
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that value choices are not purely subjective. This in turn compels us to adopt 
the concept of “positive liberty” and further to define it as “the ability to realize 
one’s ends.”
From the liberal perspective, once we acknowledge that motives (or ends) 
possess distinctions between true and false, and between important and unim-
portant, this will inevitably lead to the recognition that value choices have 
objective standards. Such objective standards can provide a country or society 
with the opportunity to use the pursuit of true ends as a pretext for interfering 
with people’s actions, giving rise to the collective suppression of the individual. 
Because of this, liberalism needs to preserve the “Maginot Line” of negative 
liberty to protect against the possibility of the collective suppressing the indi-
vidual. But, according to Taylor, this line is impossible to hold, and, moreover, 
recognizing objective standards in value choices does not inevitably lead to 
totalitarianism. In other words, Taylor believed that there is no necessary logi-
cal connection between positive liberty and totalitarianism.
Moreover, when liberals insist on the position of negative liberty, they 
actually presuppose a type of individualist viewpoint, looking upon the indi-
vidual as an independent subject with no relation to the community. This is 
precisely what Sandel called the “unencumbered self.”23 According to communi-
tarians, an individual’s choices about ends and values are formed within society. 
For this reason society is not merely an instrumental existence, but rather has an 
indivisible internal connection with the formation of an individual’s self. Taylor 
elucidates this position in this way: “One is a self only among other selves. A self 
can never be described without reference to those who surround it.”24
Not all of the disputes between the communitarians and the liberals are 
diametrically opposed, nor are all of the criticisms that the communitarians 
directed against the liberals evenhanded. It seems that the liberals’ affirmation 
of the basic rights and values of humanity is beyond doubt, and in this respect 
the communitarians’ rebukes cannot avoid a sense of impropriety. Thus, rather 
than viewing communitarianism and liberalism as two mutually opposed posi-
tions, perhaps it is better to regard communitarianism as a supplement to and 
revision of liberalism. However, communitarianism’s critique of liberalism defi-
nitely exposes several theoretical dimensions that the latter overlooks, as the 
two points discussed above show.
If we use these two dimensions as a template for interpreting the language 
used by Liu Shipei at the beginning of this chapter, it is not difficult to discern 
some points of agreement between Wang Yangming’s philosophy and Western 
communitarianism. Liu Shipei stated that Wang Yangming’s theory of origi-
nal knowing could serve as the foundation for civil rights. This is simply an 
acknowledgment that positive liberty can serve as the foundation for negative 
liberty, since original knowing pertains to the realm of positive liberty. More-
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over, Wang Yangming emphasized that “heaven, earth, and the myriad things 
are one body,” “regarding one body as the world” and “regarding the world as 
one body.” The meaning of these statements is that the original knowing neces-
sarily connects with other people and society at large when it issues forth.
However, individuals, according to Wang Yangming, can rely on their 
original knowing to uphold their autonomy in making moral judgments and 
decisions. For this reason, it is not difficult to discern an intense spirit of lib-
erty in the thought of both Wang Yangming and his later followers, especially 
the Taizhou 泰州 school. However, this spirit of liberty is not established on 
a concept of the self completely divorced from the community, or “the unen-
cumbered self,” if put in Sandel’s words. Quite the opposite, in Wang Yang-
ming’s view, an individual’s moral autonomy and the universal connectivity 
of the original knowing represent two sides of the same coin. Thus, following 
Wang Yangming with regard to the problem of the relationship between the 
individual and community, it has been argued, traditional Confucians would 
neither adopt the modern Western viewpoint of “individualism”25 nor discard 
individual autonomy and follow collective values as maintained by the recent 
advocates of “Asian values.”26
Xu Fuguan, in his highly influential article explaining liberalism, “Why 
Oppose Liberalism?” wrote the following:
When liberalists were emancipated from tradition and society, they did 
not fundamentally deny tradition and society, but made a new evalua-
tion of tradition and society in which they clarified and refined the given 
ideas and events and moreover imbued them with new content. In this 
way, they created a more reasonable and enriched tradition and society. 
Liberalists still had to live within the mainstream of tradition and society. 
However, they would not live passively or negatively. Rather they were 
active and positive in their unrelenting efforts to create and improve tra-
dition and society. They caused both to no longer be a blind impulse but 
instead, illumined under humankind’s conscience and reason, to gradu-
ally become the product of humankind’s conscience and reason. For this 
reason, liberalism not only actualized individuals from the emancipation 
of their own spirit, it also actualized the community at the moment it 
actualized individuals.27
Xu Fuguan wrote this essay in 1956, at a time when communitarianism had not 
yet become part of the Western intellectual landscape. From the above passage 
it is not difficult to see that Xu’s explanation of liberalism or his revision of it is 
consonant with the viewpoint of Western communitarianism.
In sum, the appearance of communitarianism in the West has provided us 
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with an advantageous position from which to once again evaluate the relation-
ship between Confucian tradition (including Wang Yangming’s thought) and 
democracy, and to revise the one-dimensional viewpoint of Taiwanese liberal-
ism on this issue. With this intent in mind, it is appropriate to conclude this 
chapter with an especially thought-provoking passage from Yin Haiguang’s dis-
ciple Zhang Hao 張灝:
“Inner sagehood, outer kingliness,” this concept contains a type of “per-
sonalism.” On one hand, this kind of “personalism” emphasizes a person’s 
sociality and considers a person’s sociality as indivisible from what makes 
a person human. Because of this, people must participate in society and 
politics. These “externally oriented” duties are a part of personality. This 
is essentially different in spirit from the recent Western individualism 
that takes the individual as the standard in contemplating political and 
social problems. On the other hand, the Confucians’ idea of the “inner 
sagehood” possesses a transcendent consciousness. Confucians believe 
that people’s nature is endowed by heaven, and, upon this base, individu-
ality can forever preserve its independence and autonomy and will not 
be swallowed by sociality. This type of “individualism” combines social-
ity and individuality and yet transcends both, eliminating the opposition 
between individualism and collectivism in modern Western culture. It 
can cure the defect of partiality found in both positions and provide a 
new perspective for modern social thought.28
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CHAPTER 6
Confucianism, Kant, and Virtue Ethics
I n  r ec en t  y e a r s , a trend of adopting the Western concept of “virtue 
ethics” to interpret Confucian ethics has emerged and gained popularity in 
the English-speaking world. Bryan W. Van Norden’s Virtue Ethics and Con-
sequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy, Jiyuan Yu’s The Ethics of Confucius 
and Aristotle, and May Sim’s Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius 
are representative examples of this popular trend.1 Recently, Michael Slote, an 
advocate of virtue ethics, has also begun to concern himself with this theme. His 
2008 “Humanistic Value Lectures” delivered at National Chengchi University 
in Taiwan as well as his 2013 edited volume with Stephen C. Angle, Virtue Eth-
ics and Confucianism,2 represent his efforts. Following the lead of David Hume, 
he promotes not Aristotelian “virtue ethics” but what is called “sentimentalist 
virtue ethics.” Taking this as a reference point, he also made some comments on 
Van Norden’s aforementioned book.3
There is no doubt that behind the emergence of this trend is the revival 
of contemporary Western virtue ethics. As is generally known in philosophi-
cal circles, it was G. E. M. Anscombe’s 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” 
that triggered the resurrection of the intellectual trend of virtue ethics.4 In this 
essay, Anscombe makes a sharp contrast between “ancient moral philosophy” 
as represented by Aristotelian ethics and “modern moral philosophy” as repre-
sented by Kantian ethics and consequentialist theories (mainly utilitarianism). 
This theme has been more fully developed in Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential 
After Virtue. Since its publication, “virtue ethics” has taken a place as the third 
type of ethics besides “deontological ethics” and “teleological ethics.”
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The Exclusion of German Philosophy
Before engaging in further discussion of the concept of virtue ethics, let us 
turn first to two overlooked aspects of its intellectual background—ones that 
have been neglected in the discussion of virtue ethics and Confucianism in the 
 English-speaking world. The first aspect is an intellectual trend in modern Ger-
man philosophy known as the “rehabilitation of practical philosophy” (Reha-
bilitierung der praktischen Philosophie). This trend obtains its dynamic directly 
from studies of Hegel after World War II. Hegel distinguishes between Moral-
ität (the individual, rational, and reflective morality) and Sittlichkeit (the ethical, 
social life), as we saw in the Introduction. Based on this distinction, he criticizes 
Kantian ethics because he considers Kantian ethics to remain moored in the 
stage of Moralität, yet to enter into the stage of Sittlichkeit. In this sense, some 
German scholars trace “practical philosophy”—or “the second philosophy,” as it 
is called by Manfred Riedel—back to Aristotle, regarding Hegel as the modern 
inheritor of “practical philosophy.” In 1960, Joachim Ritter published the essay 
“On the Foundation of Practical Philosophy in Aristotle,”5 which triggered dis-
cussion of the “rehabilitation of practical philosophy.” Afterwards Manfred Rie-
del collected essays contributing different views on the subject and compiled a 
two-volume book titled The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy.6 Among the 
authors of the essays were such well-known scholars as Leo Strauss, Hermann 
Lübbe, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Karl-Otto Apel, Karl-Heinz Ilting, Otto Pög-
geler, and Hans Lenk. Although this intellectual trend in the  German-speaking 
world and the intellectual trend of virtue ethics in the English-speaking world 
emerged along different intellectual lines, they both confront the same question 
of “Kant or Aristotle?” In this sense, they can be said to reach the same goal 
but through different approaches. For some reason this German intellectual 
trend has seldom been included in the discussion of virtue ethics in the English- 
speaking world, and its exclusion is most unfortunate.
Another neglected aspect is the approach taken by contemporary New 
Confucians—those who interpret Confucianism by means of Kantian phi-
losophy and its contrast with virtue ethics. Even those with basic knowledge 
about contemporary New Confucianism cannot fail to realize that Mou Zong-
san borrows concepts and frameworks from Kantian philosophy to classify 
and evaluate Confucianism from the pre-Qin period to the Song and Ming 
dynasties. With respect to pre-Qin Confucianism, Mou adopts Kant’s con-
cepts of “autonomy versus heteronomy” as his major criterion for classifying 
Confucian ethics. The ethics of Confucius, Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, 
and the commentaries to the Book of Changes are organized under the pat-
tern of autonomy, and Xunzi is placed under the pattern of heteronomy. In 
his three-volume masterpiece Xinti yu xingti (The mind-heart as reality and 
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human nature as reality), Mou continued to employ this criterion to classify 
and evaluate the philosophical systems within Song-Ming Confucianism. 
Representing the ethics of autonomy was the line from the three Confucian 
masters Zhou Dunyi, Zhang Zai, and Cheng Hao in the Northern Song to 
Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming in later times. The line from Hu Hong to 
Liu Zongzhou 劉宗周 (1578–1645) inherits the philosophical orientation of 
Confucius, Mencius, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the commentaries to the 
Book of Changes, which were classified as representing the ethics of autonomy. 
The line from Cheng Yi to Zhu Xi is a deviation from it and represents the eth-
ics of heteronomy. Therefore, Mou defines Zhu Xi as the establisher of another 
philosophical line of ethics. In the first half of his book Yuanshan lun 圓善論 
(On the highest good), Mou adopts Kant’s principle of autonomy to interpret 
most chapters of the first half of book 6 of Mencius and several chapters of 
book 7. In the second half, he follows Kant’s question of the “highest good” 
to explain the patterns of “perfect teaching” ( yuanjiao 圓教) found in Con-
fucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism in order to answer the question of “how to 
unify virtue and happiness” that was raised by Kant in his Critique of Practical 
Reason.
If we acknowledge that Kant’s ethics is a system of deontological ethics, 
then, in light of Mou Zongsan’s interpretation, Confucian ethics is basically 
also a system of “deontological ethics,” even though he never used this term.7 
To counterbalance the interpretive approach of the New Confucians, especially 
Mou Zongsan, and because of the traditional affinity between scholasticism 
and Aristotelian philosophy, some Taiwanese scholars with Catholic back-
grounds have attempted to interpret Confucian ethics as being essentially virtue 
ethics. Some examples are Shen Qingsong 沈清松 (Vincent Shen), Huang Huo 
黃藿, and Pan Xiaohui 潘小慧, and there are other representatives of this type 
of scholarship as well.8
All three of the authors of the books mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter completely ignore this intellectual background. This omission not 
only cost them an opportunity to dialogue with the Chinese academic com-
munity, but also led them to some misunderstandings. Jiyuan Yu, for instance, 
at the beginning of his book The Ethics of Confucius and Aristotle mentions 
the Contemporary New Confucians’ “Manifesto Regarding Chinese Culture 
to People All over the World,” which was published in the same year as Ans-
combe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy.” Yu used the two documents as signals 
marking the “revival of Confucianism” and the “revival of Aristotelian ethics.” 
Moreover, he emphasized that, “indeed, the philosophical orientation of these 
two rivals [sic] is the same, that is, a virtue approach to ethics,”9 even though 
the respective philosophical directions represented are actually diametrically 
opposite.
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Western and Confucian Ethics
Having explained the two neglected areas of philosophical background, let us 
return to the question of the relationship between Western ethics and Con-
fucian ethics. In Western ethics, the distinction between “deontological eth-
ics” and “teleological ethics” is a typological distinction based on dichotomy, 
which is to a large extent equivalent to the distinction in the German-speaking 
world between Gesinnungsethik (ethics of conviction) and Erfolgsethik (ethics 
of consequences). In brief, teleological ethics insists that the ultimate criterion 
for moral duty or moral value is the nonmoral values it brings about—the good 
in a nonmoral sense—such as joy, happiness, utility, and so on. In other words, 
this type of ethics reduces the good in a moral sense to the good in a nonmoral 
sense. Or, in Kant’s words, it reduces the “moral good” (das moralische Gut) to 
the “physical good” (das physische Gut).10 On the contrary, deontological ethics 
is opposed to reducing the good in a moral sense to the good in a nonmoral 
sense, insisting that the ultimate criterion for evaluating the moral significance 
of an act or a rule of action is not the nonmoral value it brings about, but its own 
character or the motive of the agent. In John R. Silber’s terminology, whereas 
deontological ethics affirms the heterogeneity of the good,11 teleological eth-
ics regards all the good as homogeneous. Furthermore, for deontological eth-
ics, since the moral value of an act does not depend on the nonmoral value it 
produces or may produce, moral value lies in its “moral character or morality” 
(Moralität), not in its “legality” (Legalität). In other words, it must be done “out 
of duty” (aus Pflicht) rather than merely “conforming to duty” ( pflichtmäßig).
It is broadly acknowledged that the first chapter of the Mencius already 
raises the issue of the distinction between righteousness and utility. As a mat-
ter of fact, this distinction is by nature one between the “moral good” and 
the “natural good” and implies the heterogeneity of the good. Confucius had 
already understood this distinction when he said, “Superior persons understand 
what is righteous whereas mean persons understand wherein their own utility 
lies” (Analects 4.16). Moreover, Confucius explicitly expresses his deontologi-
cal viewpoint in his discussion with Zai Wo about the preservation or possible 
curtailment of the three-year mourning period for parents (Analects 17.21).12 
Zai Wo has two reasons for his suggestion to curtail the three-year mourning 
period for parents. His first reason is, “if a superior person abstains for three 
years from performing the rituals, then the rituals will definitely be lost. If for 
three years he abstains from playing the music, then the music will definitely 
be ruined.” The second is, “when old grain is exhausted, the new grain will be 
on the ground; in making fire by friction, we must choose the proper wood for 
every season within one year; therefore, after one year, the mourning should 
stop.” Whereas the former is a viewpoint of consequentialism or a teleological 
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stance, the latter proves the “ought to be” (moral laws) by the “is” (natural laws) 
and also presupposes a teleological standpoint. Confucius, on the contrary, asks 
Zai Wo whether or not he feels at ease in his heart, which means that Confu-
cius establishes the meaning of “three-year mourning period” on the basis of the 
agent’s motivation. This is a viewpoint of Gesinnungsethik, that is, an ethics of 
conviction, and therefore it implies a deontological viewpoint.
Since the distinction between deontological ethics and teleological ethics 
is a dichotomous one, the result is that the relationship between the two is both 
exhaustive and exclusive. It should be emphasized here that there is an asym-
metric relationship between these two ethical viewpoints. If the moral value of 
an act is evaluated from the viewpoint of teleological ethics, the motivation of 
the agent does not matter at all unless it can give rise to the expected result. In 
contrast, deontological ethics is opposed to weighing the moral value of an act 
by the results or the possible results it may bring about; it does, however, still 
admit that these kinds of results have nonmoral value. Let us take the principle 
of utility as an example. Though deontological ethics is opposed to using the 
principle to evaluate moral value, it probably still would accept it as a derivative 
moral principle. For example, even though Kant insists that the moral value 
of an act has nothing to do with the possible happiness it may bring to either 
oneself or others, he still regards “to improve other people’s happiness,” along 
with “to perfect oneself ” as a “duty of virtue” (Tugendpflicht).13 He takes a deci-
sive step toward deriving an indirect duty of improving one’s own happiness 
from the duty of “increasing one’s own perfection.”14 No matter whether it is 
one’s own happiness or others’ happiness, it can be ascribed to the principle of 
utility. Therefore, the principle of utility can be accepted as a derivative moral 
principle.
It is quite the opposite for the teleological ethicists. In this camp, if the 
ethicist more or less accepts the fundamental principles of deontological eth-
ics, it actually means a retreat from the standpoint of teleological ethics. For 
example, suppose someone faces a moral choice and must choose between two 
different actions. He follows the principle of utility to assess both actions only 
to discover that the possible consequences these actions may bring about are 
either too complicated to weigh or, even if measurable, too close to distinguish. 
Under such circumstances, if he takes the purity of his motivation (duty for 
the sake of duty) into consideration when making the choice, this means that 
he retreats from the utilitarian standpoint and abandons the unity of his view-
point. He may defend himself by saying that the reason he takes the purity of his 
motivation into consideration is precisely because this motivation could bring 
about positive results, and this is why he still maintains a utilitarian stance. But 
such a response is just playing with words and concepts, because so-called purity 
of motivation precisely means “completely ignoring the result of an act.” There-
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fore, as long as the distinction between teleological ethics and deontological 
ethics theoretically remains strict, there is an asymmetric relationship between 
the two. In this sense, it could be argued that William K. Frankena’s “mixed 
deontological theory” is a misleading concept.15
Returning to the Question of Virtue Ethics
With this background in place, we can begin discussing virtue ethics more 
meaningfully. Since the distinction between teleological ethics and deontologi-
cal ethics is exhaustive and mutually exclusive, it is not logically possible that 
there exists a third type of ethics. The only possibility is that there are what 
might be called “subtypes” that are subject to these two main types of ethics. 
Virtue ethics, for example, can be viewed as a subtype of teleological ethics. 
When advocates of virtue ethics regard it as a third type of ethics besides teleo-
logical ethics and deontological ethics, they need to explain what the criterion 
for this trichotomous typology is. Although many ethicists try to define the 
concept of “virtue ethics,” the explanations remain rather confusing through-
out. If such different ethical views as Aristotle’s and Hume’s can be put into this 
one single concept, then how could it not be confusing?
Let us put aside Slote’s “sentimentalist virtue ethics” for the time being 
and take Aristotle’s ethics as the major representative of virtue ethics and Kant’s 
ethics as the major representative of deontological ethics to see the fundamen-
tal distinction between the two. We can summarize the popular views of the 
distinction in three points: (1) deontological ethics emphasizes “duty,” whereas 
virtue ethics accentuates “virtue”; (2) the former stresses “principle” or “rule,” 
whereas the latter underscores “character”; and (3) the former attaches impor-
tance to “action,” whereas the latter highlights the “agent.”
Regarding the first point, “duty” is undoubtedly an important concept in 
Kant’s ethics, but is not the concept of “virtue” as well? In recent years a signifi-
cant number of scholars have explored Kant’s concept of “virtue” to illustrate the 
important position of this concept in his ethical system. Robert R. Louden,16 
Onora S. O’Neill,17 Robert N. Johnson,18 Nancy Sherman,19 and Andrea Mar-
len Esser20 are among these scholars. In 2008, Monika Betzler edited a book 
titled Kant’s Ethics of Virtue,21 which includes a group of essays that are related 
to and explore this topic. In this important volume, the editor conveys special 
implications in using the term “ethics of virtue” rather than “virtue ethics.” She 
states in her introduction that “the essays here suggest that Kant’s ethics, to be 
sure, are not to be assimilated into virtue ethics. . . . But Kant’s later writings help 
us to see that virtue is a core element in his ethics, precisely because it helps us 
to do our duty.”22
Kant published his book Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of 
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Virtue (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre) in 1797.23 In this book, 
he not only provides a detailed explanation of the concept of “virtue,” but also 
regards “increasing one’s own perfection” as a “duty of virtue.” According to his 
explanation, this duty includes the cultivation of our natural perfection, that 
is, to cultivate our ability for cultural creation, and the cultivation of our inner 
morality, that is, to cultivate our moral feelings.24 Betzler’s view that Kant’s 
ethics does not pertain to “virtue ethics” as represented by Aristotle but con-
tains an “ethics of virtue” is accurate. In this sense, it is meaningless to distin-
guish between deontological ethics and virtue ethics by means of the contrast 
between duty and virtue.
The cultivation of our inner morality in Kant’s ethics to which the moral 
principle refers is a categorical imperative, and moral rules are concrete norms 
derived from it. The categorical imperative is undoubtedly the core concept of 
Kant’s ethics, but it should not be forgotten that, in Kant’s ethics of autonomy, 
the categorical imperative comes from the self-legislation of the moral subject. 
In this sense, the moral subject is a more fundamental factor. In his Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant discusses the dual “character” of human beings, that is, 
the “intelligible character” and the “empirical character.”25 Whereas the “intel-
ligible character” is the moral subject, the “empirical character” is composed of 
qualities that are to be cultivated, including our natural instincts, social habits, 
and moral feelings. Therefore, it is problematic to claim that Kant’s ethics only 
emphasizes principles and rules but disregards “character.” Having clarified the 
first two points of distinction, it is not difficult to explain the third point made 
above, that is, deontological ethics attaches importance to “action” whereas 
virtue ethics highlights the “agent.” Since a moral act is the act of the moral 
subject (agent), it is not possible that it only emphasizes “acts” but disregards 
“agents.”
In terms of interpretive strategies, the purpose of interpretation is to make 
the object of analysis emerge from ambiguity to clarity. Given that “virtue eth-
ics” is such an ambiguous term, the strategy to interpret Confucianism under 
its aegis can only make things go from bad to worse. For example, some years 
ago the Taiwanese scholar Cai Xin’an 蔡信安 published an essay titled “On 
Mencius’ Moral Choice,” asserting that Mencius’ theory of act-choice is a sort 
of “act-utilitarianism” but appears in the guise of “rule-deontological ethics.” 26 
Later he published another essay titled “Mencius: Virtue and Principle” assum-
ing that Mencius is a “virtue ethicist.”27 Such loose characterizations of Mencius 
render his philosophical worth most ambiguous and uncertain. Pan Xiaohui is 
another example. She acknowledges Confucian ethics as represented by Con-
fucius, Mencius, and Xunzi pertains to the “deontological type rather than the 
teleological type,” but she also stresses that it is not a “pure deontological type.” 
She concludes:
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Looking at Confucian moral philosophy represented by Confucius, 
Mencius, and Xunzi from this perspective, we find that it is basically a 
synthesized type attaching importance to both virtue and principle. If 
we must distinguish the relative superiority or inferiority of each one, I 
would argue that it should be construed as a synthesized type giving top 
priority to virtue while simultaneously borrowing from deontological 
ethics.28
If it is the case, as advocates of virtue ethics point out, that Kantian “deontologi-
cal ethics” and Aristotelian “virtue ethics” are so diametrically opposed to one 
another, then how is it possible to find a synthesized type of these two ethics in 
Confucianism?
Western scholars encounter a similar problem when they borrow the term 
“virtue ethics” to interpret Confucianism. Van Norden, for example, in his book 
Virtue Ethics and Consequentialism in Early Chinese Philosophy, attempts to 
define “virtue ethics.” According to him a virtue ethics has at least four compo-
nents: (1) an account of what a “flourishing human life” is like, (2) an account 
of what virtues contribute to leading such a life, (3) an account of how one 
acquires those virtues, and (4) a philosophical anthropology that explains what 
humans are like.29 He then mentions different forms of virtue ethics:
In its most moderate form, virtue ethics can be seen as a complement to 
consequentialist or rule-deontological versions of ethics, filling out one 
of the latter by adding on to it accounts of human virtues, flourishing, 
cultivation, and philosophical anthropology that are consistent with it. 
However, in the more moderate versions of virtue ethics, the four compo-
nents above are logically dependent on consequentialist or deontological 
aspects of the ethical view. Kant, for example, has a conception of the four 
items above, but they appear primarily in his seldom-read The Doctrine of 
Virtue, and he thinks of virtues as helping one to follow the deontological 
strictures of the categorical imperative. In its most radical formulations, 
virtue ethics attempts to serve as a foundation for all of ethics and to com-
pletely supplant consequentialist and rule-deontological foundations.30
With these various forms of virtue ethics, the term is so broadly defined that it 
almost loses its function as a marker. In its most extreme form, virtue ethics is 
in diametrical opposition to deontological ethics as represented in Kant’s eth-
ics; in its moderate form, however, even Kant’s ethics can be viewed as a form 
of “virtue ethics.” Since the connotations of “virtue ethics” are so divergent, no 
wonder Guido Rappe calls “the mainstream of ancient ethics,” including Con-
fucian and Aristotle’s ethics, “deontological virtue ethics.”31
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Though Kant in his formal publications never tries to define the position 
of Aristotle’s ethics directly, he levels harsh criticism at the “eudaemonist” in 
the preface to “Metaphysical First Foundations of the Doctrine of Virtue”: “if 
eudaemonism (the principle of happiness) is set up as the basic principle instead 
of eleutheronomy (the principle of the freedom of internal lawgiving), the result 
of this is the euthanasia (easy death) of all morals.”32 The passage seems to 
indicate that Aristotle is an unlikely candidate for Kant’s ethical exemplar. In 
recent years, however, Kant studies fully displays, contrary to the understand-
ing of many advocates of virtue ethics, that Kant’s ethics is not in diametrical 
opposition to Aristotle’s ethics or without any overlap with the latter, because 
it contains an “ethics of virtue” in itself. Nevertheless, Kant’s ethical system can 
by no means be equated to “virtue ethics” as represented by Aristotle. Scholars 
who attempt to interpret Confucian ethics by means of “virtue ethics” in recent 
years at best reveal that we can find the concept of “virtue” and other relevant 
traits in Confucian ethics, but this in no way proves that Confucian ethics is in 
the same family as Aristotelian “virtue ethics.”
Sentimentalist Virtue Ethics and Confucian Ethics
What remains to be discussed is the relationship between what Slote calls “senti-
mentalist virtue ethics” and Confucian ethics. It is true that what Mencius calls 
“the four buddings” readily remind us of the Scottish ethics of “moral sense” 
in the eighteenth century. The Taiwanese scholar Huang Jinxing 黃進興, for 
instance, once construed Mencius’ “four buddings” as a kind of “ ‘moral sense’ 
with empirical meaning,”33 and he consequently asserted, “Instead of saying that 
Confucian moral philosophy has something in common with Kant’s philoso-
phy, it is better to say that Confucian moral philosophy has more similarities 
with Hutcheson’s and Hume’s theories to which Kant is opposed. Both insist 
that human beings have an innate ‘moral sense’ as the criterion for moral judg-
ment.”34 Because Kant in his late works classifies what Hutcheson called “moral 
sense” as the “principle of heteronomy,” Huang Jinxing relies on this to question 
Mou Zongsan’s interpretive strategy of using Kantian philosophy to interpret 
Confucianism.35
The reason Kant in his late works is opposed to regarding “moral sense” 
as the basis for moral judgment, as the Scottish ethics of “moral sense” does, is 
that he views all feelings (including moral feelings) as sensible and thus excludes 
them from the structure of the moral subject as a rational agent. Nevertheless, 
in the latter stage of Kant’s ethics, moral feelings still have two important func-
tions—that is, both as a moral incentive (the driving force for moral conduct) 
and as an anthropological basis for moral cultivation. These two functions are 
directly related to his concept of “virtue.” “The four buddings” mentioned by 
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Mencius, however, are not (contrary to what Huang Jinxing asserted) a kind of 
“‘moral sense’ with empirical meaning”; rather, they are a kind of a priori feel-
ing, belonging to what some phenomenological ethicists such as Max Scheler 
and Nicolai Hartmann call a priori Wertfühlen (value-feeling). Therefore, the 
moral subject (the original heart-mind) for Mencius is not merely a rational 
subject as construed by Kant; rather, it possesses explicit emotionality, express-
ing itself as “the four buddings”: the dispositions of commiseration, of shame 
and dislike, of yielding and deference, and of discriminating between right and 
wrong. Here reason and emotion are unified.
Confucius also affirms the moral subject that unifies reason and emotion. 
As alluded to above, Confucius and Zai Wo once discussed the issue of pres-
ervation and possible curtailment of the three-year mourning period for one’s 
parent. In the dialogue, Confucius, on the one hand, bases the meaning of the 
three-year mourning on whether one’s conscience feels at ease or not (“If your 
heart-mind feels at ease, then do it”); on the other hand, he adopts the “princi-
ple of gratitude” to refute Zai Wo’s reason for shortening the three-year mourn-
ing period: “It is not until three years old that one is able to leave one’s parents’ 
arms. This is why the three-year mourning is a universally observed rite under 
Heaven. Did not Zai Wo also receive three years of love of this sort from his 
parents?” (Analects 17.21). It is clear here that Confucius, unlike Kant, does not 
regard the moral subject merely as the rational subject, nor consequently does 
he deprive it of all its emotionality. Therefore, the assertion by David L. Hall 
and Roger T. Ames that pre-Qin Confucians built moral judgment on aesthetic 
intuition rather than on the reflection and application of moral principles is 
certainly not true.36
Although Confucius and Mencius have a different understanding of the 
structure of the moral subject from Kant’s, this does not prevent both ethics 
from belonging to deontological ethics. It is true that pre-Qin Confucian eth-
ics contains plenty of discussions of virtue and abundant relevant intellectual 
resources, but at most this can only show that pre-Qin Confucianism also has 
an ethics of virtue. This, however, cannot prove itself to be a “virtue ethics,” 
because it cannot belong to both Kantian deontological ethics and Aristotelian 
virtue ethics at the same time.
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CHAPTER 7
A Critique of Jiang Qing’s “Political Confucianism”
I n  t h e  co u r s e  of this book, we have moved from the beginnings of Con-
fucianism in a variety of historical contexts toward its modern and contempo-
rary significance in current thinking in both East Asia and the West. This chap-
ter places the work of Jiang Qing, often considered China’s most controversial 
Confucian thinker, alongside the contemporary conversation on virtue ethics, 
where we left off in the previous chapter. In the spirit of philosophical exchange, 
this chapter too will be critical in nature in an attempt to bring the hope for clar-
ity into the dialogue of contemporary Confucianism. It is only through such 
exchanges that Confucianism can profess to be a globally relevant philosophy.
The Inseparability of Confucian Ethics and Politics
Jiang Qing has made significant contributions to modern Confucian thought 
by drawing attention to its political tradition and by applying Weber’s concept 
of “ethics of responsibility” to analyze Confucian political ethics. His construc-
tion of political Confucianism, however, appears to be mired in theoretical 
and practical difficulties. By trying to make an “ethics of responsibility” out of 
political Confucianism that is entirely independent from the “ethics of convic-
tion” of mind-and-nature (xinxing 心性) Confucianism, it lends itself to a mis-
construction of both Weber and the Confucian tradition. In both the ethics of 
responsibility relies on and presupposes the ethics of conviction, for in Confu-
cianism ethics is always the foundation for politics. As a proposal for a future 
Chinese government, Jiang has provided a very complex institutional structure 
that stands little likelihood of ever being implemented—and if it were ever to 
find itself enacted, it could turn China back to the Middle Ages. Democracy 
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certainly has its problems; even though we can witness these almost daily, the 
elucidations Jiang offers provide no other realistic solutions. By casting democ-
racy as a solely Western phenomenon, he neglects to recognize that Chinese 
people have been laboring for democracy on their own terms and in their own 
ways through their own free choices.
In 1989, Jiang Qing published an article in Taiwan’s Ehu Monthly by the 
title “The Practical Significance of and Problems Facing the Revival of Confu-
cianism in Mainland China.” In this article, Jiang boldly stated that “the greatest 
problem in mainland China at present is the problem of reviving Confucian-
ism” and that “Confucianism should replace Marxism, be restored to its lofty 
historical status, and become the orthodox thought representing the life and 
spirit of the Chinese nation in mainland China today.”1 This article was severely 
criticized on several occasions by Fang Keli 方克立, director of the Studies on 
Modern New Confucian Thought research project in mainland China.2 Jiang’s 
ideas clearly touch on a sensitive issue, but it is one that is exceedingly important 
to contemporary mainland China—that is, with mainland China’s reopening 
to the world, how are intellectuals and ordinary citizens to reassess the Con-
fucian tradition? In this context Jiang Qing’s ideas have both theoretical and 
practical significance.
Since the 1989 article, Jiang has published a number of books: Introduc-
tion to Gongyang Thought (Gongyangxue yinlun 公羊學引論),3 Political Con-
fucianism: The Reorientation, Characteristics, and Development of Contempo-
rary Confucianism (Zhengzhi Ruxue: dangdai Ruxue de zhuanxiang, tezhi yu 
fazhan 政治儒學：當代儒學的轉向、特質與發展),4 and Life Faith and the 
Kingly Way of Politics: The Modern Value of Confucian Culture (Shengming xin-
yang yu wangdao zhengzhi: Rujia wenhua de xiandai jiazhi 生命信仰與王道政
治：儒家文化的現代價值).5 In these books he develops his theories of “politi-
cal Confucianism.” Reading these works might have an unsettling effect on 
some.6 Recently Jiang has published Further Thoughts on Political Confucianism 
(Zailun zhengzhi Ruxue 再論政治儒學),7 which expands but does not signifi-
cantly alter his primary arguments.
Some Critiques of Jiang’s “Political Confucianism”
The critiques of Jiang’s political Confucianism center on two points: The first 
focuses on the theoretical problems in Jiang’s political Confucianism and the 
second on the structure and feasibility of Jiang’s “Kingly Way of Politics” (or 
“Confucian constitutionalism”).
Let us discuss the theoretical problems with his political Confucianism 
first. In his Introduction to Gongyang Thought, Jiang distinguishes two branches 
of the Confucian tradition. The first is mind-and-nature Confucianism (also 
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called “life Confucianism” or “inner sagehood Confucianism”), and the second 
is political Confucianism (also called “critical Confucianism” or “outer kingli-
ness Confucianism”).8
Broadly speaking, Confucianism can be divided into political Confu-
cianism and life Confucianism. The former is exemplified by the Han 
dynasty New Text Confucian tradition and the latter by Song and Ming 
dynasty study of heart-mind and human nature (心性之學 xinxing zhi 
xue). Both originate in Confucius, and both reflect one aspect of the mas-
ter’s teachings; yet, because they focus on different problems and pose 
different solutions, they are by nature very different and constitute two 
unique traditions within the history of Chinese Confucianism.9
As described by Jiang Qing in his Introduction to Gongyang Thought, political 
Confucianism originates in Confucius, is carried on by Mencius and Xunzi, and 
is later transmitted by Gongyang scholars in the Han dynasty including Sima 
Qian 司馬遷 (145–86 BCE), Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒 (179?–104? BCE), and 
He Xiu 何休 (129–182).10 Nevertheless, Jiang insists that political Confucian-
ism is not equivalent to a “politicized Confucianism” in which the monarchy 
is considered absolute, eternal, and holy. In Jiang’s view, it is rather the Han 
dynasty Zuo zhuan 左傳 and Old Text school that exemplify this kind of politi-
cized Confucianism, which is an alienated, that is to say, an ideological form of 
Confucianism.11 Simply put, the difference between political and politicized 
Confucianism is that the former takes a critical stance toward practical politics, 
whereas the latter is what Max Weber would describe as Machtpolitik. Thus, 
says Jiang, “political Confucianism is neither a type of political pragmatism 
nor a type of political romanticism. Rather, it seeks a middle path that both 
embraces lofty ideals and respects concrete realities.”12
Jiang Qing also makes use of Weber’s distinction between an “ethics of 
conviction” (Gesinnungsethik) and an “ethics of responsibility” (Verantwor-
tungsethik) to explain political Confucianism. In response to Lin Yusheng 林
毓生, who believes that Chinese culture favors an ethics of conviction,13 Jiang 
stresses that
life Confucianism is a study of mind and human nature, and of inner 
sagehood, and offers little use to an ethics of responsibility. Lin Yusheng 
thinks that life Confucianism represents the entirety of Chinese Con-
fucianism and encompasses the entire Confucian tradition. This would 
naturally lead to the conclusion that Chinese culture has a highly devel-
oped ethics of conviction but lacks an ethics of responsibility. However, 
if, along with life Confucianism, we acknowledge political Confucianism 
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as part of the tradition—the part concerned with politics and including 
abundant resources of an ethics of responsibility—we can avoid mistak-
ing the part for the whole and the misunderstanding of Chinese culture 
to which this gives rise.14
In support of this view, Jiang enumerates nine basic concepts of an ethics 
of responsibility:
1. An ethics of responsibility holds that the world is essentially irratio-
nal, refuses to acknowledge the universe as a rational moral organ-
ism, and objects to the imposition of reason, morality, or purpose on 
history or the world.
2. An ethics of responsibility holds that, in practical politics, the 
relationship between intentions and results is paradoxical: Good 
intentions do not necessarily bring good results and can bring bad 
results. Therefore, the behavior of those in power should be judged 
based on this complex relationship between results and aspirations 
(intentions).
3. An ethics of responsibility holds that political agents must take 
responsibility for the foreseeable consequences of their actions and 
must not shift this responsibility to God, the will of heaven, other 
people, or society: Good intentions and proper action do not absolve 
one from responsibility for said consequences.
4. An ethics of responsibility holds that in practical politics there is a 
tension between ends and means, arising from the frequent need to 
use morally questionable means to achieve benevolent ends. Con-
summate political skill is needed to dispel this tension and find a 
“middle path.”
5. An ethics of responsibility holds that political problems are different 
from the problems in life, in that government possesses the power 
of external compulsion (military power), which makes government 
a unique and independent category, and political ethics is different 
from personal ethics.
6. An ethics of responsibility holds that military power is the founda-
tion, that compulsion is the primary tool of practical politics, and 
that a dialectical relationship exists between the two—that is, mili-
tary might and compulsion are demonic powers that are “necessary 
evils” but also “proper and legitimate” means of bringing about the 
good. The use of military power and compulsion in practical politics 
should be understood dialectically.
7. An ethics of responsibility holds that the world is not perfect, and 
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neither is politics. The people whom one encounters in politics are 
normal, flawed people, and this is reflected in government. Political 
goals are constrained by reality, and there is a gap between the real and 
the ideal; thus, when making political decisions, real situations must 
be taken into account, and politicians must be willing to compromise 
on their ideals, beliefs, and ultimate goals, and to use gradual, practi-
cal, effective, and moderate means to achieve their aims.
8. An ethics of responsibility holds that practical politics is extraor-
dinarily complex and in constant flux, and it is difficult to create 
static norms for political behavior. Therefore, politicians must bring 
complex ways of thinking and deep wisdom to bear on their political 
duties and seek to resolve unforeseen problems creatively and flexibly 
while remaining true to fundamental principles and beliefs. Inflexible, 
unconditional, and “all or nothing” approaches based on simplistic 
thinking must be avoided when dealing with political problems.
9. An ethics of responsibility holds that only those people who possess 
an enthusiasm for their work and a selfless sense of responsibility, 
and are capable of maintaining an impartial faculty of judgment are 
qualified to dedicate themselves to government.15
Next, Jiang demonstrates that political Confucianism as embodied in Han 
dynasty Gongyang thought fulfills each of these nine criteria and is in fact an 
ethics of responsibility.16
Jiang emphasizes the place of political Confucianism in the Confucian 
tradition and its role in political criticism, but this area has been overlooked in 
previous research. As a result, Confucianism is often understood simplistically 
as supporting monarchic or autocratic ideologies, and Jiang’s work has helped 
clear up this misconception. However, Jiang’s understanding of the relation-
ship between mind-and-nature Confucianism and political Confucianism is 
problematic. Within traditional Confucianism, distinctions do exist between 
inner sagehood and outer kingliness, between the study of ren 仁 (humaneness) 
and the study of li 禮 (rites), and each has a place in Confucius’ teachings. But 
the relationship that holds within each pair is one of inequality and subordina-
tion. In the Analects, Confucius asks, “When we say, ‘the rites, the rites,’ are we 
speaking merely of jade and silk? When we say, ‘music, music,’ are we speaking 
merely of bells and drums?” (Analects 17.11). In Analects 3.3, he poses the ques-
tion “A man who is not humane—what has he to do with ritual? A man who is 
not humane—what has he to do with music?” He also agrees with Zixia 子夏 
that “it is the rites that come after” (Analects 3.8). Confucius also acknowledges 
that “the Yin followed the rituals of the Xia, altering them only in ways that we 
know. The Zhou followed the rituals of the Yin, altering them only in ways that 
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we know. If some dynasty succeeds the Zhou, we can know what it will be like 
even a hundred generations from now” (Analects 2.23). From these quotes we 
can see that for Confucius ren had a higher status than li, since ren is what gives 
meaning to li. Or, to put it another way, li is the objective instantiation of ren in 
a specific time and place. As such it thus changes and evolves. In sum, ren and li 
are brought together in a hierarchical and unequal relationship.
Apparently, for Jiang, mind-and-nature Confucianism is to political Con-
fucianism as ren is to li. If this is the case, he is obliged to acknowledge the 
hierarchical relationship between mind-and-nature Confucianism and political 
Confucianism, with the former subsuming the latter. Yet, when Jiang empha-
sizes their “equal standing”17 and “complementary relationship,”18 he does not 
feel the need to explain their “integration,” because, in his view, these two Con-
fucian traditions are fundamentally dissimilar “in origin, in methods, in their 
view of human nature, in their concern for society and social reality, in their 
attitudes toward rites and music, in their understanding of history, and in their 
ideals.”19 Since Jiang believes that both traditions originate in the teachings of 
Confucius, he must also believe that these two aspects of Confucius’ thought 
are inconsistent with each other. One wonders if he would be willing to accept 
this conclusion. In his book titled The Historical World of Zhu Xi (Zhu Xi de 
lishi shijie 朱熹的歷史世界), published in 2003, Yu Ying-shih shows conclu-
sively that Confucians of the Song and Ming dynasties never gave up on the idea 
of “outer kingliness,” and so Song and Ming Confucianism cannot be dismissed 
as being simply “mind-and-nature Confucianism.”
Jiang’s claim that Han dynasty Gongyang thought includes an ethics of 
responsibility is well-founded and can serve as a corrective to Lin Yusheng.20 I 
have argued previously that the Gongyang texts reveal that Han dynasty Gong-
yang thought also contained an ethics of conviction.21 We also find evidence 
of both an ethics of conviction and an ethics of responsibility in Confucius 
and Mencius.22 As mentioned above, Jiang Qing believes that political Con-
fucianism and life Confucianism both originate in Confucius and both reflect 
one aspect of his teachings. Unless Jiang is willing to maintain that Confucius’ 
thought lacks consistency, it must be shown somehow that an ethics of convic-
tion and an ethics of responsibility can in theory be united; further explanation 
would be needed to show how it could happen in practical terms. This is a theo-
retical question that Jiang’s exegesis must address.
Resolving the Issue
In order to resolve this theoretical problem, we should turn to Weber’s discus-
sion of ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility.23 To put it succinctly, 
Weber mentions this pair of concepts a number of times, but his treatment of 
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them is inconsistent. Sometimes he says that there is “an irreconcilable opposi-
tion” between the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility,24 whereas 
other times he says that “there is no absolute opposition” between the two and 
that “they are mutually complementary.”25 These contradictory statements lead 
to two completely divergent readings. Underneath the contradiction and con-
fusion, Weber’s intention is to show that, on the level of political ethics, the 
ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility are incompatible. In other 
words, people involved in politics must choose one or the other.
Yet people who read Weber often overlook the fact that the ethics of convic-
tion can be understood on two different levels. Like Weber, we could understand 
the ethics of conviction on the level of “special ethics” (here political ethics) to 
be a political principle that ignores the foreseeable consequences of actions and 
focuses solely on the purity of conviction. Or, on the level of “general ethics,” 
we could understand ethics of conviction as the opposite of an “ethics of conse-
quences” (Erfolgsethik). On this level, an ethics of consequences would claim that 
the ethical value of an act depends on its potential consequences or desired aims. 
An ethics of conviction, however, holds that the ethical value of an act depends 
primarily on the agent’s intentions and not on the potential consequences or 
desired aims. They represent two fundamentally different approaches to ethics 
and are logically incompatible. Kant’s ethics is commonly seen as the canoni-
cal ethics of conviction. But it is important to note that an ethics of conviction 
so understood need not necessarily reject all consideration of an action’s conse-
quences. Thus, from a logical standpoint, an ethics of conviction is capable of 
coexisting with an ethics of responsibility. This is clearly demonstrated in Kant’s 
ethics. It should also be pointed out that, on the level of general ethics, Weber’s 
ethics of responsibility presupposes the Kantian ethics of conviction, without 
which it would be indistinguishable from the “power politics” that Weber him-
self despises. Only in this sense can the ethics of conviction and the ethics of 
responsibility be reconciled and these theoretical problems put to rest.
Jiang follows Weber in explaining the relationship between these two 
types of ethics as a “dialectical relationship,”26 and he even stresses their connec-
tion;27 yet his treatment of this issue creates the distinct impression that the two 
are clearly distinct and incompatible.28 It is for this reason that he completely 
rejects the possibility of deriving political Confucianism from life Confucian-
ism,29 thereby depriving Confucius’ thought of its consistency. This represents 
the biggest theoretical shortcoming in Jiang’s political Confucianism.
The Structure and Feasibility of Political Confucianism
Next we turn to the structure and feasibility of this political Confucianism. 
On the basis of the claims discussed above, Jiang criticizes the Hong Kong and 
Critique of Jiang Qing’s “Political Confucianism” 109
Taiwan New Confucians for only being familiar with the traditions of mind-
and-nature Confucianism and not with those of political Confucianism. He 
further charges that their wish to develop democratic systems from Confucian-
ism is equivalent to doing away with the particular characteristics and posi-
tions of Confucianism and drawing China ever closer to Western culture. In 
other words, New Confucianism is in fact “Westernization”30 in another guise. 
Instead, he advocates making full use of the traditional resources of political 
Confucianism and “establishing a political system with Chinese characteris-
tics, . . . in concrete terms, a political system that realizes aspects of Confucian 
thought such as the spirit of ‘rites and music’ [li yue 禮樂], the ideal of ‘the 
kingly way,’ the wisdom of ‘the great unity’ [dayitong 大一統], the doctrines of 
the ‘three eras’ [sanshi 三世], and the ‘emperor as the highest rank’ [tianzi yijue 
天子一爵].”31
In his book Life Faith and the Kingly Way of Politics, Jiang proposes replac-
ing Western democratic government with “the Kingly Way of Politics.” In his 
view, the advantage that the kingly way offers over democracy is that democ-
racy, in terms of the problem of political legitimacy, emphasizes only legitimacy 
based on the will of the people, whereas the kingly way of governance derives its 
legitimacy from three sources: legitimacy based on the will of the people; tran-
scendent, sacred legitimacy; and historical and cultural legitimacy. These three 
sources make for balanced governance.32 Working from these sources of legiti-
macy, Jiang lays out a tricameral legislature with the “House of Profound Confu-
cians” (tongru yuan 通儒院) representing transcendent, sacred legitimacy; the 
“House of the People” (shumin yuan 庶民院) representing legitimacy based on 
the will of the people; and the “House of the Nation” ( guoti yuan 國體院), which 
represents historical and cultural legitimacy. The legislature would select mem-
bers of the executive system, who would be responsible to the legislature. Among 
these three bodies, only members of the House of the People would be elected, 
whereas members of the House of Profound Confucians would be nominated 
and appointed internally, and members of the House of the Nation would be 
appointed by a hereditary Duke Yansheng 衍聖, Confucius’ lineal descendant.33
In his book Further Thoughts on Political Confucianism, Jiang proposes the 
notion of “constitutional Confucianism,” which, in addition to the tricameral 
legislature, also proposes the establishment of a “Grand Academy Directorate” 
and a “republic under a symbolic monarch.” For Jiang, the Grand Academy Direc-
torate is the “form of oversight and control,” and the republic under a symbolic 
monarch is the “form of government” appropriate to constitutional Confucian-
ism. He opposes the Western idea of “popular sovereignty” and maintains that 
“the fundamental principle of constitutional Confucianism can be summed up 
in the single notion of ‘heavenly sovereignty.’ ”34 The Grand Academy is a tradi-
tional Chinese institution, and it is on the foundation of this “tradition of scho-
110 Ethics & Politics
lastic governance” that he proposes the Grand Academy Directorate. According 
to Jiang’s plan, the modern Grand Academy will have supreme authority in six 
different areas: political oversight, education and testing, protocol and rituals, 
dismissal of government officials, arbitration, and cultural preservation.35 Jiang 
stresses that, because the Grand Academy has these six powers “with respect to 
legitimate ‘sovereignty,’ that is, with respect to constitutional governance, it is 
the nation’s highest authority.”36 The Grand Academy consists of a libationer 
and grand academicians, the latter being selected and appointed by the former. 
Thirty Confucians nominated by the House of Profound Confucians and by 
the Confucian community at large will come together to form the Confu-
cian Committee, which will in turn select the Grand Academy Libationer by 
anonymous ballot. The Grand Academy academicians can be appointed by the 
government, by popular nomination, by the modern civil service exam, or by 
the Grand Academy Libationer.37 The republic is presided over by a “symbolic 
monarch,” Duke Yansheng, representing the “national essence” and acting to 
protect and promote China’s spiritual welfare, historical continuity, sanctity, 
dignity, values, and loyalty.38
Before ending the discussion of Jiang Qing’s constitutional Confucianism, 
it should be pointed out that Jiang’s ideas are similar to those already put into 
practice in Iran’s Islamic Republic, with Confucianism replacing Islam as the 
founding principle. As briefly outlined above, the power relations among the 
tricameral legislature, the Grand Academy Directorate, and the republic under 
a symbolic monarch are so complex as to make Jiang’s plan seem infeasible. It is 
true that the modern democratic electoral system easily slides into vulgar or pop-
ulist politics, but can we believe that the appointment methods of the House of 
Profound Confucians, the House of the Nation, and the Grand Academy really 
avoid the exchange of favors and arbitrary decisions by individuals? More impor-
tant, it must be asked whether China currently possesses the necessary histori-
cal and social conditions for the implementation of this kind of system. On one 
level, it seems to be nothing more than a utopian fantasy. Attempting to restore 
Confucianism to the status of national ideology in modern China would be very 
much like attempting to restore the ideal of Caesaropapism in the West, which 
renders the scheme an impractical and temporally dislocated exercise.
Jiang Qing appears to be dissatisfied with Western democracy, but would 
he really prefer a return to monarchic or aristocratic rule? Jiang describes his 
ideal “Chinese-style political system” as the “Kingly Way of Politics,” “ritual 
government,” “nonaction government,” or “great unity government,”39 and it 
appears that he has no intention of returning China to an absolute monarchy. 
He admits that “from a historical perspective, ever since the Han dynasty, politi-
cal thought has been dominated by classical texts, and to a large extent Confu-
cianism has been transformed into a political ideology solely in the service of 
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the monarch—that is to say, politicized Confucianism has become dominant, 
and the tradition of political Confucianism has nearly disappeared.”40 In other 
words, Jiang’s model of a “Chinese form of government” is a utopian ideal that 
has never been put into practice in the entire history of China. It consists of 
abstract principles with no specific content. Jiang repeatedly insists that the 
political rationality on which political Confucianism is based, as opposed to 
the moral rationality that underlies mind-and-nature Confucianism, has a real, 
objective existence,41 yet all he seems to offer as a solution is a utopian vision. 
Can we not hope for more?
The utopian nature of Jiang’s political Confucianism can also be seen in 
his criticism of Mou Zongsan, who appealed to “the self-negation of liangzhi 
[original knowing]” to explain the practical necessity of “developing democracy 
out of Confucianism.” In his critique of this New Confucian project, Jiang also 
criticizes Mou Zongsan’s “self-negation of liangzhi,” asserting that liangzhi can 
only be “presence” but cannot “negate itself ” and that Mou’s ideas violate Wang 
Yangming’s “theory of liangzhi.” Jiang’s suggestion is to
apply Yangming’s “direct outer kingliness” to modern situations and 
create an age of charismatic Confucian “sage kings” to reenchant what 
Weber has called a “disenchanted” age devoid of prophets. In that way 
the possibility of achieving inner sagehood and outer kingliness would be 
opened up today, attaining virtue and becoming a sage—the traditional 
ideals of Confucian ethical philosophy. That is to say, to turn Wang 
Yangming’s efforts to extend liangzhi and recover one’s original mind, 
and thereby to attain sagehood, into more than just conceptual exercises 
and empty talk.42
Could this be the “political rationality” that Jiang is so insistent upon? In this 
passage, he admits that Wang Yangming’s ethical philosophy can be put to use 
in the present day; but isn’t this at odds with the sharp distinction he previously 
made between mind-and-nature Confucianism and political Confucianism?
By comparison, the democratic way supported by the New Confucians is 
more indicative of a “political rationality.” The modern Western democratic sys-
tem may be a historical contingency, but it is continually being refined in the 
crucible of history. Over the past several hundred years, Chinese intellectuals 
and the Chinese people have struggled for democracy not solely because of pres-
sure from powerful Western cultures but by their own rational choice. Recog-
nizing democracy as a common ideal for all people is not inimical to developing 
democratic practice in harmony with the Chinese tradition, nor is it equivalent 
to abandoning what is essentially Chinese and surrendering to Western culture. 
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